Made in China : the rise of the Chinese domestic firms in the information industry by Fan, Peilei, 1972-
Made in China:
The Rise of the Chinese Domestic Firms in the Information Industry
by
Peilei Fan
M.S. Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, MIT
Master in City and Regional Planning, Rutgers University
B.S. Computer Science, Nanjing University, P.R. China
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in Economic Development
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
September 2003
Peilei Fan
All Rights Reserved
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly paper
and electronic copies of this thesis document in whole or in part
Signature of Author
Peilei Fan
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
September 2003
Certified by
Karen R. Polenske
Professor of Regional Political Economy and Planning
Dissertation Supervisor
Accepted by
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY
JAN 16 2004
LIBRARIES
Department
Frank Levy
Chairman, Ph.D. Committee
of Urban Studies and Planning
ROTCH;8
Abstract
This research uses a multi-case analysis approach to study China's catching-up as a late-
industrialized economy in the information and communications technology (ICT)
industries. The significant contributions of this study are: the staged catching-up theory
framework, the findings from the cases, and the policy implications.
This study contributes to the late-industrialization literature by filling its theoretical gap-
how domestic firms can catch up when there is strong MNC presence and what is the role
of innovation capability. I develop a staged catching-up theory that can be used as a
framework to analyze the successful catching-up process of domestic firms in a late
industrialized economy while facing strong MNC presence. The theory describes the
behavior of domestic firms, the behavior of MNCs, and the role of government, as well as
the spatial implications of each stage.
The case studies prove that Chinese domestic firms in the information industries have
followed a path of catching-up that can be described by the staged catching-up theory,
and innovation capability and self-developed technologies were the ultimate driving force
that has enabled leading domestic firms to catch up with the MNCs in the telecom-
equipment and PC manufacturing industries. This research validates that government
involvement has rewarded the companies' efforts in building innovation capability and
developing proprietary technologies.
This research has implications for how China can catch up, especially through developing
domestic firms' innovation capabilities, in high-tech manufacturing areas despite the
strong presence of MNCs. Also relevant is how other countries or regions, either late
industrializing countries or less-developed regions in developed countries, can use the
findings from this research to facilitate the development of their local firms in high tech
industries. The research stresses that domestic firms should prioritize building innovation
capability from the very beginning to ramp up their competitiveness and to survive in the
filtration stage, even though its benefit may not be so distinguished in the growth stage.
It also suggests domestic firms focus on in-house R&D development to build their
innovation capability, supplemented with external alliances, since the latter's
effectiveness is conditional on the strength of the former.
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Chapter 1.Introduction
1 Introduction
This study is about China's catching-up as a late-industrialized economy in the
information and communication technology (ICT) industry. In the realm of late
industrialization, much research has been done to explain what could be the causes for
countries like the newly industrialized economies (NIEs) to take off. Most debates have
focused on the role of the government versus the market (Patrick 1977; Chen, 1979;
Aikman, 1986; Friedman, 1980; Fei, 1983; Berger 1979; Saxonhouse, 1985; Bhagwati,
1988; Hasan 1976; Mason 1980; OECD 1972; Rosovsky 1972; Amsden, 1989; Wade,
1990; Singh, 1992; Sakakibara and Cho, 2002).
Some other theorists proposed technology-based views to examine the trajectory of
developing countries in terms of catching up with the advanced countries. In the context
of import substitution, Leonard-Barton (1995) described a bottom-up model that starts
from import kits, progresses to localization of parts and components, then to product
redesign, and finally to the stage of product design. For the export-led East Asian NIEs
(Hobday, 1995), the linear model goes from cheap labor assembling, to the second stage
of original equipment manufacturing (OEM), then to original design manufacturing
(ODM), and finally to original brand-name manufacturing (OBM). The linear trajectory
of technology learning characterized by following the footsteps of the forerunners is
consistent with the product life cycle theory (Vernon, 1966).
More recently, latecomers have been observed that do not follow the path or the linear
trajectory of technology learning. The fact that every country is a beginner for the newly
emerging techno-economic paradigm (Schumpeter, 1942) implies that latecomers can
catch up with more advanced countries by leapfrogging or direct innovation at the
technological frontier (Perez, 1988), as was illustrated by the catching up of Korea's
CDMA mobile phone industry (Lee and Lim, 2001).
In the case of China, some studies have implicitly followed the bottom-up/path-following
model to analyze China's catching up in various industries (Fainstein and Howe, 1997;
Naughton, 1997). Some other studies (Shen, 1999; Lu, 2000; Xu, 2002) analyzed the rise
of domestic firms in the telecom equipment and computer industries and emphasize self-
developed technologies for their development.
Reviewing the development history of China's three ICT industries (telecom-equipment,
PC, and cell phone), I noticed that domestic manufacturers have achieved a remarkable
success in catching up vis-a-vis the multinational corporations (MNCs) in terms of
gaining domestic market share. This experience is unique because few latecomers were
successful in catching up when there was a strong MNC presence. Japanese or Korean
firms as latecomers succeeded in catching up, but they did not face a strong MNC
presence in their domestic market at the time. In addition, domestic firms focused on
innovation rather than imitation during the catch up process.
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The theoretical debates mentioned above disagree on whether or not latecomer
manufacturers should prioritize in self-developed technologies, especially innovation
capability, or should focus on imitating or assimilating somewhat obsolete technologies
of more advanced countries. For this research, I focus on studying how innovation
capability has played a role in Chinese domestic firms' catching up with the MNCs.
Thus I form the following research question and study three groups of Chinese
manufacturers in the ICT industries:
What have been the roles of innovation in promoting the catching-up by domestic firms to
MNCs in China's ICT industries? How have the leading domestic firms acquired that
innovation capability and what has been the role of the government during the process?
Acquiring innovation capability here refers to improving the ability for innovation and
self-developed technologies, which is in direct contrast to the strategies of imitating or
assimilating obsolete technologies of more advanced countries. In this research, I study
leading domestic firms of the information industry in the People's Republic of China
(China) from the middle 1980s to 2002 to contribute to this understanding. I develop a
"staged catching-up theory" that helps in analyzing the catching up process of domestic
firms in late industrializing countries.
Three sectors of nationally owned companies studied in this paper are:
telecommunication (telecom) equipment, cell phone, and Personal Computer (PC)
manufacturing. Telecom-equipment manufacturing consists of five sub-sectors:
transmission systems, switching systems, access systems, data communications, and
mobile communications. Mobile communications includes both equipment for mobile
base stations and handset manufacturing. In this research, I divide domestic telecom-
equipment manufacturers into two groups: telecom-equipment manufacturers and cell-
phone manufacturers. The telecom-equipment manufacturers are firms, such as Huawei,
Zhongxing, DaTang, and Julong that make products in all or most of the five subsectors
mentioned. The cell-phone manufacturers are firms, such as Eastern Telecom, Haier,
Hisense and TCL that mainly produce cell phones and have few products in other
subsectors of the industry.
Telecom-equipment manufacturers have grown rapidly in the last two decades. In the
1980s, China relied nearly 100% on imports for its acquisition of telecommunication
equipment (Zhang, 2000). Within two decades, domestic telecom-equipment
manufacturers have progressed to hold a significant market share of the industry,
especially in switching systems, access systems, and transmission systems. Successful
domestic firms, such as Huawei, Zhongxing, DaTang, and Julong have become sources
of national pride (Xin, 2000).
Within a short period of four years, domestic cell-phone producers have achieved a
remarkable growth since they entered the market in the late 1990s: they rose from
holding less than 3.2% of the domestic market share in 1999 (Xin, 2000) to around 51.3%
for the months of January to April 2003. The fast rate of growth is outstanding because
foreign firms had dominated the cell-phone market since the market started to grow in
China in the late 1990s. For instance, in 1999, three leading foreign companies,
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Motorola, Nokia, and Ericsson, together held around 82.7% of the market share (31.9%,
29.4%, and 21.4%, respectively).'
Like the other two groups of manufacturers, domestic PC manufacturers have grown
rapidly in recent years. Despite fierce competition imposed from their foreign rivals,
such as IBM, Compaq, and Hewlett-Packard, domestic firms have won more than half of
the PC market share, increasing from less than 30% in 1991 (Lu, 2000, p.1) to
approximately 86% in 2000 (ING BARINGS, 2000). Legend, the largest domestic
producer, alone held a 30% domestic PC market share in 2001 (Legend, 2002). In 2002,
most of the ten largest PC producers in China were domestic producers (MII, 2003).
Within this context, I offer the following hypotheses to answer the research questions:
Innovation capability and self-developed technologies have been the driving force to
Chinese domestic firms' catching up with the MNCs and have determined who are the
leading domestic firms in these industries. Government involvement has rewarded the
leading companies' efforts in building innovation capability and developing proprietary
technologies.
The rest of the material is organized as follows: I start with a review of late
industrialization and staged theories of industrial evolution in Chapter 2. Chapter 3
introduces the staged catching-up theory and its spatial manifestation. Chapter 4 reviews
the role of the government in late industrialization. Chapter 5 presents the methodology.
Chapters 6-10 are case analyses: chapters 6 and 7 cover telecom-equipment
manufacturers; Chapters 8 and 9 cover PC manufacturers, and chapter 10 addresses cell-
phone manufactures. Chapter 11 states the conclusion.
'Meanwhile, Siemens, Phillips, and Toshiba had 14.1% of the market share.
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Chapter 2. Late Industrialization
2 Late Industrialization
How can late industrializing countries develop their high tech industries via nationally
owned firms? I start with theories that offer opportunities for developing countries in
today's economy. Next, I examine the main strategies that have been used or proposed
for late industrialization. Then, I review efforts to understand industrialization in
dynamic perspective, such as stage theory, product cycle, profit cycle, and MNC-assisted
growth theories. These theories have provided nutrition in building the theory of staged
catching-up. I move on to introduce a view of late industrialization that emphasizes the
role of a trio of actors: domestic companies, MNCs, and the host government. The
staged catching-up theory focuses on these three actors and their interactions during the
different stages of industrial development.
2.1 Opportunities for Latecomers
Do developing countries have an opportunity to catch up, especially in high-tech
industries? Several theorists have offered positive answers. As early as 1942,
Schumpeter mentioned "creative destruction," a notion that seems to fit perfectly as a
description of what is happening in today's economy -- new technologies, business
models, and architectures are simultaneously destroying old sources of value, while
creating new opportunities for profit. It is this shift of the technological paradigm that
suggests opportunities for latecomers.
More specifically, information and communication technologies are increasingly taking
the form of configurational technologies since both modular design and the use of open
standards can facilitate the substitution of internal components (Williams 1997). Shen
(1999) distinguishes three types of technologies. First are discrete technologies: stand-
alone technologies designed to carry out specific and common functions independent of
context. An example is a word processor or computer-controlled machine tool. Second
are system technologies: these typically relate to a wider range of activities than discrete
technologies, and are thus more tightly linked to particular application settings. System
technologies typically need to be adapted for use in developing countries in order to fit
them to their different requirements and circumstances. System technologies, such as
certain telecom-switching systems, tend to be rather rigid in their construction and may
be difficult or costly to adapt. Finally, there are configurational technologies. These
technologies match the complexity of systems technologies (in the range of applications
for which they can be used), but are designed to allow great flexibility in development
and application. Development costs are reduced by drawing upon existing component
technologies, which can be selected according to the particular uses of the final product.
This allows developing countries to reconfigure such solutions to their local needs and
exigencies. The existence of configurational technologies extends the scope for
recipient-side innovation because it makespossible foreign technologies to be locally
configured to meet local criteria.
Although Schumpeter and Williams offered theoretical evidence of opportunities for
latecomers, it is difficult for domestic firms in developing countries to utilize the
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opportunities effectively -the competition is fierce because of the coexistence of domestic
firms and MNCs. Neither author discusses specifically how domestic companies can
compete in the presence of MNCs.
The telecom-equipment, cell-phone, and PC-manufacturing sectors studied in this
research are industries that have risen amid the shift of the technological paradigm
described by Schumpeter. Moreover, the technological development of these industries
has increasingly taken the form of configuration technologies. For instance, in the optical
transmission sub sector, there is less vertical integration than in other industries, and
optical component suppliers are clearly separated from the system providers.
Furthermore, the component suppliers offer better component integration to the system
providers (Smith-Gillespie, 2001). Seizing the opportunities, China's telecom-equipment,
cell phone, and PC manufacturing producers did achieve a certain level of industrial
competitiveness despite fierce competition with the MNCs. I seek a theoretical
framework to explain the successful competition of domestic firms in the presence of the
MNCs.
First, how do companies compete? Based on research in ten leading trading nations, in a
four-year study, Porter (1990) reached the conclusion that companies achieve competitive
advantage through acts of innovation. He proposed a "diamond" model as a new way to
understand the competitive position of a nation in global competition, saying that a
nation's capacity to innovate is affected by four broad attributes: (1) factor conditions; (2)
demand conditions; (3) related and supporting industries; and (4) firm strategy, structure,
and rivalry. However, Porter did not specifically analyze competitiveness developed by
latecomers; instead, he focused on industrial competitiveness achieved by developed
countries. This research, on the other hand, will focus on latecomers' competitiveness
and study their building of innovation capability.
2.2 Strategies for Catching-up
Several main strategies were proposed for or found in late-industrializing countries: the
bottom-up linear model, the path model, and the latecomer advantage and disadvantage
model. Underneath these models are prescriptions for how late industrialized countries
can effectively catch up.
Bottom-up Linear Model
The bottom-up linear model describes a progressive, path-following pattern for
latecomers to catch up. In the context of import substitution, Leonard-Barton (1995)
described a bottom-up model that starts from import kits, progresses to localization of
parts and components, then to product redesign, and finally to the stage of product design.
In the context of export-led East Asian newly industrialized economies (NIEs) (Hobday,
1995; Johnstone, 1989), the linear model goes from cheap labor assembling, to the
second stage of original equipment manufacturing (OEM), then to original design
manufacturing (ODM), and finally to original brand name manufacturing (OBM).
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Hobday (1995) explains that the reason the bottom-up linear model takes root is that
many developing countries are isolated from (1) main international sources of technology
and (2) international markets.
Path Model
To explain the process of innovation capability building in selected industries in Korea,
Lee and Lim (2001) found three different patterns of catching-up: (1) path- following (PC,
consumer electronics, and machine tools); (2) path-skipping (DRAM, auto); and (3) path-
creating (CDMA and mobile phone). The path-skipping and path- creating could be
interpreted as "leapfrogging" in terms of catch-up. Their findings point out other, though
radically different, alternatives for latecomers to catch up. I found that even though
China's ICT industries have some characteristics described by the path-skipping and
path-creating patterns, the whole process of catching up is much more complicated and a
staged catching-up theory is needed to analyze an industry's development in various
stages.
One of Lee and Lim's findings that caught my attention is that important R&D projects
(except in the automobile industry) involved both private and public capability and that
entry was driven not by an endogenous generation of knowledge and skills, but by
collaboration with foreign companies. This implies collaboration with foreign companies
is more important than endogenous R&D development. Contrary to this conclusion, , I
have found that the innovation capability of Chinese firms was mainly driven by internal
investment in R&D, and collaboration with foreign companies is secondary. This is
discussed in detail in chapter 7.
Latecomer Advantage and Disadvantage Model
Rather than focusing on disadvantages, the latecomer advantage and disadvantage model
provides a more balanced analysis. By examining three Japanese and three Korean
semiconductor companies, Cho, Kim, and Rhee (1998) identify and categorize successful
latecomer strategies into two groups: strategies for overcoming latecomer disadvantages
and strategies for utilizing latecomer advantages. Strategies for overcoming
disadvantages include focusing on specific area, thin margin or loss bearing, and volume
building, whereas strategies for utilizing advantages include odd timing, time
compression, human-embodied technology transfer, benchmarking, technological
leapfrogging, and resource leveraging.
Amsden and Chu (2002) stated that to utilize the second-mover advantage, companies
should: (1) exploit scale economies with market concentration because product maturity
leads to declining profit margin and standardization; (2) exploit economies of scale and
scope, especially those that are unique to latecomers (e.g., information, signaling, and
risk); (3) upscale their project execution skills by investing internally in managerial and
technological capabilities (for nationally owned companies) for efficient operation of
large-scale facilities; (4) ramp up extremely fast to grow from small to large using
resources available in de-bugged technology, capital, and human resources; and (5)
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displace foreign-owned firms by nationally owned firms (a kind of de-globalization) as
skills grow stronger.
China's Catching-up Models
Some studies have implicitly followed the bottom-up/path-following model to analyze
China's catching up in various industries (Fainstein and Howe, 1997; Naughton, 1997).
In contrast to the liner bottom-up model, Lu (2000) argues that China's computer
industry has followed a top-down approach (starting with product redesign/design, then
walking up or down the ladder) because it has a strong science and technology base and a
large domestic industry to break the barriers to the top-down model.
2.3 A Dynamic Perspective
Theories that suggest a recurring, recognizable path or pattern of development can help
us to understand the evolution and development of industries and the nature of the
competition at the various stages of the industries. In this sense, they provide us a
dynamic perspective of industrialization. Rostow (1991) used historical evidence to
identify the stages of development of nations, from traditional society to mature ones
with high levels of material consumption. According to the stage theory, economic
variables, as well as social and cultural characteristics, affect the rate and manner of
progressing through these stages. It also suggests that developing countries that have
accumulated a critical amount of capital and technology can reach a "takeoff' point in
their growth trajectories. Beyond that point, the growth and stability of the countries will
depend on their ability to employ existing and emerging technologies.
The product-cycle model (Kuznets, 1930; Burns, 1934) describes an evolutionary
development path for individual sectors. The output has a bell-shaped curve over time,
with the highest output after the initial state. Vernon (1966) further expanded the
product-cycle model by examining how product innovation and the subsequent transfer
of production technology determined the pattern of trade between two countries--an
industrialized country, which produces only products that have been recently innovated
(new goods), and a less-developed country, which produces only products for which the
production technology is internationally available (old goods).
Markusen's profit-cycle model (1985) argues that individual industrial sectors develop
along a recognizable path in which profit and other economic variables (such as
employment, firm entry, market power, and occupational structure) change in a
predictable fashion. Corresponding to each stage are the distinct spatial tendencies of the
sector. Profit-cycle theory incorporates Schumpeterian and Marxist work on innovation
and capitalist dynamics, Mandel's superprofits, product-cycle theories of business
economists, and the oligopolistic model from industrial organization.
Profit-cycle theory divides each industry's development into five sequential stages
according to profitability: zero profits, super profits, normal profits, normal-plus or
normal-minus profits, and negative profits. The zero-profit stage corresponds to the
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initial birth and design stage of an industry. The super-profit stage corresponds to the
stage when the firms in the industry can obtain super profits from their innovative edge
and the absence of immediate competition. The normal-profit stage corresponds to the
stage of open entry, movement toward market saturation, and absence of substantial
market power. The normal-plus or normal-minus profit stage corresponds to the post-
saturation stage, where either successful oligopolization boosts profits again, or predatory
and excessive competition squeezes profit. The negative-profit stage corresponds to the
obsolescence stage of the sector.
Key variables across the profit cycle are investment, output, and employment. In
addition, the numbers of plants and companies present in the sector over time,
concentration ratios, and occupational composition are important variables of the profit-
cycle model.
2.4 Theory of MNC-assisted Growth
Ozawa (2000) presents an analytical framework to examine co-evolutionary changes in a
country's (especially a catching-up country's) economic structure within the context of
the global economy. A quadruple hierarchical paradigm along the axes of industries,
factors of production, consumption, and countries was presented. He pointed out that
MNCs' firm-specific assets (product and process technologies, organizational and
managerial skills, and market networks and capacities) could serve as powerful driving
forces for economic development in host countries. Government can function as a
macro-organizational facilitator. Both MNCs and government serve as catalysts for
structural upgrading.
2.5 Trinity of Industrial Development
Rostow's stage theory suggests "takeoff' opportunities for developing countries when
they can accumulate needed capital and technology. Though relevant in helping us
understand the general context of late industrialization, the framework that he provided is
too general for this study, because we focus on only high-tech industry's catch up with
the MNCs. Meanwhile, the product lifecycle model indicates a path-follower pattern for
catching-up, and it focuses on the pattern of output rather than the motivation or behavior
of the decision maker. The profit-cycle model explains why MNCs have a strong
presence globally, along with the challenges faced by latecomers to break the stage
barriers. Markusen's profit-cycle theory has successfully characterized the industrial
process in the United States. Although the development path of industrial sectors in
developing nations can also be characterized by the five stages of the profit-cycle model,
analysts cannot use the this model directly for industrial sectors in developing countries
without modification.
Ozawa's theory has realistically incorporated MNCs and the government into catching-up
economies' industrial upgrading in a general sense. However, even though Ozawa
mentions that the government can function as a macro-organizational facilitator, he does
not give further description and examples of what government can do. In addition,
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domestic producers are completely missing in his theory. Furthermore, Ozawa's
framework focuses on a rather macro level, i.e., the structural upgrading of a country.
It would be of more value to use a sectorial approach to examine at the industry level
how domestic firms could catch up within a context where MNCs and government can
serve as catalysts. Thus, taking elements from profit-cycle theory and the theory of
MNC-assisted growth, I propose a "staged catching-up theory." This is a sectorial
analytical framework for investigating domestic producers' development in catching-up
economies, which emphasizes the role of three actors: domestic producers, the host
government, and MNCs.
Domestic firms survive in an environment where the government and MNCs interact with
each other. This ongoing interaction determines two important variables: (1) the degree
of state control and (2) the penetration degree of MNCs. The degree of state control is a
synthesis variable for many indicators. Generally we can look at two types of control
exercised by the government: (1) over imports and (2) over setup of manufacturing units
by foreign firms. Thus, we can divide the industrial environment into three categories
according to the degree of government control:
* Case I. Complete control of the domestic market
* Case II. Some intermediate degree of control of domestic market
e Case III. No control of domestic market (totally free market)
In Case I, the government exercises complete control of the market. There are high
barriers for import of goods and no allowance for MNCs' manufacturing units, and few
domestic consumers will be able to buy foreign products because of the scarcity and high
price of those products. The sector will consequently have a normal sectorial path as
described by Markusen. Development may lag one or two stages behind developed
countries, but it will have a faster pace- Case I may describe some industries in certain
developing economies, but it was not the situation for China's information industry. At
the beginning of the reforms in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Chinese government
did not stop the market penetration of foreign products. As a consequence, like most
developing countries, China had a stage when no domestic production occurred and the
consumers of products relied on imports. At later stages, although the government
increased tariffs, it still allowed MNCs to set up manufacturing units.
For most developing countries, the government is weak, i.e., it can exercise only a limited
degree of control, or sometimes simply none, as Case II and Case III reflect. For Case II
or Case III, if MNCs are allowed to set up manufacturing units, then the sectorial path is
much more complicated because we have two groups of firms in the host country:
indigenous firms and MNC-controlled firms. From the perspective of MNCs, the host
country is an international dispersion location for the MNCs when they are in the normal
or normal-plus/minus stage of the profit cycle of the sector.
However, the indigenous firms may do one or both of the following: (1) seek short-term
profit by producing mass quantities to satisfy the large present demand, (2) seek long-
term profit by using current profits to develop their innovation capability, so as to
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increase their future competitiveness. Examples of the first case are consumer electronics
(e.g., TV) in China: most firms in the sector have experienced only a very short period of
super-profit, after which their profits decline to normal. Examples of the latter are the
Chinese fixed telecom-equipment producers. In both cases, interaction among the
government, MNCs, and domestic firms are complicated and will result in different
dynamics at various stages.
The following chapter (Chapter 3) provides an analytical framework to describe this
dynamic process of industrial development, especially the process that domestic firms
usually go through during the catching up given certain background and preconditions.
Further, a framework for understanding the spatial behavior of the industry is also
presented in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3. Staged Catching-up Theory
3 Staged Catching-up Theory
This chapter presents a staged catching-up theory to describe the dynamic process of late
industrialization when there is presence of multinational corporations (MNCs). At each
stage, I analyze the characteristics of the market, the behavior of domestic firms, the role
of the government, and the behavior of MNCs.
This framework incorporates insights from the following sources that were reviewed in
the previous chapter: Schumpeterian growth dynamics, staged theory, product-cycle
theory, Markusen's profit-cycle theory, and Ozawa's theory of MNC-assisted growth.
3.1 The Theory
Continuous efforts in improving innovation capabilities of domestics firms by both the
firms and the government can lead the domestic firms' catch up with the multinational
corporations (MNCs). I describe this process by a sequence of four characteristic stages:
* Preparation stage: prior to the birth of the industry in the host country (only MNCs
appears in the market);
* Growth stage: the stage of highest-profit rates for producers -- domestic firms are
born and grow in different segments of the industry from MNCs;
" Filtration stage: the stage where the market moves towards saturation; decreasing
profits eliminate less competent domestic firms;
* Globalization stage: the post-saturation stage of the domestic market, when domestic
firms become MNCs themselves, thus finalizing their catching-up process.
These sequential temporal stages of the catching-up process correspond to different
behaviors of domestic firms, MNCs, and the host government. They also manifest
different spatial patterns.
3.2 Stage I: Preparation Stage
The first stage corresponds to the preparation for the catching-up process, which could
also be called the pre-birth of the national industry. The prelude starts when the host
country allows the MNCs to enter its market, either through foreign direct investment
(FDI) or, in the case of China, by imports of foreign goods of various industries. In
China, this occurred in the 1980s, when the country just started its "Open-Door" policy
and the economy was transitioning from a traditional closed planning system to an open-
market economy.
MNCs generally start with exporting finished products to the host country to explore the
new market. But they may progress further to set up their own manufacturing sites in the
host country to take advantage of local resources for production.
The government plays a large role in this stage by allowing the appearance of MNCs in
the domestic market, though serious constraints might still be imposed on MNCs. In
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China, during the transition from the planned economy, the government was quite
conservative in dealing with foreign companies and exercised high control over MNCs
compared to other open economies.
Some domestic firms are established to benefit from the appearance of the MNCs by
engaging in the trading business or acting as their sales agents. These experiences can
provide them with chances to become acquainted with the foreign products and to
prepare for entering into the market when the time is ready.
3.3 Stage II: Growth Stage
Market demand starts to soar. The industry is in the highest profit-rate stage in the host
country. After the exploration in the first stage, the MNCs start systematically to export
their major products to the market of the host country. Some of them start to set up their
manufacturing sites in the host country. At this stage, the MNCs mostly focus on only
major segments of the host country's market, thus leaving some room for domestic
producers to grow.
Attracted by the high profits of the industry, domestic firms start to enter the available
segments of the market. Many domestic firms grow fast during this stage. These small
firms compete with a variety of strategies. Because of the market segmentation, the
domestic firms differentiate their products (ala monopolist competition); thus, the
domestic producers are not directly confronted with the MNCs.
At this stage, three types of government intervention are vital: import control, foreign
direct investment (FDI) control, and specific industrial policy. First, import control
directly affects the export decisions of MNCs. Second, if the country has a great market
potential and certain advantageous production factors, the MNCs are motivated to set up
their manufacturing units in the country. If they are allowed, they will try to do this
through wholly owned subsidiaries, or, if they are not allowed to set up this type of plant,
they will enter into joint ventures. (Fan, 2001) High import control will further enhance
this tendency. Third, the government can have specific industrial policies to protect
certain segments of an industry so that they will not be dominated by MNCs, thus
ensuring that domestic firms will have some room to grow.
3.4 Stage IlIl: Filtration Stage
Market demand continues to soar. While certain subsectors' profits drop to normal, the
industry expands and maintains super profits in newly expanded subsectors. Domestic
producers and MNCs compete head-to-head at this stage. Their competition in the same
market segments may be due to one of two possibilities: MNCs expand into the
segments that used to be occupied solely by the domestic producers; or, domestic
producers expand outside their original market segment and compete directly with the
MNCs in originally MNC-dominated segments.
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Because their dominant position is threatened or changed, MNCs have to drop prices for
products in those segments where domestic producers have entered. Profit in those
subsectors has declined from super to normal. MNCs might successfully cooperate with
some domestic firms (for instance, IBM and Alcatel cooperated with Chinese firms to set
up IBM-Great Wall joint ventures and Shanghai Bell), thus transforming their operations
in the host country to become part in the MNCs' global production chain. At this stage,
MNCs have a much better comprehension of the business environment of the host
country. They focus on localization of their manufacturing and sales functions in the host
country. They even start to move some high-end R&D functions (mostly oriented to
later stages of product development) to the host country.
Facing MNCs with advanced technologies and large scales of production, weak domestic
producers are quickly filtered out of the market. Only very competitive domestic
producers survive this fierce competition. The surviving domestic firms have core
competencies in areas such as technological capacity, managerial and organizational
skills, and marketing network and capability. These producers know their advantages
and disadvantages vis-a-vis the MNCs. The domestic producers focus on developing the
core competencies, at which the MNCs are strong, while they maintain their advantages
in the local market, such as after-sales services, etc.
The government can assist the industry to enter the filtration stage and make domestic
firms better prepared. First, the government can facilitate this competition by removing
the barriers, if any, previously created to protect the domestic producers. On the other
hand, the government may use certain industrial policies, such as customer coordination
for domestic producers, financial support, R&D support, etc., to strengthen the positions
of domestic producers in the competition.
3.5 Stage IV: Globalization Stage
The competition in the domestic market becomes fiercer, even more than in the
international market. In terms of R&D, domestic firms directly cooperate with
international partners who have world-leading technologies. Domestic producers start to
explore the international market by exporting to external markets, seeking foreign capital
through foreign equity markets, or setting up manufacturing sites inforeign countries. In
this sense, domestic producers become MNCs themselves and thus finalize the catching-
up process of the industry.
The original MNCs may leave for other markets if the market in the host country has
been saturated. They may also enhance their functions in the host country if there exist
some advantageous factors that are not easily replicable in other catching-up economies.
At this stage, as domestic producers become mature and more capable vis-a-vis the
MNCs, government intervenes less often. Most interventions from the government are
indirect, such as science and technology (S&T) projects to encourage the R&D
advancement of the domestic producers in the industry. The government may assist
domestic producers' endeavors in the international market. For instance, the State
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Council and Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) greatly facilitated Great
Dragon's exporting to Russia.
3.6 Key Variables across the Staged Catching-up Process
In Table 3.1, I summarize the change in the sector across the four stages, using the same
sectorial features as that of Markusen's profit cycle theory (1985). These are: output,
price, cost, profitability; production features such as employment, occupation structure,
subcontracting, and advertising and sales; and industry structure features such as entry,
concentration, size of firm, vertical integration, and modal class of ownerships. These
features provide an aggregate picture of various business behaviors during the catching-
up process. This also makes it possible for me to compare the staged catching-up theory
and the profit-cycle model. Further, to distinguish between MNCs and domestic firms, I
have three sub-categories (total, MNCs, and domestic firms) for most of the features.
(See Table 3.1)
The evolution of the first several variables (output, price, cost, profitability) is product-
based, or broadly, sub-sector-based. A high-tech industry, such as telecom is
characterized by emerging new sub-sectors, with a certain time lag in between. So while
subsector A's products might be in the stage with a saturated market, dropping price and
profitability, sub-sector B's products might just be getting started with increasing demand,
and high profitability.
The evolution of the production features and industry structure are sectorial-oriented, i.e.,
these features represent industry's evolution or the catching up process more precisely.
We can see that domestic firms' employment growth and level are much more
dramatically changed than the MNCs. In terms of occupation structure, domestic firms
will keep a high R&D staff! total employee ratio all throughout the stages.
Variables of industrial structure have an interesting dynamic evolution. Throughout the
stages, domestic firm sizes keep expanding. Entry barrier changes from high in the
preparation stage to low in the growth stage, but starts to rise again in the filtration stage;
concentration changes similarly from high to low to high; With the staged catching-up
theory, the change of the variables is very easy to comprehend. Initially, as only large
MNCs exist in the domestic market, the entry barrier is high, as no domestic firm knows
how to enter the industry. During the growth stage, some opportunity, such as a segment
of the market with low barrier of entry, shows up, and many small domestic firms start to
enter the market, leading to a low concentration. During the filtration stage, competition
eliminates uncompetitive domestic firms, barrier to entry rises again, and strong firms
expand quickly, thus leading to high concentration again. These features carry further
into the globalization stage.
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Table 3.1Business Behavior During the Catch Up Process
Catch-up Stage Ownership Preparation Growth Filtration Globalization
Output, cost,
price, profits,
investment
Output
Level Total low moderate moderate/high igh/moderate
MNCs low moderate moderate/high moderate
Domestic n.a. ow/moderate moderate/high high/moderate
Growth Total moderate rapid+ moderate+ moderate+/moderate-
MNCs moderate rapid+ moderate+ slow/slow-
Domestic n.a. rapid++ Rapid moderate+/moderate-
Price
Level high high/moderate moderate/low stable to slow
Growth rapid- moderate- moderate- stable to slow
Unit Cost Total
MNCs high/moderate moderate Low low
Domestic n.a. high/moderate moderate to low low
Profitability
MNCs high high/moderate Moderate low/moderate-
Domestic n.a. high/moderate Moderate ow/moderate-
Production
Features
Capital/labor
ratio
Employment
Level MNCs low moderate moderate/high high to moderate
Domestic n.a. low Moderate moderate/high
Growth MNCs moderate rapid moderate+ slow/slow-
Domestic n.a. rapid++ Rapid moderate+/moderate-
Occupation
Structure
Engineering MNCs low low low/moderate low/moderate
Managerial MNCs high high moderate/high moderate
Production MNCs high high High high
Engineering Domestic n.a. moderate/high High high/moderate
Managerial Domestic n.a. low moderate to high high to moderate
Production Domestic n.a. low/moderate Moderate high
Subcontracting MNCs low moderate Moderate moderate to high
Domestic n.a. high Moderate moderate to high
Advertising, MNCs low low to moderate Moderate high to moderate
Sales
Domestic n.a. moderate moderate to high igh to moderate
Industry
Structure
Entry high to moderate low/moderate moderate to high high
Concentration high low/moderate moderate to high igh
Size of Firm MNCs large/medium large/medium Large large
Domestic n.a. small medium to large large
Vertical MNCs extensive extensive Modest modest
Integration
Domestic n.a. modest modest/extensive modest
Modal Class of MNCs corporate/conglomer orporate/conglom ::orporate/conglomer corporate/conglomerate
Ownership ate crate ate
Domestic n.a. orporate: single :orporate: multiplant corporate/conglomerate
plant
Source: The author, based upon the same features and conventions as in the profit-cycle theory (Markusen, 1985).
Chapter 3. Staged Catching-up Theory
3.7 Acquiring Innovation Capability
What kind of force drives the upgrade of domestic producers, thus pushing the domestic
industry to progress from one stage to another? Innovation capability is the driving force
that is behind the catching-up of market-share of domestic firms. Throughout the stages
of the catching-up process, only those who have innovation capability can exploit the best
of the opportunity. In the growth stage, innovation capability is reflected in the
company's capability to identify and develop products in segments different from the
MNCs' market. In the filtration stage, the importance of innovation capability is
demonstrated by the fact that self-developed technology is necessary for domestic
companies to compete against the MNCs in the same market. In the globalization stage,
improving innovation capability to the level of the MNCs becomes more urgent, because
domestic firms need to satisfy the sophisticated requests from customers in other markets.
How do the domestic firms acquire their innovation capability throughout the stages of
development? I view two preconditions as vital. First, the industry itself should not be a
mature industry, i.e., the industry should still be in the process of creating numerous
innovations, as with telecom-equipment. Second, the firms must be equipped with
resources for developing their innovation capability, either through state promotion of
R&D, or through firms' investment in R&D from their revenue, or through directly
acquiring other technologically advanced firms. Group advancement, i.e., a group of
domestic firms advancing their innovation capability together, along with research
institutes and universities, will be a very efficient way to supply such resources.
The first precondition is required because it provides a window of opportunity for
indigenous firms. Indigenous firms acquire their capabilities in the subfields that are
already a mature technology for MNCs (such as switching systems), but because of the
linkage between the subfields of the sector, if a new subfield emerges, they may be able
to leverage their ability to develop new products in the new subfields. In this sense,
continuous emergence of new subfields in the sector means continuous opportunities for
the indigenous firms to catch up with or even surpass the MNCs.
The second precondition is required because the development of innovation capability in
an emerging sector requires a huge amount of resources. Thus, the firms either have to
be extremely profitable, or they must have some other resources to invest in R&D, or
both. It is hard for firms that cannot even balance their account to invest 10% of their
revenue in R&D. As Markusen points out, state promotion of R&D could be very useful
to help the sector fulfill this precondition.
In-house R&D development, supplemented with external alliances, is the key channel for
domestic firms to build up their innovation capability. I need to emphasize that without a
major in-house R&D development effort, external alliance or other forms of technology
transfer will be less efficient, as internal development affects the ability to absorb the
transferred knowledge. Studies of large and medium-size enterprises in China's industry
have confirmed that technology transfer affects productivity only through its interaction
with in-house R&D (Hu, Jefferson, and Qian, 2003).
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Because of the disintegrated value chain, many international firms who have cutting-edge
technology and have specialized in certain aspects of the process are willing to cooperate
with domestic firms to benefit from the expanding market. By cooperating with these
international firms, domestic firms can obtain a short cut in catching-up with the
technological capabilities of the MNCs. Further, acquisition and merger may be
considered an effective way to advance innovation capabilities over the short term.
Though most small-to-medium firms are unable to afford such approaches, for large
companies who diversify into new fields of manufacturing, this will be a reasonable
choice.
If both preconditions are satisfied, indigenous firms can follow a spiral path between
super profits and normal profits as the sectors try to develop various products in different
subfields. In contrast, the MNC-controlled firms in the host country, serving only as the
production base for their parent companies, have hardly any of these dynamics.
3.8 Spatial Manifestation of the Catching-up
How is the catching-up process of domestic firms reflect in space, then? I derive the
spatial behavior of the industry that is corresponding to each stage.
Industrial location theory originated from concerns of early spatial analysts about
traditional basic costs of the industries. Prior to the 1960s, most location theorists
(Weber, 1929; Isard, 1956; Beckmann and Thisse, 1986) believed that basic costs, such as
transportation costs from supplier to market, access to material inputs, and the availability
or cost of labor were the dominant determinants of industrial location. This classical
location theory is also called Weberian location theory after Alfred Weber (1929), who
provided a method for finding the optimal location for a firm, given distance to raw
materials and the final market.
The basic cost factors have declined in their relative importance, as other location factors
became more important. Those other factors include technical competence of the labor
force, state and local taxes, regional business climates, and quality-of-life factors.
Markusen, Hall, and Glasmeier (1986) pointed out that because high-tech production does
not rely on either raw materials or a high value-to weight ratio, it does not necessarily use
the location calculus specified in the Weberian model. High-tech industries' locations are
usually determined by variables such as availability of skilled labor, proximity to
academic institutions, amenity and quality of life, etc., rather than the friction cost (Blair
and Premus, 1993).
From the viewpoint of economies of scale, Polenske (2002) has proposed two types of
economies of scale that may enhance regional growth, namely, agglomeration
economies/diseconomies and dispersal economies/diseconomies. In contrast to the
popular term of "agglomeration economies/diseconomies", she created "dispersal
economies/diseconomies" (2001). She proposed a clear investigation of these two factors
on regional development. For instance, using three cases - China's coke-making industry,
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Haier, and Chicago metal industry - Polenske and Li (2003) found supply chains produce
at least two types of dispersal economies -- transportation and inventory cost saving and
service-level improvement.
To link the dynamics of industrialization with location and the profit cycle, Markusen
(1985) derived the spatial behavior of sectors and the consequent regional location
patterns from the profit-cycle behavior: concentration, agglomeration, dispersion,
relocation, and abandonment. At the initial stage, the sector's location is confined to one
or a few locations. At the super-profit stage, firms tend to cluster with each other and
draw linked sectors and a skilled labor force to them at the initial site. In the third stage -
- the normal-profit stage -- as market competition and cutting costs become major
concerns of the firms, firms tend to disperse their additional production units from the
core, but the sites are closer to markets and have cheaper labor and land than the core.
The aggregate spatial outcome of the fourth stage, the normal-plus or normal-minus stage,
is relocation. The sector may close plants in one region while expanding production in
others. In the last stage, the negative-profit stage, firms retire their production.
3.9 Location Pattern of the Staged Catching-up
According to the staged catching-up theory, both domestic and MNC companies, but
especially domestic companies, have distinct resource requirements at various stages of
the catching-up model. Because regions are unequal in terms of market demand and
factor supply, their attractions for a business vary. I derive the hypothetical spatial
behavior of the sectors and the location pattern of firms from the catching-up model.
During the preparation stage, the sector generally is confined to one or a very few
locations, which I call "concentration." This is a direct result of MNCs' first
appearance in the host country's market. MNCs usually choose the areas where the
business environment is favorable (for instance, special economic zones,) as their starting
points for exploring the host country's market, either for exports or FDI. Domestic firms,
mostly involved in the trading business or acting as sales agents for foreign producers,
similarly favor locations with a good business environment (mostly special zones) or
wherever the foreign firms choose to place a hub for their operations in the host country.
In the growth stage, the sector is found to have operations in many sites of the country,
which I call "expansion." MNCs emphasize manufacturing capacity, usually expanding
their operations through relocating their manufacturing sites. Meanwhile, many small
domestic start-up firms begin to grow rapidly with a need for manufacturing capacity as
well as other resources. Locations of firms are not confined to a few sites, but expand to
many sites in regions with favorite business climates.
In the filtration stage, because decreasing profits eliminate less competent domestic firms,
the domestic firms diminish in numbers. However, the surviving domestic firms grow in
size. The sector is characterized by several large MNCs and several medium, but
competitive, domestic producers, all of which are multi-plant corporations. MNCs focus
on localization of their manufacturing and sales functions in the host country to decrease
their production costs. Similarly, concerned about market share and production costs,
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domestic firms expand their manufacturing capacity to achieve economies of scale. The
sector is found to have fewer locations, of larger scale, for manufacturing functions.
Furthermore, companies' R&D functions cluster in only a few locations where highly
skilled labor is concentrated. Because MNCs may move some high-end R&D functions
to the host country, they will choose locations for their R&D functions similar to those of
domestic firms to access the skilled labor pool. In addition, market access will be another
criteria because high-end R&D often involves close contact with the customers. I call this
phenomenon "consolidation," where manufacturing and R&D sites of firms congregate
in only a few locations. In contrast, both MNCs and domestic firms start to form a
relatively complete national sales network, though with regional concentrations.
In the last stage, the industry's location is found to span national borders, which I call
"globalization." Domestic firms become MNCs themselves and set up sales offices and
factories in foreign countries. They also establish their new R&D centers where the
cutting-edge knowledge is in order to utilize international professional expertise in
research and development. Adding of external locations for the R&D function is novel
compared to the MNCs from the developed countries, which relocated to developing
countries to take advantage of the low costs and the expanding markets.
Concentration, expansion, consolidation, and globalization are staged spatial
manifestations of firms and the industry during the catching-up process. The staged
theory provides insights in understanding what are the primary resources (marketing,
manufacturing, or R&D) that companies focus on developing in each stage, how that has
posed requirements for location, and what are the spatial manifestations of the industry.
On the other hand, firms' location decisions are a result of balancing agglomeration and
dispersal economies/diseconomies. For instance, when at the growth stage, companies
place a high priority on faster expansion of manufacturing capacity. Dispersal economies
prevail over agglomeration economies as many firms were established in different
locations. While in the filtration stage, agglomeration economies became more dominant
for manufacturing and R&D functions, because companies compete for manufacturing
capacity by economy of scale and strengthen their R&D functions by gathering in
locations of prominent knowledge network clusters. Factors important to dispersal
economies, such as cost saving of inventory, and transportation and service improvement,
are not essential to R&D. This leads to the spatial result that the R&D function of firms
only concentrated in a few locations. At the globalization stage, firms' R&D function
dispersed to global locations in a concentrated manner, i.e., even though the geographic
region has been extended, only certain locations are preferred. While at the same time,
firms' market function has always tended to disperse.
This chapter offers the staged catching-up theory that can be used as an analytical
framework to describe the dynamic process of the latecomers' catching-up. The driving
force behind the staged catching-up are continuous efforts in improving innovation
capabilities of domestic firms by both the firms and the government. This chapter also
derives the spatial behavior that corresponds to each stage.
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The following chapter (Chapter 3) provides an analytical framework to describe this
dynamic process of industrial development, especially the process that domestic firms
usually go through during the catching up given certain background and preconditions.
Further, a framework for understanding the spatial behavior of the industry is also
presented in Chapter 3.
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4 The Role of the Government in Late Industrialization
Among the research that has been done exploring the causes countries like the newly
industrialized economies (NIEs) take off, most debates have focused on the role of the
government versus the market (Patrick 1977; Chen, 1979; Aikman, 1986; Friedman, 1980;
Fei, 1983; Berger 1979; Saxonhouse, 1985; Bhagwati, 1988; Hasan 1976; Mason 1980;
OECD 1972; Rosovsky 1972; Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; Singh, 1992; Sakakibara and
Cho, 2002). Some focused on the role of the government in innovation capability
building for domestic firms (Bell and Pavitt, 1992; Freeman, 1987; Nelson, 1992;
Lundvall, 1992; Hobday, 1995)
This chapter reviews literature that focused on two central issues: (1) government vs.
market in late industrialization and (2) government role in innovation capability building.
4.1 Government Vs. Market
There are two variant neo-classical views to explain the East-Asian success: the free
market (FM) theory and the stimulated free-market (SFM) theory. Neoclassical theorists
see efficiency in resource use as the principal general force for economic growth. They
attribute the East-Asian success to the fact that the superior market in East Asia, with
fewer price distortions, produces a more efficient allocation of resources than markets in
other countries.
The FM theorists say that the East-Asian Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) do better
than other newly industrialized countries because the markets for goods and factors of
production were freer, i.e., the East-Asian states seldom interferes in the working of the
market.(Patrick, 1977; Chen, 1979; Aikman, 1986; Friedman, 1980; Fei, 1983).
The SFM theorists recognize the existence of market distortions and industrial policies in
East Asian, but say that industrial policies merely offset existing market distortions,
creating overall neutrality in resource allocation. (Berger, 1979; Saxonhouse, 1985;
Bhagwati, 1988)
In direct contrast with the neoclassical view, several earlier South Korea (Hasan 1976;
Mason 1980) and Japan (OECD, 1972; Rosovsky, 1972) analysts have emphasized the
directive role of the state in East Asia. Wade proposes a political-economy approach,
which he called government market (GM), that treats capital accumulation as the
principal general force for economic growth. According to the GM theory,2 the East-
Asian success is a result of a higher level and different composition of investment than in
less-successful countries. The difference in investment is due mostly to government
actions to constrain and accelerate the competitive progress, carried out by a relatively
authoritarian and corporatist state. (Wade, 1990, pp 26-27)
2 Wade's GM theory builds on both the idea of the development state (Johnson 1982; White 1988) and on
the older development economics' understanding of the nature of the development problem.
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Amsden (1989), on the other hand, specifically states that government policy makers
deliberately got some prices "wrong," so as to change the signals to which decentralized
market agents responded, and they also used non-price means to alter the behavior of
market agents. The resulting high level of investment generated fast turnover of
machinery, hence a fast transfer of newer technology into actual production.
Wade criticized that the FM and SFM theories are silent on the political arrangements
needed to support their policies. In contrast, he maintains that his GM theory has
emphasized the developmental virtues of a hard or soft authoritarian state in corporatist
relations with the private sector. A centralized bureaucracy was conferred with enough
autonomy to influence resource allocation in line with a long-term national interest, with
which short-term profit-maximizing sometimes is in conflict.
Wade rejects claims that the East-Asian success is a result of free-market principles or a
result from government intervention only. He states that the East-Asian success was
rooted in the way allocation decisions were divided between markets and public
administration and the synergy between them.
4.2 The Advocate Role of the State
In "Asia's Next Giant," Amsden (1989) examines the industrialization process of South
Korea. She explores state intervention, shop-floor management, and the big-business
group chaebol. She drew attention to the interesting phenomena that the government
imposes strict performance standards on those industries and companies that it aids. Her
analysis is very powerful evidence for the strong role of the state in economic
development.
Singh (1992) maintains that the superior performance of the Asian countries is due to the
fact that they are less subject to interest rate, demand, and capital-supply shocks of the
world market. He argues that it is the world-market force over which the developing
countries had no control that caused the crisis of economic development in the Third
World in the 1980s. Singh points out the flaws of the orthodox perspective on economic
policies of the success of the East-Asian NICs in 1980s. The orthodox perspective
attributes the success to the economic policies, such as extensive liberation policies,
privatization, deregulation, liberalization, and closer integration with the world economy
proposed by international financial institutions. Empirical evidence from Japan, Taiwan
(Sachs, 1987),3 and South Korea (Amsden, 1989) all support the role of the state and
negate the orthodox view.
Later in his critical analysis of the World Development Report (1991) of the World Bank,
Singh (1994) argues that the best way to promote industrialization and economic
development in many developing countries is for the government to pursue a vigorous
3 Sachs (1987) points out Taiwan is more heavily dependent on state-owned enterprises than any country in
Latin America (except Venezuela).
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"industrial policy." Government policymakers in Japan,4 , South Korea,5 and Taiwan,6
three of the fastest growth East Asian countries, have guided the market towards planned
structural change, and they integrated their economies with the world economy in the
directions and extent to which it was useful for them to do so. He criticized that the
report authors misinterpreted the East-Asian countries as having a neutral passive state
with a "market-friendly approach to development," or a deep integration with the world
economy.
4.3 The Role of the Government in improving Innovation
Capabilities
Amid the policy debate on industrial technology in developing countries, Bell and Pavitt
(1992) emphasized technological capability as a source of competitive advantage but
rejected the traditional wisdom that production capacity leads automatically to
technological capability. They point out that market-related institutions tend to
undervalue technological accumulation. They therefore argue that the "market-failure"
approach is useful in defining government's role in funding education, training, and basic
research.
They also present a classification of acquisition of technology by firms into four
categories of technological development: (1) supplier-dominated firms, (2) scale-
intensive firms, (3) science-based firms, and (4) specialized-supplier firms (p. 264).
Firms in each category have their distinctive method of acquiring technology.
4 Each sector of the Japanese economy has a cliental relationship to a ministry or agency of the government.
The ministry, in addition to its various statutory means of dealing with the economic sector, holds a general
implied administrative responsibility and authority that goes well beyond what is customary in the United
States and other Western Countries. Although Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) plays
the most prominent role, its operations are not distinctive. The industrial bureaus of MITI proliferate
sectoral targets and plans; they confer, they tinder, they exhort. This is economics by admonition to a
degree inconceivable in Washington or London. Business makes few major decisions without consulting
the appropriate government authority; the same is true in reverse. (Caves and Uekusa, 1976) The Japanese
government's role in promoting industries is very crucial in that "Japan may be called a country of the
Government industrial complex" (Nino, 1972). MITI's vice-Minister Ojimi has described Japan as a plan-
oriented market economy (Nino, 1972).
5 The following aspects of South Korea's industry policy have drawn most attention: 1. The use of long-
term credit at negative real interest rates to foster particular industries. 2. The heavy subsidization and the
coercion of exports. 3. The strict control over multinational investment and foreign equity ownership of
South-Korean industry. 4. A highly active state technology policy. 5. State promotion of large-scale
conglomerate firms, government encouragement of mergers of specific corporations, and, in general, state
restrictions on the free entry and exit of firms. (Amsden 1989; Wade 1990)
6 Taiwan is one of the developing mixed economies that have the largest public enterprise sector. Public
enterprises have contributed one-third of the gross fixed capital formation in Taiwan from 1950-1975, a
period which witnessed the most rapid economic and industrial growth in that country. The public sectors
has been used as the chosen instrument for a big push in many sectors. Public enterprises have played a
central role in creating new capacities. Incentives and pressure are brought to bear on private firms as
well- import controls and tariffs, entry requirements, domestic-content requirements, fiscal investment
incentives, and concessional credit are devices used by the government as "administrative guidance."
(Wade, 1990:pp. 110-11)
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They conclude that "successful technological accumulation depends on (a) the acquisition
of foreign technology; (b) investment in education, training, and research; (c) economic
incentives for innovation and imitation; (d) continuous growth of demand; and (e)
institutions and policies designed to encourage firms to accumulate technology."
Therefore, Bell and Pavitt imply that government should get involved in education,
training and research, as well as establish institutions and policies designed to encourage
firms to accumulate technology.
Other theorists, such as Friedrich List (Lundvall, 1992, p. 16), also indicate the need for
governmental responsibility for education and training and for developing an
infrastructure supporting industrial development. To these theorists, production of new
technology is not something only related to firms, but to a system of private firms,
government, and universities. They use the National System of Innovation (NSI) to refer
this complicated system. Freeman (1987) explicitly uses the concept of NSI to analyze
the organization of R&D and of production in firms, inter-firm relationships, and the role
of government (especially MITI) in Japan. Nelson (1992) presented studies of the US
NSI and analyzed the combined public and private character of technology and the role of
each party in producing new technologies. He emphasized the important role of
institutional set-ups for NSI. Based on the belief that the international competitiveness of
nations is founded on innovation, Lundvall (1992) also pointed out that NSI can play a
role in determining the long-term dynamics of an economy.
Governments in NLEs have been actively involved in improving NSI in general and
helping firms in high-tech sectors to advance their innovation capabilities. Those
involvements mainly include increased investment in education, government institutes
and policies for encouraging firms to accumulate technology.
Korea increased steadily its investment in education from 2.5% of the government budget
in 1951 to 22% in 1987. It also set up large government-funded institutes, such as the
prestigious Korea Institute for Science and Technology (KIST), to carry out R&D and to
train engineers and researchers. These institutes obtained more than 90% of government
research funding during the 1980s. (Hobday, 1995)
Though government technological and industrial intervention had little effect during the
1960s and 1970s, Taiwan's government supplied the educational and infrastructure
support needed for electronic industrial development to overcome the barrier of entry.
The government controlled Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) trained
engineers in advanced semiconductor technologies and transferred technology to local
firms. Further, ITRI incubated several firms which became the core of the domestic chip-
manufacturing industry. (Hobday 1995)
To encourage upgrading of the R&D part of the manufacturing for electronics and IT
industries, Singapore's government set up several technology institutes in the early 1990s,
such as Institute of Manufacturing Technology, Institute of Microelectronics and
Magnetic Technology Institute (EDB, 1992).
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Even in the laissez-faire Hong Kong, government agencies played an important role in
helping companies to improve their innovation capabilities. For instance, the Hong Kong
Productivity Council (HKPC), funded mainly by the administration, was established in
1967 to provide technological support for local firms. HKPC assists small and medium -
size firms by subsidizing training programs and consultancy, by making modem
electronics facilities available, and by helping companies to design new products. For
instance, in 1992, HKPC organized 2 consortia: one involved 15 firms to design a
palmtop computer; the other involved 8 firms to produce a cordless telephone. These
projects brought new innovations to the market and helped small firms to overcome their
size constraints. (Hobday 1995)
4.4 Chapter Conclusion
Most debates on late industrialization focus on government vs. market. Another
important aspect is the government role in improving innovation capabilities of the nation,
in general, and domestic firms in high-tech industries, in particular. For this study, I
assume in my case analysis that the government has set up goals to help domestic firms
and has been able to adjust its behavior/policies with feedback from the environment to
maximize the effectiveness of its involvement. Thus, I will focus on analyzing the
changed role of the government: What role has the government played during the
catching up process in china? What caused its involvement to change?
Further, I will study the role of the government in firms' improvement of innovation
capabilities. My main questions are: What has the government done to help firms
improve their innovation capabilities? What caused their role in the process to change?
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I have used a multi-case study for this research, supplemented with simple regression
analysis. I have chosen three to five domestic firms from each of three manufacturing
groups in China and analyzed their development history and innovation capabilities from
their founding date to the end of 2002. The three manufacturing groups are: (1) telecom-
equipment manufacturers, (2) computer manufacturers, and (3) cell-phone manufacturers.
In this chapter, I explain the reasons for using multi-case analysis of these three industries
in China, criteria of selecting firms, data collected for answering the research questions
and testing the hypothesis in chapter land the data-collection process. The detailed
description of regression analysis can be found in Chapters 7 and 9.
5.1 Why Choose Case Analysis?
I have chosen multi-case analysis mainly for the following reasons: First, the qualitative-
case approach allows me to conduct an in-depth analysis of the phenomena (Ragin, 1994),
i.e., a longitudinal assessment of business environmental changes and corresponding
changes in companies. Second, choosing a multi-case analysis rather than a single-case
analysis allows me to "identify similarities within subsets of cases that distinguish them
from other subsets"(Ragin, 1994, p. 124). I was able to find commonalities of firms in
the same industry and to distinguish firm-specific characteristics.
In order to ameliorate the disadvantages of case analysis, for each manufacturing group I
provide a brief introduction of the industrial background, which covers industrial
structure, major suppliers, and market characteristics, both globally and domestically.
Thus, the detailed firm-level analysis is solidly rooted in the industrial context.
In addition, for this study, the limited time available to finish my research work makes it
impossible to conduct an extensive study for three different industries. Further, there are
no publications providing the detailed statistical data that I would need to conduct the
industrial analysis, which means I would have to conduct my own data collection at the
industrial level, i.e., prepare my own survey forms to send to thousands of companies and
ensuring most of them had returned the survey form with reliable answers. This amount
of work would not be feasible for a single researcher to do. However, in the future, this
approach could be used for similar research projects.
5.2 Why China?
China has a very interesting institutional setting. The so-called "market economy"
started in the 1980s and brought China great changes. Having experienced economic
transition over the last twenty years, China now has a huge market for information
infrastructure and other IT products. More and more individual consumers have their
own cell phones and personal computers. For instance, in 2002, China had 170 million
cell-phone subscribers,7 the most subscribers of any country in the world. The
www.umtsworld.com/industry/narketshare.htm as of Oct. 28,2002
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exponential growth of phone and Internet usage has imposed requirements for the
country's telecommunication infrastructure and drives the telecom equipment market to
expand rapidly as well. On the supply side, the Chinese government and enterprises are
trying hard to catch up in the high-tech sectors. As a result, the share of the PC market
held by domestic producers has increased from less than 30% in 1991 to approximately
86.4% in 2000.8 Meanwhile, domestic telecom equipment producers have shown
increasing performance in various areas of the industry, measured by their growing
market shares vis-a-vis the MNCs.
Second, few studies have been done for China's domestic firms in the information
industry. Shen (1999) tracked the early development history of a domestic firm, Great
Dragon Information Technology (GDT), in contrast with a joint venture from the 1980s
to the early 1990s. He described the acquisition of Public Digital Switch System (PDSS)
technological capabilities in the two contrasting cases: "System-12", in which the foreign
technology was transferred into China as a complete system through a joint venture
(Shanghai Bell); and "HJD04", a locally developed system which utilized available
foreign components and design tools and was developed by GDT. Shen's analysis
provides insights into China's "dual-track" technology policy of "walking on two legs" in
the early development stages of telecommunications.
Lu (2000) documented in detail the development history of four major domestic firms in
the IT sector-Stone, Legend Group, Founder, and Great Wall-from their founding dates
in the 1980s to the late 1990s. He argued "the Chinese computer enterprises followed a
unique mode of technology learning, which [was] coupled with unique organizational and
institutional arrangements" (Lu, 2000, p. 3). Rather than the "bottom-up" model-starting
with the assembly of imported kits, then the localization of parts and components, then
product redesign, then design of original product-the Chinese firms have followed a
"top-down" model of technological learning, i.e., starting with product design or redesign,
and then going forward or backward to transfer technologies at other levels. Lu
contributed "technology capability" and "enterprise governance" to this model of
technological learning.
Xu (2002) examined the development history of two generations of high-tech companies
in China's IT sector. The first-generation companies, Legend, Founder, and Great Wall,
appeared in the mid- and late 1980s, competing in computer-related areas. The second-
generation companies, Sohu, Sina, and Netease, are internet-related companies. Xu's
analysis focused on the relationship between external resources and the building of
organizational capability. Xu shows that external resources are important, but that rich
resources do not guarantee success if they fail to help build organizational capabilities,
and might even become a hurdle to sustain a competitive edge. Firms build their
organizational capabilities through its development process rather than just from richer or
"better" external resources.
Further, there are Chinese books written on China's high-tech companies, such as Xin
(2000), Xu (2000), and Zhang (2000). However, they are not scholarly literature and
8See details in Chapter 5.
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were written for popular audiences with no attempt to provide an intellectual
understanding of the issues of concern in the present research. Nevertheless, they
provide some details on the telecommunication and PC industry's development and can
serve as part of the evidence.
5.3 Why Choose These Three Groups of Manufacturers?
First, I am interested in the information industry because of my own technical
background in electrical engineering and computer science. My technical background
helps a great deal in communicating with engineers and understanding companies' R&D
choices. Second, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) oversees these three groups
of manufacturers. It will help us to distinguish the industrial-level issue within the same
institutional setting. Third, these groups of manufacturers vary in their degree of success
and their developmental paths. It will be interesting to compare the factors that have
caused their variation.
5.4 Companies
I have chosen twelve companies from the three sectors according to the following criteria:
" Are they major players in their field by the measures of market share, sales
revenue, appearances in media reports, etc.?
* Do they have a large impact on the development of the industry?
Based on these criteria, I selected three to five firms from each manufacturing group.
They are: Huawei, Zhongxing, Julong, and Datang as the telecom equipment producers;
Eastern Telecom, Panda Electronic, Haier, and TCL as cell phone producers; and Legend,
Great Wall, and Founder (Fangzhen) as PC manufacturers (Table 5.1).
These twelve companies are only a subset of the companies in the three manufacturing
groups. They were the major players in the market in 2002 or leaders in the 1990s. The
selection of these companies represents the successful cases from the industry; analysis of
their development history will shed insight on how to succeed as latecomers. Further, I
use China's 100 largest electronic companies as a base to analyze each company's
innovation capability.
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Table 5.1 Companies Chosen for Case Analysis
Sales
Revenue Profit
Date of (in US$ (in US $
Company Name Establishment Employment billion) million)
Telecom-equipment Manufacturers
Huawei Technology Corporation
Shenzhen Zhongxin Technology Corporation
Datang Telecom Technology Co., Ltd.
Great Dragon Information Technology
P- g t g A hPR 101141 ] 1
PC Manufacturers
Legend Computer Group Corporation
Peking University Founder Group Co.
ALITl Ab L ) -17 JEg %- M A
China Great Wall Computer Corporation
11W{iki Utl ]J
Cell-phone Manufacturers
TCL Holding Co., Ltd.
TCL M 4 PU ]
Haier Group Co.
* /T1 :M &NJ t
Hisense Group Co.
Eastern Communications Group Co. Ltd.
)Yf A M h R I"
Panda Electronics Group Co., Ltd
Source: website of each company.
1988
1985
1998
1994
1984
1986
1986
1981
1984
1969
1958
1936
18,000
12,916
2.7 319.8
1.3 96
4,183 0.247
2,500 0.24
11,220
6,000
n.a.
30,000
30,000
10,000
2,200
36.1
4.2
3.9 169.3
1.4 29.5
2 n.a.
2.5 86.1
7.3 241.9
1.9 26.1
1.3 45.7
n.a. 2.6 117.2
Note:
1. Eastcom's profit is 2001's data.
2. Great Wall's Revenue is RMB 16.2 billion, about $1.96 billion, Eastcom's renenue is RMB 10.5 billion,
about $1.27 billion, both are 2001's data.
3. Using exchange rate: 1 USD = 8.27740 CNY
4. n.a. = not available.
Huawei, Zhongxing, Julong, and Datang are four representative domestic firms that arose
in the 1990s. Julong developed the first large switching system (HJD04) in China, which
led to the take-off of Chinese telecom equipment production in the 1990s. Datang was
Chatper 5. Research Methodology
established in 1998 by a research and development institute within the Ministry of
Information Industry (MII) in Xi'an. It is an R&D-oriented enterprise, and most of the
employees are researchers in the field of telecommunications.9 Zhongxing,
headquartered in Shenzhen, has a broad range of products in all the subsectors of the
telecom equipment industry. All three of these companies are state-owned. Huawei,
which is the biggest of the 4 firms, is a privately owned company located in Shenzhen.
Zhongxing and Huawei have been rated as the most innovative enterprises in China.' 0 I
have explored whether or not innovation capability, which is shared by all these firms, is
the most crucial resource for firms in this subsector by asking relevant questions during
interviews.
In the cell-phone market, several producers, such as TCL, Haier, Hisense, and Panda
Electronic, are large consumer electronic producers that diversified into the cell phone
production. As the largest domestic producer in 2002, TCL is well known for its
innovative concept of jewelry cell phones. Hisense, an electronic enterprise famous for
its R&D orientation, started cell-phone production in late 2001 but has achieved
substantial growth since then. Marriages to Motorola and Ericsson played an important
role for Eastcom and Panda Electronic, to become leaders in the cell-phone industry in
the earlier days. However, the marriage had its negative consequence as both companies
were discouraged from developing their own brands. I conducted a comparative review
of the strategies of each firm and their development histories to seek insight into why
they have grown and if their growth is sustainable.
Legend is the leading PC producer in both China and Asia Pacific with a 30.2% market
share domestically in 2001 and a 13.6% market share in Asia Pacific in the third quarter
of 2001. Founder is the second largest PC producer in China, but its main business also
has roots in Chinese electronic publishing systems and software development. Great Wall
is the manufacturer that produced the first domestic PC and later formed several joint
ventures with IBM. Their strategies for market entry provide evidence for a different
resource focus other than innovation capability.
In some cases, I have chosen the companies not according just to how successful they
have been but because of their glorious past, such as GDT and Great Wall, which were
market leaders at the beginning and were models for other domestic firms, but now lag
behind other companies.
5.5 Question-Hypothesis-Data
To answer the research questions, I specify the following four detailed questions and
offered hypothesis for each of them. I will gather data to test the hypothesis.
(1) Why have domestic firms caught up with the multinational corporations (MNCs)
in the telecom-equipment, PC, and cell-phone industries?
9 Company brochure.
10 www.chinanex.com.
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Hypothesis: Leading domestic firms in China's information industry have followed a
path of catching-up that can be described by a staged catching-up theory.
To investigate the staged process of catching up, I will get time-series data on domestic
firms' market share and firms' annual data on revenue and employment. Based on these
time-series data and other information of the market and industry, I can roughly divide
the stages described by the staged-catching up theory.
It is relatively easy to differentiate between the preparation stage and the growth stage
because during the preparation stage there exist few domestic firms in the market, while
many domestic firms should start to appear at the beginning of the growth stage. Thus, I
use the date when many domestic firms were established and more specifically, started
their manufacturing production as an indication for the start of the growth stage. During
the growth stage, domestic firms' market share will experience great increase while the
foreign firms' market share will correspondingly decrease. Consequently, domestic
firms' revenue and employment are expected to experience high growth.
To differentiate between the growth stage and filtration stage is not as easy. Instead of
just looking at increasing number of domestic producers, I will examine the market
segments of domestic firms and MNCs. During the growth stage, domestic producers
differentiate their products from the MNCs. During the filtration stage, domestic
producer and MNCs compete head-to-head in the same market segments with
sophisticated products. I therefore can use the overlay of domestic producers' market
segments with the MNCs' as an indicator of entering the filtration stage. Further, the less
competent domestic producers will be forced to exit or be left behind by the increasing
competition. The decreasing profit-rate and number of domestic producers can also help
to indicate the start of the filtration stage.
How do we differentiate between the filtration stage and the globalization stage then?
The most important characteristics of the globalization stage is the exploration of
international markets and international R&D cooperation. Thus, when these practices
become common to leading domestic firms, it symbolizes the start of globalization stage.
I therefore will use data on demand, profitability, occupational structure, and industry
structure (concentration, size of firms) of the different stages to show this evolution. In
addition, I will investigate domestic firms' choices of location and competitive strategies,
as well as MNCs' behaviors and government involvement during the different stages.
(2) What role has innovation capability played in the development of China's
domestic firms in the telecom-equipment, computer, and cell phone industries?
Hypothesis: Innovation capability and self-developed technologies have been the key to
Chinese domestic firms' catching up with the MNCs and have determined who are the
leading domestic firms in these industries.
To investigate what role innovation capability has played in the development of China's
domestic firms in the telecom-equipment, computer, and cell-phone industries, I will first
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examine if self-developed technologies have enabled domestic firms to produce products
they otherwise would have been unable to produce. In detail, I will examine the products:
- that were dominantly produced by MNCs: e.g., public digital switch systems (PDSS);
- that have been produced specifically for the Chinese market by domestic firms only:
e.g., Chinese language add-on cards for personal computers;
- that have been produced at the same speed as the MNCs: e.g., 2.5G GSM and
CDMA cell phones
- that no one has ever produced: e.g., 4 th generation electronic publishing systems,
China's 3G standard (TD-SCDMA).
I will also examine if self-developed technologies have enabled domestic producers to
produce at a cost less than that of MNCs and thus gain market shares. I will examine
products such as PDSS, PCs, and 2G and 2.5G cell phones in all three industrie.
Moreover, I will check if leading domestic producers in these industries have also been
leaders in terms of innovation capability. A strong correlation between leadership and
innovation capability supports the hypothesis that innovation was the key to the
successful development of the leading firms. Since I have chosen only leading firms to
analyzing the relationship, the sample data are very small, between 6 -8 data points.
Nevertheless, the explanation power of innovation capability will be demonstrated. To
measure innovation capability, I will gather data on firms' R&D output, such as degree of
involvement of national S&T projects, rank from the peers, and numbers of patents. To
measure leadership in a market, I will use market share and ranks from Ministry of
Information Industry (MII).
(3) How have domestic firms acquired their innovation capability?
Hypothesis: In-house R&D development, supplemented with external alliances, is the key
channel to build up their innovation capability.
I will examine the following two major channels for building innovation capability:
(a) Internal investment. Strong internal investment usually means (i) high R&D spending
as a percentage of revenue, and (ii) high R&D staff as a percentage of total workforce.
Furthermore, I will gather MNCs data for these two indicators for comparison, because
different industries define high internal investment differently.
(b) External alliance. Indicators include (i) domestic and foreign R&D partners, and (ii)
the nature of joint R&D activities.
In addition, I will investigate what special channels the domestic firms have utilized to
build their innovation capability. I will also investigate joint ventures' technology
transfers from the foreign partners, because that was expected to be a major venue for
building innovation capabilities. When data is available, I also use some simple
regression analysis to indicate the explanation power of R&D spending to innovation
capability and a company's revenue.
(4) What factors have enhanced the building of innovation capability and what role
has the government played during the process?
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Hypothesis: Government involvement has rewarded companies' efforts in building
innovation capability and developing proprietary technologies through a positive
feedback system composed of: network clustering, disintegration of the global value
chain, and sub-sector linkage.
I will examine the following four factors:
(1) Government involvement:
-What kind of support has the government offered and which kinds have been most
effective in improving innovation capability?
-How has the government chosen National S&T program participants? Is it a merit-base
selection based on strength of innovation capability?
(2) Network Clusters: clustering of firms and the evolution of firms' R&D locations
(3) Global Value Chain Disintegration: Have the industries moved towards disintegration?
Have the manufacturers move towards specification?
(4) Sub-sector (inter-industry) linkage: how has sub-sector linkage enabled leading firms
to quickly diversify into emerging sub-sectors because basic R&D and other knowledge-
assets are convertible between sub-sectors or even industries?
5.6 Data Collection
I have relied on two major sources for data. First, I have collected documents such as
annual reports, company brochures, employee handbooks, and journal articles. Second,
to get an intuitive insight of the companies, I spent several months to interviewing
employees of the companies and government officials through two field trips to China.
At the initial stage of the research, I read books and papers in the research area to
familiarize myself with the literature and find the most interesting research questions. I
also collected secondary data about the industry and companies to get a sense of the
industry and to narrow down the candidates for case study. During my research, the
Internet has been a great supplemental resource. I usually start to know a company by
visiting their website and searching "GOOGLE" for any information related to the
company. The result of Internet research is unpredictable, though. The Internet has
loads of information on some companies (for instance, Legend); while it has little
information on others (e.g., Great Dragon). The secondary data collection continued
throughout the research process.
I have taken two field trips to complete data collection and conduct interviews at the
twelve companies selected for case study. The first trip was taken from December 2001
to January 2002, when I mainly conducted research at ZTE, Huawei, Datang, Great
Dragon, Legend, Founder, and Eastcom. The second trip was taken from December 2002
to January 2003, when I mainly studied the rest of the firms in the list, namely, Great
Wall, Haier, TCL, and Panda Electronic, as well as doing some follow-up research on the
previous seven firms. In addition to the field trips, I have also used telephone and email
to contact people for the information I needed when I was in the United States.
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I interviewed people at the selected firms (managers, R&D engineers, and marketing
people), government officials (MPT/MII), local government officials, and researchers at
universities related to all three industries (Table 5.2). I learned the companies' general
development histories and resource focuses from the managers. Engineers at the
companies and researchers at universities offered me information on the key technologies
of the leading products, how and by whom R&D projects were chosen, and how the
projects were conducted. Government officials gave me a general overview of the
industry and offered insights into how and why the government got involved.
The interviews usually lasted for two to three hours. Most interviews happened at the
interviewee's office or in their company conference rooms. Some of them were
conducted in a company's dining hall, or at a local restaurant or coffee house. Most
interviewees did not want me to use a tape recorder; therefore, I used a notebook to
record important points of the interview. Furthermore, some interviewees preferred not
to disclose their names as references. The following table shows the number of people
that I interviewed for each company or organization.
Table 5.2 People Interviewed
Companies
Huawei Technologies
Zhongxing Telecom
Datang Telecom
Great Dragon Information Technology
Legend
Founder
Great Wall
Eastcom
Panda Electronics Group (PEG)
TCL Corporation
Haier Group
Hisense
Organizations
System Reform Office, State Council
Ministry of Information Industry
State Information Center, Planning Commission
Ministry of Science and Technology
MNCs
Universities
Service Providers
Others
Total
Source: The author.
Number of People Interviewed
27
4
8
5
1
2
2
0
1
0
1
2
8
1
2
4
1
4
4
3
5
51
Before the interview, I usually send out a brief introduction of myself, the research, and
the outline of the interview questionnaires to the interviewee, because some people prefer
to view the questions beforehand to decide if they are the appropriate person to answer
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the questions. Sometime, they will refer me to another person. I usually start the
interview with a brief introduction of myself and learn about the interviewee's
background and position in the company and organization. Then I asked the questions.
Sometimes I followed the question outline; sometimes I pick up interesting points made
by the interviewee and follow up on them.
The difficulties of access to companies varied. In general, I needed a personal network or
Guanxi connection to get initial access. Then, I used the so-called "snowball
procedure," -- through the initial access person, I was able to interview more people in
the same company. For the most important interviewees, I tried to follow up with emails
or phone interviews. In some cases, I had several interviews with a single individual.
Interviewees in the domestic companies were generally interested in the IT industry and
how companies function in the United States. As a friendly exchange, I spent some time
answering their questions on these matters. Sometimes, I would even exchange views
about the technological development of the IT industry, especially regarding data
communications, but I did these exchanges after the interviews, so that it would not
influence their answers.
For instance, I gave a presentation on my master's thesis, "The Design and
Implementation of General Purpose Translator for IPV6 and IPV4 networks (GT64)," to
ZTE Nanjing R&D Institute in January 2002. My master's thesis was finished at the
MIT Laboratory of Computer Science (LCS) and represents the cutting edge of research
in the IPV6 field, currently an important issue in the field of data communications.
Domestic companies as well as researchers in China have kept well informed about
current research in this area and are actively involved in the development as well. Later,
the company published a summary of the thesis in their IPV6 special issue of the
company's technological magazine "ZTE Technology."
I have also obtained approval from the MIT Committee on the Use of Humans as
Experimental Subjects (COUHES) to conduct my interviews in China. The COUHES
(website: http://web.mit.edu/committees/couhes/) reviews research projects that utilize
humans as research subjects and devises procedures to ensure that subjects are protected
against risk, and that their rights, privileges, and privacy are protected. The appendix
includes the application to COUHES and the interview questions and informed consent
forms.
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6 Staged Catching-up of Telecom-equipment
Manufacturers
Domestic telecom-equipment manufacturers in China have made impressive progress in
gaining market share vis-a-vis the multinational corporations (MNCs). Guided by the
following research questions, I apply the staged catching-up theory to analyze the
development process in this chapter:
" Why have the domestic firms caught up with the multinational corporations (MNCs)
in the telecom-equipment industry? Can we identify distinct stages of this evolution?
* What has been the role of the government in this staged catching-up of the industry?
I organize the chapter as follows: to offer a general background for the analysis, I begin
with a brief introduction of the global telecom-equipment market and current leaders of
each sub-sector. Next, in Section 6.2, I analyze the catching-up of domestic firms with
the MNCs in China's telecom-equipment industry and identify the stages of this
evolution. In Section 6.3, I examine what role the government has played in developing
the industry and compare different policies' effectiveness. I provide conclusion remarks
in Section 6.4. In the next chapter, I focus on investigating the role of innovation in the
staged catching-up process.
6.1 Overview of the Telecom-Equipment Industry
The telecom-equipment industry is one of the most R&D intensive industries--the
average R&D spending of leading MNCs (as a percentage of revenue) was around 10%-
20% in 2002 (MIT Technology Review, 2003). The industry has several global leaders,
such as Alcatel, Cisco, Ericsson, Lucent Technologies, Nortel Networks, and Nokia,
which had average revenues of over $20 billion in 2002. In addition to these telecom-
equipment manufacturers, Siemens and Motorola, two giant electronics companies, also
lead in the field of telecom-equipment-their revenue in 2002 were $77 billion and $30
billion, respectively. Most of these companies had a significant drop of 20% in their
revenue of 2002 compared to that of 2001.11 Telecom-equipment manufacturers had a
harsh year in 2002 because of the slowdown of the economy in general and the drop in
demand coming from the cutback of telecom-infrastructure spending in North America,
Europe, and Asia Pacific.
6.1.1 Leading firms in Sub-sectors
Telecom-equipment manufacturing can be roughly divided into the following five sub-
sectors: optical transmission systems, switch systems, access systems, data
communications (router and Ethernet switches), and mobile communications.
" Except Cisco and Siemens, who increased their revenues by 17.8% and 2.1%, respectively from 2001 to
2002.
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The following descriptions explain the function of each sub-sector: optical transmission
systems are optical lines that transport telecom traffic; switching systems reside at those
points where different lines connect with each other, and determine which traffic goes to
which line; access systems connect the network with the end user. Data communication
uses Internet Protocol (IP) networking technologies (routers and Ethernet switches) to
transmit voice and data. It employs the same infrastructure described above, except that
router or Ethernet switches have replaced the telephone switch. Mobile communication
refers to the wireless part (the part without any physical connection) of the telecom
network. It is an extension of the telecom network since the traffic coming from the
wireless point may need to use the fixed telecom network for long distance
telecommunications.
Examining the global market for telecom equipment, I summarize current leaders of each
sub-sector in Table 6.1. I divide mobile communication into two main segments:
mobile equipment and mobile handsets. I leave the details of global and domestic
mobile-handset manufacturers to Chapter 10. Details of each sub-sector can be found in
Appendix 6.1.
Table 6.1 Leading Firms in Sub-sectors of the Global Telecom-equipment Industry, 2001
Subc tors n n.................. I ........... L Firms (Top Three)
Optical transmission systems Alcatel, Lucent, Nortel
Switch systems n.a.
DSL: Alcatel, Siemens, Lucent
Access systems Cable Modem: Motorola, Toshiba, Ambit
Router: Cisco, Juniper Networks
Data communication Ethernet Switch: Cisco, Nortel, Enterasys
Mobile communication Ericsson, Motorola, Nokia, Lucent
Source: The author, from Appendix of this chapter.
Note: DSL stands for Digital Subscriber Line.
n.a. = not available.
Table 6.1 reveals that several companies, such as Alcatel, Nortel, Motorola, and Lucent,
lead in at least two sub-sectors, while companies like Cisco or Nokia are very specialized
in data communication or mobile communication. This implies that a similar
technological base exists for different sub-sectors so that when a company excels in one
sub-sector, it is comparatively easier for it to diversify into, and do extremely well in,
another sub-sector.
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6.1.2 The Growth of China's Telecommunication Infrastructure
China's telecommunication infrastructure has experienced tremendous advancement in
the past two decades. China had one of the poorest telecommunication infrastructures in
the world. However, not until the end of the 1970s did it become clear that China's weak
telecommunication infrastructure had constrained its economic expansion. Thus, the
government had given great priority to strengthen to meet the accelerated growth in
demand for telecom services. Consequently, the capacity of China's telecommunication
infrastructure has undergone magnificent growth from 1980 to 2000 (Table 6.2). Fixed
capital investment increased nearly 200 times during the two decades. The switchboard
capacity grew more than 40 times-from 4.43 million lines in 1980 to 178.26 million lines
in 2000. Accordingly, the numbers of both fixed-line and mobile phone subscribers have
grown exponentially. The number of fixed-line subscribers increased more than 70 times
during that period--from 2.14 million to 144.83 million. From 1990 to 2000, the number
of mobile-phone subscribers jumped astonishingly 4700 times-from 0.02 million to 84.53
million users, which creates a remarkable average growth rate of 141% per year.
Table 6.2 Growth of China's Telecommunications Infrastructure, 1980- 2000
Average Average
Growth Rate, Growth Rate
Categories 1980 1990 2000 1980-1990 (%) 1990-2000 (%)
Switch board capacity
(million lines) 4.43 12.32 178.26 10.87 31.56
Fixed-line subscribers
(million) 2.14 6.85 144.83 12.49 36.17
Mobile phone subscribers
(million) n.a. 0.02 84.53 n.a. 141.07
Fixed capital investment
(billion RMB) 1.34a 4.92 213.50 30.03 52.29
Revenue (billion RMB) 3.90 15.55 479.27 n.a. n.a.
Penetration rate (%) 0.43 0.60 18.12 n.a. n.a.
Teledensity (%) 0.45 1.01 14.08 n.a. n.a.
Source: China Transportation and Communication Society (various years).
Yearbook of China Transportation and Communication. Beijing. (Wong, 2002: p. 47)
Note: a. 1985 figure; b. 1985-1990
n.a. = not available.
6.1.3 MNCs' Operation in China
Echoing the market growth, most of the global leading firms started their operations in
China in the 1980s and 1990s. Tables 6.3 lists seven major MNCs in China: Cisco,
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Ericsson, Lucent Technologies, Motorola, Nokia, Nortel Networks, and Siemens; all of
whom have also appeared in Table 6.1. I attach a brief introduction of each firm's
operations, facilities and major products in China in the appendix. Among the seven
MNCs, Siemens and Motorola have the most employment (20,000 and 13,000).
Motorola distinguishes itself by its large investment in China-by 2002, it had invested
$3.4 billion from the point it established subsidiaries in China in 1987. It also had the
highest sales revenue ($5.7 billion) among all seven MNCs in 2002.
Table 6.3 Major MNCs in China's Telecom-equipment Industry, Company Statistics, 2002
Employment Investment Sales
Year Amount in (in billion US$)
Entering China (in
Company Name China 2001 2002 billion US$) 2001 2002
Alcatel China 1983 5,000 6,500 0.8 n.a. 2.0
Cisco Systems China 1994 500 300 n.a. 1.0 n.a.
Ericsson China 1985 4,000 4,500 0.6 1.7 n.a.
Lucent Technologies
China 1993 n.a. 3,000 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Motorola China 1987 13,000 13,000 3.4 4.9 5.7
Nokia China 1985 5,500 5,000 20 2.9 n.a.
Nortel Networks
China 1972 2,600 2,600 n.a. 1.6 n.a.
Siemens China 1994 21,000 21,000 0.5 3.4 3.5
Source: The Author, summarized from http://www.chinanex.com and websites of each company above.
(www.alcatel.com.cn, www.cisco.com.cn, www.ericsson.com.cn, www. lucent. com. cn,
www.motorola.com.cn, www.nokia.com.cn, www.nortelnetworks.com.cn, www.siemens.com.cn)
Note:
1. n.a. = not available.
2. Alcatel of France entered China's telecom market in 1983 by forming China's first joint venture in
telecom equipment manufacturing called Shanghai Bell with Belgian government. Alcatel's
investment in China exceeded $0.8 billion in 2002. Sales in 2002 are expected to $2 billion.
3. Cisco didn't have a China office until 1994. In 1998, it upgraded its China presence to a limited
company in order to reinforce its competitive position in China. Cisco's employee numbers are
estimated numbers. Cisco's sales in 2001 exceeded $1.0 billion.
4. Ericsson of Sweden began selling in China as early as 1892. It returned to China in 1985. Ericsson's
investment in China exceeded $0.6 billion in 2002.
5. Lucent China was stemmed out from its parent AT&T China in 1996.
6. Motorola's investment in China was about RMB 28.5 billion ($3.4 billion) by 2002. Its sales in 2002
were RMB 47 billion ($5.7 billion).
7. Nokia had $1.5 billion export in 2001 and $2.2 billion export in 2002. Nokia's investment had
amounted to Euro 2.3 billion (nearly $2 billion) by the end of 2001. Its sales in 2001 were Euro 3.4
billion Euros ($2.9 billion).
8. Nortel China's revenue is 9% of the company in 2001.
9. Siemens began selling telecom product to the Chinese as early as 1872 (a manual telegraph receiver).
In 1994, the company began its formal operation in China. Siemens' sales was euro 3.6 billion ($3.5
billion).
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The presence of MNCs has facilitated the building of China's telecommunications
infrastructure; however, it has also posed great challenges for domestic firms. Despite
the challenges, domestic firms have advanced from being far behind in every sub-sector
in the 1980s, to catching up in the switch market in the middle 1990s, to capturing the
access market in the late 1990s, and to becoming competitive in the markets of optical
transmission, data communications, and mobile communications in the new millennium.
Why have the domestic firms caught up with the MNCs in the telecom-equipment
industry? Can we identify distinct stages of this evolution? Next, I apply the staged
catching-up theory to examine the development history of domestic firms from the 1980s
to 2002.
6.2 Catching up in Stages
The staged catching-up theory can be used to describe the catching-up process of the
domestic firms with the MNCs in the telecom-equipment industry. Using this theory, I
identify the four stages for the telecom-equipment industry: preparation stage (early
1980s-early 1990s), growth stage (early 1990s-middle/late 1990s), filtration stage
(middle/late 1990s-2000), and globalization stage (2000-2002). To demonstrate this
staged process, I rely on two major sources: (1) the catching-up of domestic firms in the
sub-sector of switch equipment (they developed Chinese public digital switch systems
(PDSS) during the preparation and growth stages); and (2) major leading domestic firms'
development during the four stages. I have a detailed analysis of the catching-up in the
switching equipment sub-sector in the appendix. Here I focus on the development of
several leading domestic firms.
6.2.1 Staged Development of Major Domestic Firms
The growth of major domestic manufacturers in the telecom-equipment industry
constitutes a significant portion of the history of the industry. I used the following four
domestic firms as my primary candidates to examine the staged development of the
industry: Huawei, ZTE, DTT, and GDT, for the reasons stated in the "Research
Methodology" chapter. Chinese people use the term "Great China" to describe those
four companies, because if you combine the first characters of the companies' names in
the reverse order (Ju -Great Dragon, Da - DTT, Zhong - ZTE, Hua - Huawei), you will
create the phrase "Great China" in Chinese. The phrase reflects China's pride in these
domestic companies that have risen quickly and competed confidently with the giant
MNCs. Tables 6.4 and 6.5 summarize these companies' general information.
Huawei and ZTE were established in the middle of the 1980s, while DTT and GDT were
established in the middle of the 1990s. The size of Huawei and ZTE are much larger than
that of DTT and GDT. For instance, Huawei and ZTE have over 22,000 and 12,000
employees, respectively, comparable to the workforces of the two largest MNC's in
China, Siemens and Motorola, who have about 21,000 and 13,000 employees,
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respectively. In comparison, DTT and GDT only have about 4,000 and 2,500 employees,
respectively. The revenue and profits of these companies also illustrates this size
difference. The four companies have similar major product ranges, but Huawei and ZTE
have many more R&D and production facilities than DTT and GDT.
Table 6.4 Major Domestic Telecom-equipment Manufacturers in China, 2002
Sales
Date of Revenue Profit
Company Name Establishment Employment (in US$ billion) (in US $ m
Huawei Technology Corporation
I--j t*-FR & A 1988 18,000 2.7
Shenzhen Zhongxin Technology
Corporation
)Ilii tU 1985 12,916 1.3
Datang Telecom Technology Co., Ltd.
thr { 44 1-f1 A 1998 4,183 0.247
Great Dragon Information Technology
SA f i r * PR IfE A 1994 2,500 0.240
Source: Summarized from http://www.chinanex.com, each company's website as of January 2003
Note: DTT and GDT's data on"Sales Revenue" and "Profit" was 2001.
illion)
319.8
96.0
36.1
4.2
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Table 6.5 Major Domestic Telecom-equipment Manufacturers in China, Facilities and Products
Company Name Major facilities Major Products
Central office: C&C08, iNET; transmission: OptiX high-
end optical cross-connect series with throughput up to 1.6
terabit per second, DWDM system, multi-STM-16
Headquarter in Shenzhen, 6 (Metro-3000), multiservice platform (Metro-6100),
research centers in major flexible access (FAI6); data communications: ATM
Huawei cities of China, the company switch, routers, ISDN terminals, IP telephony systems;
Technology also has research facilities in broadband switch and access systems; mobile
Corporation the US (Santa Clara and communications: GSM900/1800, GPRS, CDMA (IS-95A
Dallas), Russia, India, and and CDMA2000; wireless local loop (WLL): intelligent
Sweden. network and others.
Switching: ZXJIO central office, network control core
Shenzhen (Softswitch); access systems: fiber optic access pointterabit (AXAO), PCS system (ZXPCS), wireless local loop
Zehoogxi 11I wholly owned research (ZXC1O-SCWLL); optical systems: transmission unitCnoogy facilities across the country, (Unitrans ZXSM- 150/600/2500), DWDM (Unitrans
Cororaion the US (New Jersey) and ZXWM-32); mobile systems: ZXGJO-GSM, ZXC 10-
Korea; 26 sales offices and CDMA, and CDMA2000-IX; data communications:
customer support centers integrated access router; broadband wireless access; and
across China. videoconferencing products.
High-capacity CO (SP-30, has 65% market share in high-
end switch sector), SDH and DWDM equipment, access
Datang Telecom equipment; wireless data (broadband access, WLL,
Technology Co., fLAN and multi-service access); mobile systems (switch
Ltd. Headquarters in Beijing, 5 or GSM, CDMA, HER and messaging), WCDMA
IkJ* qWT41 subsidiaries, 2 R&D centers system; microwave; multimedia; microelectronics and
i~Akt~1 in Beijing and Shanghai terminal equipment
HJD04E high-capacity exchange (PSTN and ISDN); user
access unit; OpenIN intelligent network; HIP-Phone
office system; EASTAR-WLL access system; WAN-2000
Great Dragon broadband wireless access system; GDCGS-2000
Information A research center, a wholly distributed mobile switching system; GSM base station;
Technology owned subsidiary and two CDMA system; data communications: OmniRouter-880,
M with controlling interest, plus IP telephony system (access, router, terminal, fax);
two oversea joint ventures SupNet series (hub and switch).
Source: Summarizedfrom http://Www.chinanex.cor as of Jan. 2003.
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Table 6.6 Huawei, ZTE, DTT, and GDT's Revenue (billion RMB), 1985-2002
Company ZTE Huawei Datang GDT
Date of Establishment 1985 1988 1998 1995
1985 * b.e. b.e. b.e.
1986 n.a. b.e. b.e. b.e.
1987 n.a. b.e. b.e. b.e.
1988 n.a. n.a. b.e. b.e.
1989 n.a. n.a. b.e. b.e.
1990 n.a. n.a. b.e. b.e.
1991 n.a. n.a. b.e. b.e.
1992 n.a. n.a. b.e. b.e.
1993 0.1 n.a. b.e. b.e.
1994 n.a. n.a. b.e. b.e.
1995 n.a. 1.4 b.e. b.e.
1996 0.3 2.6 0.4 n.a.
1997 0.6 4.1 0.5 n.a.
1998 2.0 8.9 0.9 2.6
1999 2.5 12.0 1.1 1.2
2000 4.5 22.0 2.4 n.a.
2001 9.3 25.5 2.1 0.4
2002 11.0 22.1 2.1 n.a.
Source: ZTE Annual Report 98-2002, Major Operation Revenue (ZhuYinYeWu)
DDT Annual Report 1999-2002, Major Operation Revenue (Zhu Yin YeWu)
Top 100 Electronics Companies by M11 1999 (for 1998 performance) for GDT's data
Chinanex.com for GDT's 2001 dat.
Note:
1. b.e. = before establishment, no data.
2. n.a. = not available.
3. before 1998, the revenue refers to Xi'an Datnag Telephone Corporation.
4. * 0.00035
Table 6.6 and Figure 6.1 use the revenue data to illustrate the development of these four
domestic firms. The revenue paths of these major domestic firms, especially Huawei
and ZTE, demonstrate that their performance was distinct during each of the different
stages. The table and the figure provide the evidence to support the hypothesis that
China's telecom equipment industry has experienced the development process described
by the staged catching-up theory.
During the preparation stage (early 1980s-early 1990s), ZTE and Huawei had little
growth (DTT and GDT were not established) in revenue. During the growth stage (early
1990s-middle/late 1990s), all four companies had rapid growth with an increase in
revenue of between 40% and 100% per year. During the filtration stage (middle/late
2000), Huawei and ZTE further increased their speed of expansion and, correspondingly,
their revenues exhibited an exponential growth with an annual increase of up to 200%.
Meanwhile, DTT struggled to keep up the revenue level, while GDT's revenue
disappointedly slipped to bottom. During the globalization stage, all four companies had
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difficultly maintaining the speed of growth because at the same time the companies
started their globalization process, their revenues were affected by the bear market of the
world telecom-equipment industry.
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Figure 6.1 Huawei, ZTE, DTT, and GDT's Revenue (1985 -2002)
I will illustrate the staged catching-up process by examining each company's
development path during the four stages and I review the companies in the order of their
date of establishment.
6.2.2 Shenzhen Zhongxing Technology Corporation (ZTE)
ZTE (:2$ rP)L . i -* A4 ?WRi]) was started as Zhongxing Semiconductor Co., Ltd.
in February 1985 by three parties. Two components were from within the former
Ministry of Aerospace Industry (MAI) and the other was a company from Hong Kong.
Within seventeen years, the company grew from a trading company and a manufacturing
factory that did simple processing to China's second largest company in the telecom-
equipment industry. ZTE is engaged with the following areas of telecommunications:
optical transmission, data communications, and mobile equipment. The workforce grew
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from several hundred in the 1980s to more than 12,000 in 2002. The company's revenue
leapt from RMB 0.35 million in 1985 to RMB 11 billion in 2002.
I review ZTE's development in each of the four stages as following:' 2
Preparation stage (1985-1992): Zhongxing Semiconductor was established in Shenzhen
as a joint investment in 1985. No. 691 Factory under the former MAI was the main
shareholder with a 66% share of the company; other parties included Great Wall
Industrial Co. (Shenzhen office) under MAI, and Yunxing Electronics Trading Co. (Hong
Kong). The company originally planned to manufacture products in microelectronics;
however, the production technology and market needed were not available at the time.
The company therefore started to produce watches, electronic keyboards, and telephones
to accumulate capital. In June 1986 the company started an eight-person R&D team to
develop a 68-unit analog small-scale switch. Although the company staff were
knowledgeable in electronics, they were not familiar with switch technology. The
company therefore invited Shan'xi Posts and Telecommunications Bureau to be a partner
for the project. In less than one year, the R&D group successfully developed the ZX-60
and secured certification and licenses from MPT. Afterwards, the company decided to
develop its own digital-switching system despite the dominant market presence of the
MNCs in China. To improve the technology capability of the company, it cooperated
with the Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications (BUPT). The development
successfully resulted in the ZX500 Digital Switch for C5 end office, which was certified
by MPT in November 1989.
Growth stage (1993-1996): Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment Co., Ltd. (ZTE)
was registered with initial capitalization of RMB 3 million in March 1993, and the
company started to operate as a private company but with national ownership.' 3 A
research and development institute was established in Nanjing to develop a large-scale
digital switching system as well as core networking and data communications devices. In
November 1995, the ZXJ1O large-scale PDSS was successfully developed and was
licensed by MPT. This was one of the three main switches that were developed by
domestic producers. ZXJ10 was kept as the company's core product and enabled the
company to move towards diversification into other areas of telecommunications. In 1996
ZTE was chosen as one of 300 key state-run enterprises (increased to 520 later) by the
State Council.
Filtration stage (1997-2000): ZTE was listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange on
November 18, 1997. It was the first large domestic telecom-equipment enterprise to be
listed on the stock market. ZTE started to diversify into different sub-sectors of the
industry, especially in access equipment and optical transmission. During this stage, ZTE
12 ZTE divided its development history into 3 periods (ZTE, 2001): 1985-1992, 1993-1996, and 1997-
present based on its production characteristics. The first two periods match the first two stages of the
staged catching-up theory. I further divided 1997-present into two stages: 1997-2000 and 2001-present and
these two stages will correspond to the two later stages of the industry described by the staged catching up
model.
13 Guo You Min Yin in Chinese. State-owned, but not state-operated.
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established six more R&D facilities throughout the country and in South Korea. ZTE
was evaluated by investors as the company with the most potential in 199814 and it won
the third position in the same category' 5 in 2001.
Globalization stage (2000 - 2002): After exponential expansion in the filtration stage,
ZTE started to experience some sluggishness in revenue growth, as the whole industry
suffered slow-down. The company has coped with the situation by reorienting itself to
focus on mobile and data communications as their new growth opportunity. For instance,
mobile equipment contributed to more than 40% of its revenue in 2002. Since 1999, ZTE
has been chosen as a major participant for the development of various communication
technologies (especially in the mobile and data communications area) in the prestigious
national science and technology program "863 Plan." By the end of 2002, ZTE had taken
19 important "863 Plan" projects, covering 3G, high-speed data communications,
integrated access systems, an optical transmissions. During this stage, ZTE established
two R&D institutes in Xi'an and Chongqing.
I summarize the distinct characteristics of ZTE during different stages of development in
Table 6.7. The revenue and asset value had little growth in the preparation stage, but
rapid and exponential growth in the growth and filtration stages, and then slowed in
growth in the globalization stage. Accompanying this change has been the increased
numbers of branches of the company and their location strategies, as well as competition
strategy and government involvement. The priority for location changed from being
close to a good businesses environment, to nearness to R&D skilled labor, to market
access, and finally to international locations of R&D and market access. Competition
strategies changed from focusing on small-scale switch equipment to large-scale switches,
to other equipment in the transmission equipment sub-sector, access equipment, and data
communications and mobile communications equipment.
" Stock Daily (newspaper in Chinese), November 25, 1998 (report on 100 public companies).
" China Stocks (newspaper in Chihinese), June 18, 2001(report on 50 public companies with greatest
potential).
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Table 6.7 ZTE's Stage Development (1985-2002)
Stage 1:
1985-92
Preparation
Stage
350,000 (1985)
0.28 million
(1985)
Zhongxing
Semiconductor
Co., Ltd (1985);
Shenzhen R&D
institute (1986)
Competition identify
strategy products (C5
countryside
switching
market) and
industry R&D
Location business
Variables environment
Government
involvement
at ZTE
Stage 2: 1993-96
Growth Stage
0.1 billion (1993);
0.6 billion (1996)
3 million (1993);
0.4 billion (1996)
Zhongxing
Stage 3: 1997-2000
Filtration Stage
1.35 billion (1997);
0.25 billion (1997)
6 R&D institutes in
Stages
Revenue
(RMB)
Asset
(RMB)
Branches
established
Number of
Branches
focus on large-scale R&D in access
switch R&D,
market expansion,
the availability of
the R&D skill-pool
Local government
awarded ZTE for
its excellence; It
was also
recognized by
national
government as one
of the important
national enterprises
and chosen as one
of the "Torch"
Program
equipment, optical
transmissions,
product
diversification, get
more investment
from the capital
market, management
the availability of the
R&D skill-pool,
market-access
Torch program
awarded ZTE for its
excellent
performances. State
Economic and Trade
Commission (SETC)
selected ZTE as one
of National
Technology Centers
that enjoys beneficial
policies. SETC and
MII selected ZTE as
Stage 4: 2000-
Present (2002)
Globalization
Stage
11 billion (2002)
12.4 billion
(2002)
2 R&D institutes
in Xi'an and
Chongqing,
cooperated labs
in P.R. C. and
U.S., S. Korea,
etc.
12 R&D
facilities, 3
branches in
Shan'xi, Beijing,
Shanghai.
R&D in mobile
equipment and
3G, data
communications,
international
cooperation,
export
R&D skill-pool,
International,
Central
government
selected ZTE as
a leader or
participant for
R&D projects of
national S&T
program - "863
Plan". Involved
in total 19 "863
Plan" projects
by 2002
enterprises. one of the national
aided enterprises.
Source: ZTE Handbook, 2001. ZTE Website: www.zte.com.cn.
6.2.3 Huawei Technology Corporation (Huawei)
Telecommunication Beijing, Shenzhen,
Equipment Co., Ltd and South Korea
(ZTE) in Shenzhen;
3 R&D institutes in
Nanjing and
Shanghai
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As the largest telecom-equipment maker in China, Huawei ()) reached
sales revenue of RMB 22.1 billion in 2002, which was about two times that of the second
largest producer ZTE (RMB 11 billion). Established in 1988, Huawei has a similar
growth path as ZTE's. I also review Huawei's development in the preparation, growth,
filtration, and the globalization stages.
Huawei was set up in 1987 in Shenzhen with a registered capital of RMB 20,000 (Xiao,
2002). The company started by selling small-scale telephony-switches and fire alarms
and consulting for various machiner producers. In the first two years, the company also
served as a sales agent for an HAX1 switch for a Hong Kong company. With the capital
accumulated by this low-risk, profitable business, Huawei chose to undertake switch
manufacturing several years later. Advised by professors from Huazhong Science and
Technology University, Huawei started to develop small-scale switch systems in the late
1980s and early 1990s--the preparation stage of the industry's development. Huawei's
small-scale switch systems, like ZTE's, gained success in the market for telecom bureaus
in the countryside.
During the growth stage (early 1990s-middle/late 1990s), Huawei's development was
propelled by its self-developed large-scale switch systems--C&C08. It is also C&C08
that brought the fast growth of Huawei and distinguished Huawei from other domestic
producers later in the filtration stage. Huawei has maintained its leadership position and
the fastest expansion in the industry ever since the early 1990s, as Figure 6.1 illustrates. 7
It is worth noting that, at the time, most businesses in Shenzhen were trading companies
and the Special Economic Zone was experiencing a real estate and stock "bubble
economy."
From the middle/late 1990s to 2000, the filtration stage of China's telecom-equipment
industry, Huawei gained more momentum of growth than during the previous growth
stage by diversifying into other sub-sectors of the industry through its technological
advantages accumulated from R&D in large-scale switching equipment.
From 2000 to 2002--the globalization stage of the industry, Huawei has been proactive in
globalizing its sales network and R&D facilities. In addition to its extensive sales
network in China, Huawei has 30 overseas offices. Its broadband products are being used
in 150 cities across China, Asia, and South America. Huawei's Quidway NetEngine has
become a strong contender in high-end router market and has been sold in more than ten
countries beside China. Huawei's overseas sales were $550 million in 2002, almost 20%
of the company's total revenue.' Further, Huawei has five overseas R&D centers in
United States, India, and Sweden.
16 One kind of switch.
4 For instance, Huawei has fast production growth every year from 1997-1999: it produced 4.1 million
switches in 1997 with a 20% market share, 7 million in 1998 with a 24% market share, and 3.8 million in
the first half of 1999 with a 35% market share (ZTE, 2001).
18 Chinanex.com, Company section. website: www.Chinanex.com.
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6.2.4 Datang Telecom Technology Co., Ltd. (DTT)
The great Tang Dynasty is one of the most splendid periods in Chinese history. Datang
Telecom Technology and Industry Group, with headquarters located in Beijing (capital
of China), [and] services nation wide, is ambitious for [the] whole world at the same
time. It is determined to contribute to the creation of another most splendid dynasty of
national information industry!
- Datang Telecom Technology and Industry Group
- http://www.catt.ac.cn/englishl
DTT ( 4tif~ 1k 1), initiated by the Chinese Academy of
Telecommunications Technology (CATT) of the MPT, was founded in 1998 through
investment capital. The company was built upon Xi'an Datang Telephone Corporation, a
joint venture established in 1993 by CATT (the 10th Research Institute) of the MPT and
International Telephone and Teledata, Inc. (ITTI), a company started by a group of
Chinese scholars in the United States.
When DTT was established in 1994, the domestic industry was in the middle of the
growth stage. DTT joined the other domestic producers in the competition through its
self-developed technology SP-30 in the middle of the 1990s. Figure 6.1 indicates that
compared with Huawei and ZTE, DTT's growth path has been flatter. It had neither
enough time nor enough accumulated experience for expansion, because it became a
telecom-equipment manufacturer in the middle of the growing stage, much later than
Huawei and ZTE. When the industry started to move into the filtration and globalization
stages, DTT was slow in responding. It has put little effort in exploring the international
market during the globalization stage. For instance, data from MI19 indicates that DTT
had little revenue from exports in 2002, only 0.2% of the total revenue, which implies
that DTT is far behind its rivals in developing international markets. Despite all these,
DTT's development of China's own 3G standard, TD-SCDMA, has won the company
great respect and will potentially bring great fortune for the company.
6.2.5 Great Dragon Information Technology Corporation, Ltd. (GDT)
GDT (E-i J g i riJ'fE' t1) has its roots in military communications with its
original investor being the Joint Chiefs of Staff in China. In 1994, GDT became a
commercial company when many military factories were ordered to convert themselves
to civilian enterprises. GDT is a company under the Post and Telecommunications
Industry Corporation (PTIC) of MII. GDT consists of a research center (GDT
Information S&T Research Institute), a wholly owned subsidiary, two subsidiaries with
majority control, and two overseas joint ventures. Currently, GDT has about 2500
employees and assets of 3 billion RMB.
GDT is the only company here that shows an overall decline in terms of revenue in recent
years. I include GDT as one of the cases because GDT has a glorious past and its decline,
'
9 MIL 2002.
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which is associated with its slow response in diversifying into other emerging sub-sectors,
reflects the competitive nature of the industry. I divide GDT's development history into
four periods: the first period (1991-1993), the second period (1994-1996), the third period
(1997-2000), and the fourth period (2000-present), which corresponds well to the
preparation, growth, filtration and globalization stages of the industry.
During the pre-establishment stage of GDT (1991-1993), China's first PDSS system
(HJD-04) was developed by the group who later founded GDT. Even though GDT was
not formally established until 1994, HJD-04's development started long before. HJD-04
was developed as a joint project involving two participants: a military R&D institute (the
Center for Information Technology, Zhengzhou Institute of Information Engineering of
the People's Liberation Army), and a state-owned factory that was an industrial
procurement unit of the MPT (Luoyang Telephone Equipment Factory or LTEF). In
1991, HJD-04 was certified and licensed by MPT and manufacturing started the next year.
Since 1994, the telecommunications networks of the government and the military have
used the system and its related products extensively. In 1993, the National Science
Commission approved the proposal to establish the National Digital Switching System
Engineering and Technological Research Center (NDSC) in Zhengzhou, which later
became the main research institute under GDT.
GDT was successfully leading the whole industry during the growth stage. For instance,
in 1997, GDT produced 6 million switches, 30%-40% of total production by domestic
firms. However, GDT has been unsuccessful in maintaining its leadership position ever
since the industry entered the filtration and globalization stages. For a detailed discussion
on GDT's changed position from leading to lagging behind, please refer to Appendix 6.5.
6.3 Role of the Government
The Chinese government's involvement changed over the four stages of development of
the telecom-equipment industry. During the preparation stage, the government had little
involvement and it mainly focused on supporting developing domestic switch technology.
During the growth stage, after several domestic producers developed their own switch
equipment, the government became much more involved and offered direct support in
finance, marketing, and export, especially to the first Chinese PDSS producer-GDT. As a
result, GDT rose as the leader of the industry in the growth stage. During the filtration
stage, even though it still supported export and marketing for major domestic firms, the
government became less involved. Instead, it was involved indirectly through selecting
suitable candidates in the national science and technology (S&T) program, such as "863
Plan". During the globalization stage, the government was involved little and focused on
supporting developing cutting-edge technologies and standards in the mobile and data
communications sub-sectors. For instance, the government showed its great support to
TD-SCDMA, the Chinese 3G standard developed by DTT, by allocating a great portion
of the frequency spectrum to the standard. I review the industry environment and the
evolution of government support in detail in the following paragraphs.
Chapter 6. Staged Catching-up of Telecom-equipment Manufacturers
In the early 1980s, China had to import many whole systems of switching equipment (too
many to coexist in China's market) because the government was under pressure to satisfy
the domestic demand and to resolve the shortage of capital. The government resolved the
capital shortage by using international lenders all over the world. Most importantly,
foreign switch vendors asked their governments to lend capital to the Chinese
government for purchasing their equipment. It is this environment and the decisions
made by the government to use foreign capital that formed the characteristic of "whole
system importation" of the switch-equipment market at the time.
From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, China's switch equipment market was
characterized by "joint production with foreign manufacturers." Seven joint ventures
were established during the time and this development of the industry was echoing the
government's policy "to exchange technology with the market." At the time, the
government thought that setting up joint ventures was an effective way to get technology
from the foreigners. The government stated in the policy that offering technological help
through joint ventures is the precondition for foreign producers to enter the Chinese
market for switches. The period from the early 1980s to the early 1990s corresponds to
the preparation stage of the telecom-equipment industry.
The Chinese government never gave up pursuing domestically produced switch
equipment. R&D on switches started in the early 1980s, long before HJD-04 was
developed successfully in 1991. On March 12, 1991, the DS-30 switch, the first attempt
at a Chinese public digital switch system (PDSS), was certified by the MPT. MPT
Telecom S&T Research Institute's First Institute and Tenth Institute jointly developed
DS-30, whose functions reached international standards. At the end of 1991, HJD-04,
was certified and licensed by the MPT. HJD-04, the first commercially produced
Chinese domestic PDSS equipment, also signified the era for domestic production as
several other companies such as Huawei, DTT, ZTE, and Jingpeng, all developed their
own switches.
The Chinese government has encouraged the development and production of domestic
switches via R&D involvement of nationally owned institutes during the preparation
stage and capital support during the growth stage. It is under this support that domestic
producers quickly rose and gained domestic market share, for instance over 50% market
share in 1997, not including JV production. (See detail in Appendix 6.4).
However, during the growth stage of the industry, the main problem for domestic switch
equipment producers was the shortage of capital for both domestic suppliers and
domestic customers. Domestic suppliers were in urgent need of capital to increase
production capacity and improve technology. Meanwhile, in order to buy domestic
switches, domestic customers had to own large amounts of capital.
To facilitate the domestic production of switches, in 1995, the government stopped
accepting foreign loans for imported switches. Furthermore, from 1996 on, the
government imposed an import tariff on telecom-equipment. The government financially
helped both the demand and the supply side. It facilitated trust loans for customers who
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bought large quantities of telecom products from domestic producers, especially for
companies within the MPT system. For instance, by the end of 1997, with the help of the
State Council, GDT's customers received loans totaling 1.4 billion RMB from the
People's Bank, the largest national bank, to purchase products from GDT. Second, the
government facilitated financial aid for technology improvement in certain key products.
On the supply side, stated-owned banks offered loans to domestic producers to improve
their production capacity. For example, the Construction bank loaned 0.7 billion RMB to
GDT in November 1996 for technology improvement in a specialized circuit board
production line and a development center.
MPT played a vital role in encouraging customers to use the domestic products. In 1993,
as domestic switches achieved the MPT's standards , MPT urged provincial and city-
level telecommunications bureaus to give priority to purchasing domestic products when
the function/price ratio was the same. MPT helped domestic firms to access the domestic
market by holding conferences for domestic suppliers and customers and encouraging
suppliers to support national brand products. MPT organized two conferences for
domestic switch producers, and one for mobile equipment. In April 1996, at the first
"Domestic Switches Customer Coordination Conference" held by MPT, six domestic
producers met with representatives from 30 provincial and city telecommunications
bureaus and signed 5 million orders and settled 7 million orders. In 1997, at the second
"Domestic-developed Switches Customer Coordination Conference," 17 million orders
were signed and 18 million orders were settled. In that year, the market share of
domestic producers (excluding joint ventures) was over 60%.
During the filtration and globalization stage of industry development, the government
mostly focused on encouraging companies to build innovation capability, which I will
investigate in detail in later sections. The government helped domestic producers to
expand into international markets in addition to the domestic market. For instance, the
central government helped GDT to obtain a license from Russian Telecommunications.
As the first domestic PDSS producer, GDT gained great support from the government.
Here, I offer a brief history of GDT during the preparation, growth, and filtration stages
to demonstrate government's role in the development of domestic firms.
GDT was formally established in 1994 to produce the HJD-04, China's first PDSS. The
government support for GDT before its establishment is mainly reflected in its effort to
develop domestic PDSS technology in the preparation stage. China started R&D on
switch technology in the early 1980s. In 1983 China established an R&D project to
develop its own PDSS technology under a state scheme to promote technological
innovation, which was successfully completed in 1986.20 The project resulted in the
earliest Chinese switching system, the DS-2000, which was based on knowledge of the
Japanese system F-150. Later, a more advanced version, DS-30, was developed, but it
was not until HJD-04's birth that China's first commercial PDSS arrived.
20 As early as in September 1984, a project of a digital program-controlled private automatic branch
exchange (PABX) was started as a prelude for getting into switch technology (Shen, 1999).
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During the growth stage (1993-1996) of the industry, the government provided support in
five main areas: company setup, financing, R&D, marketing, and export. First, several
government agencies initiated the proposal to set up GDT. In June 1993 the National
Science Commission, the Ministry of Electronics, and MPT filed a joint petition with the
State Council, proposing to start an enterprise group that would enlarge the production of
domestic PDSS. In the next five months, national leaders such as Jiang Zemin, Li Peng,
Zhu Rongji, Li Lanqing, and Zou Jiahua showed concern and interest towards the petition
and finally approved the proposal.
Second, the government offered GDT financial help through loans. With the State
Council's intervention, major national banks, such as the People's Bank, the
Manufacturing and Trade Bank, and the Construction Bank, all lent GDT's customers a
great amount of trust loans21 for purchasing products from GDT. The loans totaled 1.4
billion RMB by the end of 1997. In addition, the Construction Bank, a major state-
owned bank, loaned 0.7 billion RMB to GDT in November 1996 for its technology
improvement in specialized circuit board production and for setting up the development
center.
Third, the government supported GDT's R&D activities by recognizing their excellence
in certain research fields and enrolling them into National Science and Technology (S&T)
programs. For instance, HJD-04 received awards such as MPT S&T Progress First
Award, China Electronic S&T Ten Achievements, and National S&T Progress First
Award. GDT's HJD-04E and its related research became a project enlisted in the "863
Plan" in February 1992 and part of the National Science and Technology Special Plan.
Last, the government actively supported GDT in exporting its products. GDT exported
HJD-04 to North Korea in 1994, the first time that China had exported its PDSS. In
January 1996, the National Science Commission set up meetings with the National
Economic and Trade Commission to discuss the export of HJD-04. After a face-to-face
interchange between the Chinese and Russian governments,2 2 in December 1996, GDT
obtained a license to export HJD-04D to Russia. Moreover, the government became
directly involved in coordinating market demand for domestic suppliers. The second
"Domestic Switch Customer-Producer Coordination Conference" organized by MPT
helped GDT to obtain 3,870,000 orders.
During the filtration stage of China's telecom-equipment industry (1997-2000), GDT
expanded its product range from switching systems to mobile communications and data
communications. The company also started to cooperate with many companies,
institutions, and governments, both domestic and foreign. In this stage, the government
continued its financial, R&D, and export support. Financially, the government increased
its loans to GDT customers, reaching a total of RMB 8 billion for 1998 and 1999. In
terms of R&D support, the government enrolled GDT in more national S&T programs.
21 The loan was designed for GDT's customers. Many local telecom bureaus were short of capital to
purchase the switch equipment. The government used the loan to encouraged telecom service providers to
purchase GDT's products.
2 Summarized from GDT's event calendar from the company's website.
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For instance, GDT was listed as an industrial base for the "863 Plan" and gained six
projects from the "863 Plan." Furthermore, the government continued to support GDT's
exports to other countries. Exports to Russia were further facilitated by the close contact
of the Chinese and Russian governments. In particular, in February 1998, Premier Li
Peng visited Russia, and officials from the two governments signed a cooperation
agreement between GDT and Russia Telecom. As a former military unit, GDT's product
was preferred by the military -- HJD-04 has been used to replace the No. 5 Switch from
the United States as the main switch for Beijing Military Network in the late 1990s.
6.4 Chapter Conclusion
This chapter examined the development of China's telecom-equipment industry and
concluded that domestic firms have caught up with the MNCs in the four stages
described by the staged catching-up theory: the preparation stage (early 1980s to early
1990s), the growth stage (early 1990s to 1996), the filtration stage (1997-2000), and the
globalization stage (2000-2002). Evolution of markets' and companies' economic
indicators, such as revenue, demand, profitability, production structure (employment,
occupation structure), industry structure (concentration, size of firms), government
involvement, and location choices, as well as the individual development histories of
ZTE, Huawei, DTT, and GDT, all have confirmed that China's telecom equipment
industry has gone through the first three stages and is now at the beginning of the
globalization stage.
Analyzing the development history of major companies in the industry, I found that even
though the companies had different backgrounds when they started, they have shared
some commonalities and utilized similar strategies to deal with the changes and
challenges posed by the market and the environment. Table 6.8 summarizes findings, in
the light of Table 3.1 "Business Behavior During the Catching-up Process."
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Table 6.8 Characteristics of China's Telecom-equipment Industry and Domestic Firm's Development
Early 1980s-2002
Stages
Profit margin
Market
characteristics
(demand)
Industrial
structure
Stage 1 Stage 2 (Growth
(Preparation) Stage)
high for high for switches
switches
strong demand strong demand for
for switches switches; growing
demand for other
products
many small Quite a few small to
companies medium size firms
from different
backgrounds
Number of numerous
suppliers foreign
suppliers
numerous JVs and
domestic producers
switches
Stage 3 (Filtration
Stage)
medium for switches,
medium to high to other
equipment
decreased demand for
switches, increase
demand for other
products
consolidated industry;
leading firms invested
heavily in R&D
coexistence of JVs and
Stage 4 (Globalization
Stage)
low for switches, but
medium to high for other
products
low demand for switches;
strong demand for other
products
several distinct large
companies with some
specialized small
companies
coexistence of JVs and
of domestic producers in all domestic producers in all
subsecors of the industry subsectors of the industry
Focus of
resource
development of
domestic firms
Occupational
structure
Government
policy at the
industry level
doing R&D in doing R&D in large
switch scale digital switches
technology
varied
Whole-
system import
and joint
venture
production for
switch
equipment,
R&D support
in switching
technology
increasing R&D ratio
Financial support for
domestic firms (loans
for their trusted
customers and
financial aid for
technology
improvement); S&T
program for
switching technology;
export support;
customer
coordination
doing R&D in access
equipment, optical
transmissions,
diversifying to other
areas, and increasing
manufacturing capability
increasing R&D ratio
National S&T programs
for various technologies
in telecom-equipment
industry, export support;
customer coordination
doing R&D on data and
mobile communication,
increasing management
efficiency, exploring
international markets
high R&D ratio
National S&T programs
for various technologies,
especially in mobile and
data communications,
mobile frequency resource
support for the Chinese
standard TD-SCDMA
Locations of business R&D resources R&D resources (skilled R&D resources (skilled
domestic firms environment, (skilled labor pool), labor pool), labor pool, market-access,
R&D manufacturing base manufacturing base international locations
resources
(where the
innovation is)
Source: Summarized from previous sections.
Note: Stage 1: late 1980s-early 1990s; stage 2: early 1990s-middle/late 1990s; stage 3: middle/late 1990s-
2000; stage4: 2000-present (2002).
Demand for switch equipment has gone from high to low, while the demand for other
sub-sector's equipment has risen since the filtration stage. Corresponding to the change
in demand, profitability for switch equipment has kept decreasing from high to low profit
margin, while the profit margin for other equipment has been rising since the filtration
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stage. The sector's employment has kept growing; however, the speed of growth has
changed from rapid to slow. Also, the occupation structure has been characterized by
increasing R&D staff ratio until now it has a high R&D staff! total Employment ratio. In
terms of the industry structure, the industry has become more concentrated, i.e., the
number of firms has decreased. Firms have varied their priority of location in the
different stages.
In this chapter, I also demonstrate that the government has displayed different
involvement in the four stages of the development of the telecom-equipment industry.
Porter (1990) emphasized that the government should play a supportive and indirect role
that should encourage change, promote domestic rivalry, and stimulate innovation.
However, Amsden (1989), Singh (1992, 1994), and Wade (1990) stressed the importance
of government policies and justified government's direct intervention, especially from the
experience of the newly industrialized countries (NICs) of East Asia. In this research, I
have found the intervention was critical to domestic producers at the earlier stages of
their development. During the preparation stage, the government decision of importation
to satisfy the domestic demand and "to exchange technology with the market" formed the
character of the switch-equipment market - first, "whole system importation," and later,
"joint production with foreign manufacturers." During the growth stage, it is also the
government's persistent R&D and capital support, in addition to its support in market
access, that led to the successful development and the expansion of production of
domestic switching equipment. It is therefore fair to conclude that government
intervention has promoted the development of domestic firms from the preparation stage
to the growth stage. During the filtration and globalization stage, the government became
less involved and focused mainly on helping domestic firms to build knowledge-based
assets, which helps to build the innovation capability of leading domestic firms.
In sum, this chapter has illustrated that Chinese domestic telecom-equipment
manufacturers have followed a path of catching-up that can be described by the staged
catching-up theory, and government intervention has promoted this process. Does
innovation matter during this catching-up process, then? This question will be answered
in the next chapter.
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Appendix 6.1 Global Telecom-Equipment Market
Access Market
The global access market consists mainly of two segments: DSL and cable modem. Digital
Subscriber Line (DSL) refers to a type of digital modem that operates on standard phone lines.
The downstream (data to the user) and upstream (data from the user) data traffic can operate at
symmetric or asymmetric speeds. Cable modem refers to a modem that operates over the
ordinary cable TV network cables. "Cable" is short for Cable TV (CATV) Network. "Modem" is
Modulator-DEModulator.
Digital Subscriber Line (DSL)
In 2001 global service providers spent $2.3 billion on DSL equipment. Among them, Europe and
the Asia-Pacific region led the global market with 66% of the ports shipped. DSL equipment
for service providers here is defined as network systems that stay within the network and support
the major types of high-bandwidth data: Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL), Single-line
High-bit-rate Digital Subscriber Line (SHDSL), and Very-High-Bit-Rate Digital Subscriber Line
(VDSL). Over 19 million DSL ports were shipped in 2001, 98% of them coming from ADSL,
the most popular DSL technology for incumbent service providers, due to its availability, ease of
deployment, and cost structure (RHK, 2002).
Table 6.9 shows that Alcatel led in market share by 41%, which is far ahead of Siemens (13%)
and other followers, namely, Lucent (10%), Fujitsu (8%), and Cisco (8%). Alcatel was able to
maintain leadership in the DSL market in part due to its strong relationships with incumbent
service providers around the world.
Global demand for DSL is still growing and the prices for DSL equipment are continuing to drop.
As a result, competition between vendors is intensifying. Current leading international DSL
vendors are coming under increasing pressure from equipment manufacturers in East Asia,
primarily in China, Korea, Japan, and Taiwan (RHK, 2002).26
Cable Modem
Cable modem includes the following segments: standards-based equipment - Data Over Cable
Service Interface specification (DOCSIS) 27 equipment, proprietary equipment, and Digital Video
23 Source: http://www.bandwidth.ie/downloads/dsl info.pdf as of May 1, 2003.
24 Source: Cable-Modems.org. 2003. "The Cable Modem Reference Guide," http://www.cable-
modems.org as of May 1, 2003 (Cable-Modems.org, 2003).
25 "2001 was a growth year for Europe as incumbent service providers, led by Deutsche Telekom, ramped
up deployment of DSL in order to remain competitive and gain additional broadband subscribers. Asia-
Pacific showed similar deployment growth, accounting for 30% of global DSL equipment revenues. North
American deployments grew slightly in Q4 01, but revenue growth is expected to decline in 2002",said Ian
Cox, Senior Analyst with Broadband Access Networks at RHK (RHK, 2002).
26 BroadBand Access Networks: Global -2001 DSL Market Share. RHK Telecommunications Industry
Analysis website: http://www.rhk.com/pressrelease.asp?id=151 as of Oct. 28, 2002.
27 DOCSIS is the dominating cable modem standard. It defines technical specifications for both cable
modem and Cable Modem Termination System (CMTS) (Cable-Modems.org, 2003).
Chapter 6. Staged Catching-up of Telecom-equipment Manufacturers
Broadcast /Digital Audio-Visual Council (DVB/DAVIC) 28 standard equipment. Within several
years, DOCSIS has grown rapidly to become the main type of equipment shipped. In 1999
DOCSIS cable modems accounted for less than half the cable modems shipped. 29 However, in
the second quarter of 2000, DOCSIS modems accounted for 68% of worldwide cable modem
shipments; proprietary modems represented 31% of shipments, and DVB/DAVIC modems had
only 0.4% share.3 In the last quarter of 2001, DOCSIS modems represented more than 85% of
all shipments and 75% of revenue.31 The cable modem market overall has been growing rapidly
as well. It is expected to grow by 30% to 50% in the next few years32 as demand for broadband
access continues to rise.
Table 6.9 DSL Global Market Share, 2001
Company Share
Alcatel 41%
Siemens 13%
Lucent 10%
Cisco 8%
Fujitsu 8%
Inovia 7%
NEC 6%
Samsung 5%
Others 2%
Total 100%
Source: RHK, 2002
Currently, Motorola is the market leader in the DOCSIS segment, followed by Toshiba. Ambit
Microsystems, a Taiwanese manufacturer, ranked third in terms of worldwide market share (see
Table 6.10). It is worth noting that Taiwanese manufacturers have become the world's largest
suppliers of cable modems. According to the Market Intelligence Center 33 of the Institute of
Information Industry (Taipei, Taiwan), the world shipment of cable modems amounted to over
8.1 million units in 2001. Taiwan's cable modem shipments accounted for 65.6% in 2001 and
were expected to rise to 67.8% in 2002. The main reason for this phenomenon is that more first-
tier cable modem vendors are placing Original Equipment Manufacturing/Original Design
Manufacturing (OEMIODM) orders with Taiwan manufacturers, who have the lowest prices, in
order to bring costs down as the prices for cable modems fall.34
2 DVB/DAVIC standard is also known as DVB-RCC and as ETS 300 800. Very few vendors have
developed equipments for this standard and it is fighting he EuroDOCSIS standard for the European market
(Cable-Modems.org, 2003).
29http://www.cable-modems.org/articles/market as of Oct. 28, 2002.
30 http://www.cable-modem-internet-access.com/market/ as of Oct. 28, 2002.
31 www.joohong.co.kr/eng/news/press/content.asp?idx=4 as of Oct. 28, 2002.
3 http://www.telecom.globalsources.com/MAGAZINE/TS/0208/CABLE0 .HTM as of Oct. 29, 2002.
33http://216.239.39. 100/search?q=cache:sDakIKsbbiYC:www.amigo.com.tw/news/20011202.pdf+market+
share+for+Cable+Modem&hl=en&ie=UTF-8 as of Oct. 28, 2002.
34 http://www.telecom.globalsources.com/MAGAZINE/TS/0208/CABLEO1.HTM. Most Taiwan cable
modem manufacturers produce for several major OEM/ODM buyers, including Com21, Scientific-Atlanta,
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Alongside Taiwan's prosperity in the cable modem market, there is a growing number of
mainland companies producing cable modems as well, such as Chongqing JingHong Hi-Tech,
Star Networking Technology, and WeiFang Beida Jade Bird Huaguang Technology. Some of
them are well prepared for the future cable modem market, which will shift toward next-
generation digital services such as voice and video. For instance, to develop its cable modem,
Star Networking has formed a technical partnership with Texas Instruments (TI), which
specializes in voice-enabled cable modem technology with DOCSIS 1.1-ready technology and
digital signal processors.
Table 6.10 Cable Modem (DOCSIS) Market Share, Q2 2002
Company
Motorola
Toshiba
Ambit
S-A
Thomson
Com2l
Linksys
Terayon
Other
Total
36Source: Company Reports, Kinetic Strategies.
Total Units Total Share
825,000
448,000
433,000
272,000
200,000
57,000
51,161
32,000
250,000
2,568,161
32.12%
17.44%
16.86%
10.59%
7.79%
2.22%
1.99%
1.25%
9.73%
100.00%
Optical Transport Market
The optical transport market can be divided into the following five segments:3 7
1. Dense Wave Division Multiplexer3 8 (DWDM) - Long Haul Terrestrial.
2. DWDM - Metropolitan
3. Synchronous Optical Network/Synchronous digital Hierarchy3 9 (SONET/SDH) -
Asynchronous disconnected Mode (ADM)
4. SONET/SDH - Multiservice
and Toshiba. Three reasons account for the price decrease of cable modems: increase in data rates,
established chip designs, and DOCSIS standards.
3 http://www.telecom.globalsources.com/MAGAZINE/TS/0208/CABLE02.HTM as of Oct. 29, 2002.
36 http://www.cabledatacomnews.com/au02/aug02-1.html as of Oct. 28, 2002.
37 Dell'Oro,2002. http://www.delloro.com as of Oct. 28, 2002. Different research companies vary in their
definitions of the optical transport market. For instance, RHK defines the optical transport market to
include all major categories of equipment used in optical fiber networks: SONET/SDH, MSP, OED,
traditional and superband DCS, WDM, OADM, and OCS equipment.
38 DWDM is a fiber-optic transmission technique that employs light wavelengths to transmit data parallel-
by-bit or serial-by-character. (International Engineering Consortium. 2003. http://www.iec.org.)
39 SONET and SDH are a set of related standards for synchronous data transmission over fiber optic
networks. SONET is short for Synchronous Optical NETwork and SDH is an acronym for Synchronous
Digital Hierarchy. SONET is the United States version of the standard published by the American
National Standards Institute (ANSI). SDH is the international version of the standard published by the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU). (Techfest.com, 2003. http://www.techfest.com.)
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5. Optical Switch
Alcatel led the overall optical transport market in 2001 with a 16% share, followed by Lucent at
12% and Nortel at 11%. The global market for optical transport declined by 34% in 2001, as
optical transport markets in North America and Europe were hit hard by the economic recession.
However, the Chinese market grew by 70% to $1.9 billion.40 China is viewed as one of the
world's most dynamic markets for communications equipment and "the market with the strongest
growth." 4 1 Many of the world's largest and best-known suppliers have established joint ventures
in China, and they supplied approximately one-half of the market's need in 2001. The remaining
half has come from domestic companies. Those domestic companies have gained rapidly in
expertise and are now taking aim at North American and European markets.42 For instance,
Huawei has emerged as the country's strongest optical transport manufacturer and now has
significant impact and potential in Europe.43
Table 6.11 Optical Transport Global Market Share, 2001
Company
Alcatel
Lucent
Nortel
Fujitsu
Ciena
Marconi
NEC
Siemens
Tycom
Tellabs
Cisco
Others
Total
Source: ISP-Plane 4 , 2002
Share
16%
12%
11%
9%
6%
6%
6%
4%
17%
100%
Router Market
We can divide the router market into three segments (Smith-Gillspie, 2001):
* Core Routers. These are used in the backbone of the networks. They are developed
for maximum throughput and capacity.
40 Reported by Strategies Unlimited, a Silicon Valley-based market research firm. http://www.strategies-
u.com/PressRelease.asp?Release=43 as of Oct. 29, 2002.
41 Stephane Teral, director of European and global optical transport at RHK. http://www.isp-
planet.com/research/2002/opticbbone_020225.html as of Oct. 29, 2002
42 http://www.strategies-u.com/PressRelease.asp?Release=43 as of Oct. 29, 2002.
43 http://www.alcatel-sbell.com.cn/en/news/detail.asp?lngRecordlD=896 as of Oct. 28, 2002.
4" http://www.isp-planet.com/research/2002/opticbbone_020225.html as of Oct. 29, 2002
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* Edge Routers. These are used for line aggregation such as broadband (DSL and cable
modem) and corporate access (TI, T3, OC-3). These routers have smaller footprints and
higher interface densities and flexibility.
* Service Routers. Telecom carriers use these to deliver services to customers. They
are generally smaller boxes with a greater amount of application software than other types of
routers.
Revenues of the global router market slipped 3%, from $1.67 billionn in the fourth quarter of
2001 to $1.62 billion in the first quarter of 2002.45 Cisco is the market leader in all router
categories. For all of 2000, the core router market was $2.4 billion; according to the Dell'Oro
report, Cisco had 71% of the market, while Juniper Networks had 28%. For the 3rd and 4th
quarters of 2001 (Table 6.12), Cisco maintained over 80% market share, while Cisco's main rival
Juniper Networks, retained 8% to 11%. However, Juniper Networks is very competitive in the
high-end market, where its core router market share is around 30%.
Table 6.12 Global Router Market Share, Q3 and Q4, 2001
Company Total (Q3) Total (Q4) Core Routers (Q3) Core Routers (Q4)
Cisco 82.70% 84.40% 65% 69%
Juniper Networks 11% 8.50% 32% 27%
Other 6.30% 7.10% 3% 4%
46Source: Dell'Oro, 2002
Ethernet Switch Market
Table 6.13 Global Switch Market Share, Q4 2001 and Q1 2002
Company Q4 2001 Q1 2002
Cisco 60.2% 66.0%
Nortel 7.3% 5.7%
Enterasys 47  5.0% 3.0%
3Com 4.6% 4.2%
Extreme 3.9% 4.2%
Others 19.0% 16.9%
Total 100.0% 100.0%
Source: Summarized from Network World Fusion4 (05/20/2002) and Dell'Oro Group49(02/2002).
4s May 17, 2002, http://www.vnunet.com/News/1 131853 as of Oct. 28, 2002.
46 http://www.bayarea.com/mld/mercurynews/business/2676972.htm and
http://www.rametronics.com/news_25.html as of Oct. 28, 2002.
47 Exterasys Networks had less than 3% market share, down from 5% in the previous quarter. This is due
to the administrative shakeups and financial troubles it has encountered.
48http://www.nwfusion.com/news/2002/0520cisco.html
49 http://www.delloro.com/PRESS/PressReleases/ES021502.shtml
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Ethernet switches can be divided into the following segments50:
1. Ethernet Switches - Layer 2 Ethernet
2. Ethernet Switches - Layer 3 Ethernet
3. Ethernet Switches - Layer 4/7 Server Load Balancing (SLB)
4. Wireless Local Area Network (LAN)
5. Network Interface Cards (NICs)
Cisco has maintained dominance in the switch market, even though the market as a whole was
down by 4% from the previous quarter (Q4, 2001). Of the $2.65 billion worldwide sales of
Ethernet switches in the first quarter of 2002, Cisco has "grabbed a bigger share of a shrinking
pie" - it grew its share from 60% (Q4, 2001) to 66%. Nortel remained a distant second with
5.7%. Other players include Enterasys, 3Com, and Extreme. (Table 6.13)
Mobile Equipment Market
I have divided mobile communication into two main segments: mobile equipment and mobile
handsets, leaving the mobile handset market details until Chapter 10.
Five large companies are dominant in the mobile equipment market: Ericsson, Lucent, Motorola,
Nokia, and Nortel. In addition, there are several regional and second-tier OEMs such as Siemens,
Alcatel, Hughes Network Systems, NEC, Hitachi, Fujitsu, Samsung, Hyundai, and LGIC (see
Table 6.14). Mobile service providers contract with mobile equipment producers to plan,
manufacture, integrate, install, and, in many cases, manage their mobile networks (BT
Alex.Brown, 1999a). Ericsson is the market-share leader globally, based on its leadership in two
important segments, GSM and TDMA. Nokia has also gained market share in the GSM market
(it is number two), based in part on its dominance of the GSM 1800 segment (BT Alex.Brown,
1999b).
Table 6.14 Mobile Infrastructure Market Shares (all standards combined)
Company Market Share*
Ericsson 32%
Motorola 17%
Nokia 12%
Lucent 11%
Nortel 8%
Other 20%
Source: BTAlex.Brown (1999b)
*: Based on percentage of global installed base.
Lucent is strong in Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) (ranking first) and Time Division
Multiple Access (TDMA) (ranking second), which are the largest digital standards in the United
States, but has been less active in international markets. Motorola has been a pathfinder in the
mobile industry and has won a significant Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) and
CDMA contracts. Although Motorola has had problems due to its lack of an internally
manufactured switch, it is solving these issues through closer partnerships with Alcatel and Cisco,
which supply its switches. Nortel has also been a significant player in all digital standards, and
5 Dell'Oro Group (http://www.delloro.com as of Oct. 28, 2002).
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the company's mobile infrastructure business has reportedly been gaining momentum (BT
Alex.Brown 1999b).
Appendix 6.2 Multinational Companies in China
It is widely recognized that the Chinese telecommunication equipment market is one of the most
competitive markets in the world (Xin 2000). Most of the large MNCs, either system providers
or OEMs, compete directly against domestic Chinese firms in the Chinese market. In addition,
major component suppliers have entered the Chinese market through direct manufacturing
operations in China or by providing components to Chinese firms. I briefly introduce the seven
MNCs in China (Table 6.15).
Alcatel China
Alcatel of France entered China's telecom market in 1983 by establishing China's first joint
venture in telecom equipment manufacturing (Shanghai Bell) through its subsidiary Belgium
Telephone. At the time, China was in seriously short supply of basic telephone exchange
equipment. Alcatel benefited from the strong demand by supplying central office (CO) and other
equipment. Alcatel was also the first to bring the GSM cell phone system to China (1993), which
now has a user base of 120 million. Alcatel started China's first GPRS (general packet radio
service) trial network in 1999. In recent years, Alcatel has been facing intense competition in
China's telecom market. In October 2001 Alcatel acquired Shanghai Bell and now controls 51%
of the company.51 Recently, Shanghai Bell formed a mobile communication department with
Korea's Samsung, thus making mobile communication in China even more fiercely competitive.
Cisco Systems China
Cisco Systems opened its first China office in 1994, much later than other foreign companies in
the same industry. Cisco China relies primarily on local partners' channels for sales, rather than
on its own sales force. Most products sold are IP backbone routers and concentrators, broadband
systems, and data switches (all data-communication products). Because the construction of IP
networks has slowed down, Cisco may face serious challenges ahead in developing new markets,
as traditionally the Chinese market is weak in data communications in terms of traffic volume and
number of customers.
Ericsson China
Ericsson has one of the largest investments (exceeding $600 million) among foreign telecom
companies. Ericsson's initial success comes from its early entry and selling central office (CO)
switches (AXE10) in the mid- to late- 1980s. The company has adjusted its strategy from voice-
centric to Internet and IP platforms. Early in 2001, Ericsson announced it would cease cell-phone
production (except in China, because of the robust growth of cell-phone users there) and instead
concentrate on mobile infrastructure and other system-wide products. Nevertheless, the handset
sales of Ericsson in China have slipped from the third to the fourth place because of the strong
competition.
Motorola (China) Electronics
5 This was one of the conditions proposed by the European Union for China to enter into WTO.
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Motorola is the largest foreign investor in China's electronics (including telecom) industry. It has
invested $3.4 billion over the past 14 years. Motorola cell phones have the largest market share in
China (32%). Motorola has moved aggressively in the CDMA area. It won the largest contract
for supplying a CDMA system for China Unicom to be deployed by 2002, worth $407 million.
Motorola is one of the few companies that offer both CDMA infrastructure and handsets. In the
cell-phone market, Motorola now faces intense competition from Nokia, Ericsson, and Siemens,
as well as Chinese companies such as Eastcom, which started two joint ventures with Motorola
for producing base station systems and Motorola cell phones.
Nokia China
Currently, China is the second largest market for Nokia, trailing only the US market. Nokia is
also the second largest cell-phone supplier in China with a market share of 30% (after Motorola).
Nokia is one of the major firms in the Star Net Industrial Park in Beijing. The company has
limited product offerings beyond the GSM cell-phone family, which might put the company in a
vulnerable position if the new service (GPRS, WAP, 3G) does not take off in China as soon as
anticipated.
Nortel Networks China
Nortel is a strong supplier of high bandwidth fiber optic transmission systems. Its largest joint
venture, Guangdong Nortel, won a contract in 2001 from China Unicom to provide a CDMA
network worth $275 million. Nortel competes with Lucent Technologies in high-speed backbone
transmission systems and with Cisco Systems in IP network and broadband equipment.
Siemens China
Siemens China employs 21,000 in China. It has five joint ventures for telecom products; the
company also has a wide range of products in communication, automation and control, medical
equipment, energy, power transmission, transportation, and lighting manufactured in China. In
the telecom area, Siemens China provides switch products and GSM systems and handsets. It
competes with Motorola, Nokia, and Ericsson in the latter. It is now the third largest cellphone
supplier in China.
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Table 6.15 Major Multinational Corporations in China's Telecom-equipment Industry
Facilities and Major Products, 2002
Facilities Major Products
17 facilities in China, including: 6
research (new product dev. And eng.
Services), 11 wholly owned or joint
Alcatel China venture facilities
SDH/DWDM transmission systems,
broadband access, wireless systems and
terminals, IN, OSS and network management
technology support center in Beijing (one
Cisco Systems of the four support centers in the world), 4 IP backbone routers and concentrators,
China regional offices broadband systems, and data switches
CO switches( AXE- , in mid- and late-
1980s), mobile (infrastructure and handsets),
10 JVs, 4 WOSs, and 26 sales offices, 6 data communications and consumer
Ericsson China R&D centers or projects electronics
Lucent
Technologies
China
Motorola
China
Nokia China
Nortel
Networks
China
7 manufacturing facilities (JVs and optical transmission systems (SDH and
WOSs), 8 regional sales offices, 2 Bell DWDM), Internet backbone (ATM and IP
Labs branches (Beijing and Shanghai), switches), CO switch (5ESS) and wireless
and four R&D centers. systems.
one wholly owned factory, one holding mobile switches, base stations, and handsets
company, 8 joint ventures, 18 R&D for GSM and CDMA, walkie-talkies, IC chips,
centers, 26 sales offices, and a software and broadband products, such as HFC, cable
development center for ASICs modems and adaptors.
mobile base stations, controllers, mobile
switch access equipment, digital switching and
22 local offices, five joint ventures and transmission equipment, and various handsets
two research centers, in China
4 joint ventures, 2 research centers, and
various sales office
High bandwidth fiber optic transmission
system (10Gps high-speed transmission
products), ATM switch, wireless Internet, IN,
and VoIP Solution.
5 joint ventures in telecom products CO switches (EWSD switching family), GSM
including BISC, total 40 manufacturing systems and handsets in the field of telecom
Siemens China facilities and 28 local offices. equipment
Source: The Author, summarized from http://www.chinanex.com and websites of each company above.
(www.alcatel.com.cn, www.cisco.com.cn, www.ericsson.com.cn, www. lucent. com. cn,
www.motorola.com.cn, www.nokia.com.cn, www.nortelnetworks.com.cn, www.siemens.com.cn)
Note:
1. After Alcatel's acquisition of Shanghai Bell, all Alcatel facilities in China will be subsidiaries under
Alcatel Shanghai Bell.
2. Nokia: Originally had 8 joint venture, but in March 2002 (or 2003), Nokia announced that it will form
a new joint venture for handset production (including CDMA) which will replace four handset joint
ventures (two in Beijing, one in Guangdong, one in Jiangsu). The new JV will be the largest handset
manufacturer with combined production and exports.
3. Simens provides products and services in communications, automation and control, medical equipment,
energy, power transmission, transportation and lighting in China.
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Appendix 6.3 China's Telecommunication
Overview of the Network
1. Optical Fiber Network
Starting in the early 1990s, the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPT) decided to
devote ten years to building an optical fiber network (50 fiber optical main lines) to cover capital
cities of all provinces and 70% of the regional cities. By the end of 1998, MPT had finished its
"8-Horizontal, 8-Vertical" main line optical transmission network. In 1999 and 2000,
respectively, 290,000 kilometers (km) and 150,000 km new optical fiber lines were built in China,
reaching a total of 1,440,000 km. (ZTE, 2001).
2. Fixed-line Communication
By 2000 China's national capacity for local phone switches had reached 0.18 billion units,
making it the nation with the largest number of the switches in the word; the phone rate reached
15% of the total population. (ZTE, 2001).
3. Mobile Telecommunication
Having started in 1984, China's mobile telecommunication has only 18 years of history. By 2000,
total cellular phone users reached 7.1 million, which was 45% of the annual new phone
ownership. The R&D on mobile communication started in the late 1980s. In the middle- and
late-1990s, analogue mobile technology (1G) was replaced by digital mobile technology (2G or
2.5G) in most developed countries. Currently, GSM 1800 has entered the commercial usage stage.
The GSM network covers 308 regional cities, 91% of all regional cities, and 2000 counties or
local cities, i.e., 88% of all local cities. The network is able to connect with 80 operators from 48
countries/regions for automatic roaming. Moreover, 3G R&D and the test networks in Beijing,
Shanghai, and Guangzhou have been started. (ZTE, 2001).
4. Data Communication
Data communication, centered on computer technology and network technology, is the future of
telecommunication. By the end of 2000, over six million people had used data and multimedia
communication in China.
In sum, currently China has a telecommunication network that is mainly based on the optical
network, complemented by satellite and digital microwave networks. Data transmission has been
incorporated into the network, which is controlled by switches. Moreover, China has participated
in the Asia-Europe Land Optical Fiber and Fiber Link Around the Globe (FLAG) International
Deep Sea Optical Fiber projects, which will increase communication capability and further
integrate the country with the world. (ZTE, 2001).
5. Other subsectors
In 1998 local manufacturing supplied 98% of the switching equipment for fixed local networks.
In the area of optical transmission, domestic manufacturers' products had a substantial percentage
as well. In 1998, 50% of optical transmission systems were produced by domestic manufacturers.
In 1998 China developed its own 2.5 High Speed Optical Transmission Equipment. Currently,
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the ATM Broadband switching equipment is only one or two years behind the leading MNCs. In
the area of access systems, domestic producers now supply 50% of the market need. 2 ZTE by
itself held 34% of the domestic share in 2000. However, in the subsectors, such as mobile
communication and data communication, foreign products have retained most of the market share.
Though starting late and still far behind, China has again made successful group progress since
1998 in the area of mobile switching base stations (Figure 6.1). Datang, Huawei, ZTE, and
Jingpen have successfully developed mobile switches and base station network equipment.
Datang and Huawei's products have been certified and licensed, and can be connected with
foreign-produced equipment in the same networks. In 1998, Datang's GSM System was certified
by MPT. In Novemeber 1998, Huawei's GSM System was certified and licensed. In 1999,
Datang's GSM System started in Shanghai Congming Island. At the "Domestic GSM System
Customer Coordination Conference," Great Dragon, Datang, ZTE, Huawei, and Jinpeng signed
contracts for 7 million orders.
From importation to successful development, China has needed only 4 years to catch up in GSM
Systems. The following figure shows the progress of Chinese domestic producers in the mobile
equipment market.
Figure 6.2 Market Share of Chinese Domestic Vendors in Mobile Equipment Supply
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Source: Yan Xu, 200153
In all subsectors, the government has focused on having sound policies on capital injection, loans,
and supply and demand coordination. The government hoped that domestic producers can obtain
domestic market share in a short period of time with the support of sound policies. Besides
gaining domestic market share, Chinese firms have also started to enter the international market,
though mostly in Eastern Europe, Russia, Africa, and South America. In 1999 the total revenue
from exporting telecommunication equipment and systems reached US$ 46.6 billion. (Xin 2000).
52 Many of the world largest and best-known suppliers established joint ventures in China and they supplied
approximately one half of the market's need in 2001. The remaining half came from domestic companies.
These domestic companies have gained rapidly in expertise and are now taking aim at North American and
European markets. (See 7.1.1 section.)
53 http://www.chamber.org.hk/streaming/ppt/yanxu/wto-hkgcc/sldOO.htm
Xu, Yan, xuyan@ust.hk, Sep. 10, 2001
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Characteristics of the market
At present, China's telecommunication market can be characterized by the following:
1. It is the largest telecommunication market in the world.
2. The development of telecommunication is ahead of the national economy's development.
3. China's telecommunication network has been transformed from a fixed phone network to
broadband integrated service digital network, at the same pace as implementation of this
technology abroad.
4. The development of the market has evolved through "exchanging capital with the
market" and "exchanging technology with the market" to going global.
5. The government supports the domestic producers with beneficial policies.
6. The Chinese telecom market has sufficient supply, or supply exceeds demand.
7. In terms of regional development, the east coastal region has been the main focus; the
center and west regions are far behind.
8. The market for telecommunication operators is not controlled any more by a monopoly;
the competitive operator environment is ready to be open to the global market (as
mandated by China's accession to WTO).
9. Several nationally-owned enterprises with self-developed technologies have arisen.
10. China will still be the focus in the world of most telecommunication MNCs; competition
will become fiercer.
Appendix 6.4 The Catching-up in Switching Equipment
China's market of telephone switches has experienced from total dependence on foreign
equipment, to joint production with foreign manufacturers, to supplying the market with mostly
self-developed switches (Table 6.16).
I divide the process of catching up of the switch equipment into three periods: early 1980s to late
1980s, late 1980s to early 1990s, and early 1990s to late 1990s. The market was characterized by
foreign-import systems in the first period, to joint ventures (JVs) with a 60% of the market share
at the end in the second period, to almost 100% domestic production in the third period.
The first and second period of the switch-equipment market (from the early 1980s to the early
1990s) happened during the preparation stage of China's telecom-equipment industry, i.e., the
industry is preparing the domestic firms for the late catching-up process. During this stage,
telecom-equipment MNCs started exporting finished products to China; later, they set up their
own manufacturing sites in China. The third period (early 1990s to middle/late 1990s) of the
switch-equipment market occurred during the growth stage of the industry. Domestic firms
started entering the available segments of the market, i.e., the small-scale switch equipment, and
then developed their own large-scale PDSS equipment. The market share of domestically
produced switch equipment and the sizes of the companies (in terms of revenue and employment)
expanded quickly during the period. The following paragraphs present a historical review on
how China transformed itself from total foreign-dependence to self-dependence in the field of
switch equipment.
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Table 6.16 China's market of Telephone Switches, Early 1980s to Late 1990s
Market
Periods Supply Characteristics Demand Characteristics Characteristics
Early 1980s -late Urgent demand with All foreign imported
1980s Import all needed systems customer lack of capital switches
Late 1980s - early Joint production with 60% market share for 9
1990s foreign manufacturers Strong demand JVs.
98% market share for
Early 1990s - late Strong demand to nearly domestic producers
1990s Self-development saturated market (including JVs)
Source: ZTE (2001) and Xin (2000).
First Period: Whole System Importation (Early 1980-Late 1980s)
From the early to the late 1980s, China's switch market was characterized by importing whole
systems because domestic producers were unable to supply the needed equipment to service
providers. In 1982, the Fuzhou Telecom Bureau imported the first digital switch (Fujitsu F150).
Local telecom bureaus subsequently imported digital switches from Belgium, France, Japan, and
Italy. The following are some of the examples:
* In 1984 the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunication (MPT) spent 35 billion yen from a
fund that Japan provided to import 520,000 switches and build the first 600 km of fiber optic
lines in China.
* In 1985 the Beijing Telecom Bureau imported 100,000 switches from France.
* In June1985 Guangzhou imported 26,000 switches from Sweden.
* In 1988, the Beijing Telecom Bureau imported 155,000 E1OB switches from Alcatel CIT.
Why did China import so many whole systems during this period? Two demand-side factors
motivated the importation. First, service providers had urgent need to satisfy the domestic
demand for phone installation--several hundred thousand business units and households were
waiting for phone installation in the 1980s. Second, service providers needed abundant finance to
purchase the switch equipment, and importation of the equipment can partially solve the funding
problems. Even though most telecom service providers were very eager to improve their telecom
networks, they were short of capital to purchase the equipment. To resolve the problem for the
service providers as well as to enhance their own marketability, foreign switch vendors asked
their governments to get involved. For instance, to facilitate the importation of switch equipment
from France, the French government lent Beijing Telecom Bureau a mixed loan. Foreign capital
evolved from a single kind of loan to rental and other kinds of loans-government loans, mixed
loans, commercial loans, and mortgages. The local telecom bureaus, supervised by MPT, used the
loans to buy switches for city phones (30 million units) and long distance (2 million units).
Further, they built inter-/ intra-provincial long distance, optical fiber lines (50,000 km),
microwave lines (30,000 km), satellite earth stations (18), automatic letter sorting systems (28),
and other telecom infrastructures.
However, the large amount of importation caused too many models to be coexisting in China.
The main models included: Alcatel (ElO), Siemens (EWSD), NEC (NEAX), AT&T (5ESS),
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Nortel (DMS), Ericsson (AXE10), and Fujitsu (F-150). Moreover, there were huge loans that
China had to pay back. Loans for imports for the period from 1984 to 1990 totaled $1.16 billion
and $5.16 billion for the period from 1991 to 1995." The lenders, both public and private, were
from all over the world: Canada, Sweden, Japan, Belgium, Spain, Germany, France, the United
States, Australia, the United Kingdom, Norway, Finland, Switzerland, Italy, Israel, Hongkong,
and Taiwan, as well as some international organizations, such as the World Bank, and the Asian
Development Bank. (ZTE, 2001).
Second Period: Joint Production with Foreign Manufacturers (Late 1980s-Early 1990s)
From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, the Chinese government set up the policy "to exchange
technology with the market,"5" i.e., the foreign producers could be in the Chinese market for
switches if and only if they agreed to offer some technological help to the Chinese. Consequently,
several joint ventures were established (Table 6.17). Among them, Shanghai Bell, a joint venture
(JV) of Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications with Belgium Bell Corporation established in
1984, was the first one, and it produced S-1240 local switches. Other major ones included joint
ventures with Nokia, Ericsson, NEC, AT&T, and Nortel Networks.
Table 6.17 Major Joint Ventures Established in China for Producing Switches, 1984-1995
Foreign Establishment
Name of Joint Ventures Partner Model Starting Date
Shanghai Bell Belgium Bell S-1240 1984
Beijing International Switching Corp Siemens EWSD 1990
Beijing Ericsson Telecommunication System Limited Corp Ericsson MD1 10 1991
Tianjin RiDian Electronics Telecommunication Industrial Limited
Corp NEC N-61 1992
Qingdao AT&T Keji Telecommunication Equipment Limited Corp Lucent 5ESS 1993
Guangdong Nortel Telecommunication Equipment Limited Corp Nortel DMS 1995
Source: ZTE, 2001.
By 1996 nine joint ventures produced switches and gained over 60% of the domestic market
share. The establishment of those JVs contributed to the domestication of switch products.
Products from those JVs reached the international standard. Some local producers of the JVs
developed their capability in production and learned a great deal from their JV partners. For
instance, Shanghai Bell controlled S-1240's software and hardware technology. Telecom-service
providers directly benefited from the JVs as the price for the switches was much lower than
before. For instance, after Shanghai Bell's establishment, the price of the S-1240 dropped
dramatically from $210 in 1987 to $130 in 1989. Having the S-1240's software and hardware
technology, combined with other lower production cost (such as labor, land, etc) in China,
Shanghai Bell can produce S-1240 switches at a lower cost than the foreign parent (Belgium Bell),
which led to the price drop. (ZTE, 2001; Shen, 1999)
Third Period: Self-development (Early 1990s-Middle/Late 1990s)
54This period is also called "the eighth five years" in China.
"You Shichang Huan Jishu" in Chinese.
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The Chinese government never gave up the hope of developing pure domestic switch products.
In December 1991, HJD-04, which was jointly developed by the Liberation Army Information
Engineering Institute in Zhengzhou (Henan Province) and Luoyang Telephone Equipment
Factory (LTEF), was certified and licensed by the MPT and thus closed a fifteen-year gap of
switch technology between developed countries and China. By the end of 1994, the production
capacity of HJD-04 reached 4 million lines, and its domestic market share was over 15%. In
December 1996, HJD-04 passed the test for entering Russia's telecommunication network, thus
becoming the first Chinese switch to obtain a foreign license.
Later, several other companies developed their switches as well, such as Huawei's C&C08,
DTT's SP-30, ZTE's ZXJ-10,56 Jingpeng's EIM601, and Beijing HuaKe's EIM-601. By 1998 the
domestic products had gained a market share of more than 98% (including JVs). China took
only 10 years in catching up in the ten thousand unit switch equipment (from importing to
developing its own) successfully.
Table 6.18 Switch Production Capacity of Major Firms in China, 1997 (in million units)
Companies Production Capacity
Joint Ventures 12.5-15
Shanghai Bell 5-6
BISC 2.5-3
Tianjin NEC 2-3
Qingdao AT&T 1
Guangdong Nortel 1
Suzhou Fujitsu 0.5
Nanjing Ericsson 0.5
Domestic Firms 13-15
GDT (HJDO4) 6
Huawei (C&C08) 2
Beijing HuaKe (EIM-601) 1
ZTE (ZXJ-10) 1
Wenfang Huaguang (JSN- 1) 1
Legend (LEX-5000) 0.5
All others 1.5-3.5
Source: ZTE, 2001.
The main strategy of the most successful domestic producers was to start switch marketing in the
countryside towns and villages, because the equipment requires less technological complexity
than in urban areas. After they had accumulated some knowledge of customers and lower-end
56 Detailed comparison of Huawei's C&C08 and ZTE's ZXJ- 10 can be found on pages 22-23 of ZTE
Handbook (2001).
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switch technology, they upgraded themselves by developing the large-capacity switches used for
cities. This strategy was called "the countryside encircling the city.""
In 1997 domestic switch production capacity on switches reached 13 to 15 million units (See
Table 6.18), while JV production capacity totaled 12.5 to 5 million. Together they made about 30
million production capacity and occupied 98% of domestic market. In addition to the major joint
ventures mentioned in the second period, domestic firms, such as GDT, Huawei, Beijing Huake,
ZTE, and Wenfang Huaguang, had large production capacities, especially GDT, whose
production of 6 million units gained it a 20-24% market share, was leading all other companies
(including JVs) at the time.
Appendix 6.5 GDT: From Leading to Lagging Behind
In recent years, GDT has suffered from a decline in revenue, especially from sales of its core
central office products, as demand has diminished and competition has risen. As a result, the
company has slid in market share in almost all product categories. For example, MII ranked GDT
28th in telecom/electronics sales in 1998, but only 54th in 1999. The company declined to
participate in the rankings in 2000 and MII removed the company from the list in 2001 for poor
financial performance. In 2001, GDT reported only 400 million RMB ($48.2 million) in revenue
and 90 million RMB ($10.8 million) in operating loss, much worse than the company had
expected.
Thus, GDT changed from being the leader in domestic switch products to being the least
competitive company among the four major telecom equipment manufacturers. GDT's rise and
fall in the past decade indicates the fierce competition in China's telecom equipment market.
Analysts say the main reason for GDT's decline is that it missed the opportunity for an IPO in
1998 and lacked a competitive mechanism within its capital and management structure. The
company also failed to pursue new technology and develop products in demand.58
On July 28, 2002, GDT started its third restructuring to resolve the problems that the company
faced: (1) ownership and management structure, (2) proprietary technology ownership, and (3)
capital structure. Though GDT has a separate committee of shareholders, board of directors, and
control commission, the inherent multi-interest corporate structure has led to continuous conflicts
among different parties. For instance, the shareholders represent capital providers, technology
providers, debt owners, and suppliers. Under such a structure, it is unavoidable to make random
decisions, as well as changing the management team and the company's strategies relatively
frequently. Consequently, the company missed good opportunities for growth even in the areas
in which it had strong roots. For instance, GDT started R&D in access equipment one year
ahead of other companies, but it was unable to seize the growth opportunities later.
Ownership of proprietary technology is another problem that keeps plaguing GDT. In 1996
disputes occurred between technology owners of HJD04, which affected GDT's normal operation
severely. The problem was finally resolved after one year's negotiation and bargaining, but this
57 This is the same as Mao Zedong's strategy in the anti-Japanese war and civil war in the 1930s and 1940s.
Mao's strategy was to root the development of the communist party in the country side, then attack the
Japanese and the Republic Party who occupied the urban areas.
58 www.chinanex.com as of Oct. 20, 2002.
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left the situation that even though the switch technology belongs to GDT, the company does not
have full control over it.
Insufficient capital is another bottleneck for GDT's development. GDT has only one way to
obtain investment capital-bank loans. To accommodate its high operation cost, GDT has
borrowed a large amount of cash from its production units. To make things worse, it also takes a
long time to receive the payment from GDT's customers. At the beginning of 1999, GDT got
contracts, but it could provide no products. The situation soon stimulated a vicious cycle-
because the customers could not get their ordered products, they slowed down their purchasing
and decreased orders from GDT, which dramatically decreased the cash GDT could receive.
GDT then borrowed more cash from its production units to balance its operation cost; but, short
of production capital, the production units were not able to produce orders normally. (Yao,
2002).' 9
59 Yao, Chuanfu. 2002. "Julong's Restructuring, save or reborn?", People's Posts and Telecommunications
(Chinese Newspaper, Ren Min You Dian), November 19, 2002.
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7 Innovation Capability of the Leading Telecom-
equipment Manufacturers
This chapter answers the following research questions:
" What role has innovation capability played in the development of China's domestic
telecom-equipment manufacturers?
" How have the firms acquired their innovation capability?
e What factors have enhanced the building of innovation capability and what role has
the government played during the process?
I start with investigating the role innovation has played in the development of Chinese
domestic firms in Section 7.1, both at the initial and later stages. I examine the
relationship between innovation capability and industrial leadership. In Section 7.2, I
study two major channels that domestic firms use to acquire their innovation capability:
(1) in-house R&D development and (2) external alliance. I further explore the factors,
such as the government, as well as network clustering, configuration technologies, and
sub-sector linkages, which have enhanced the building of innovation capability in Section
7.3. I present concluding remarks in Section 7.4.
7.1 The Role of Innovation Capability
The case studies of the domestic telecom-equipment manufacturers prove that innovation
capability and self-developed technologies have been the key to their catching up with
the MNCs and have determined who are the leading domestic firms in the industry. I will
demonstrate the relationship between innovation capability and industrial leadership
through both a simple regression analysis and some examples at the company level.
7.1.1 Regression Results on Innovation Capability
In the appendix of this chapter, I adopt the liner regression model to investigate the
relationship between "Leadership in the Telecom Equipment Industry" (dependent
variable, Y) and "Rank in Innovation Capability" (independent variable, X). Appendix
7.1.1 exhibits the regression analysis results of the six leading domestic telecom-
2
equipment producers. With an R value at 0.69, the model is significant, indicating that
innovation capability has a strong explanatory power to leadership position of domestic
firms in the industry. The following figure shows the strong correlation between
"Evaluation of Innovation Capability" and "Rank in Telecom-equipment Industry."
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Figure 7.1 Rank in Telecom-equipment Industry vs. Evaluation of Innovation Capability Line Fit
Plot
I further investigate the relationship between "Rank in Innovation Capability" and "R&D
Spending" in Appendix 7.1.2. Here, "Innovation Capability" is a dependent variable (Y).
First, I use "R&D Spending (in million RMB)" as an independent variable (X), and then I
replace it with "Percentage of the R&D Spending of the Revenue" to factor out the effect
of firm size. Both regression results are significant, with R2 at 0.51 and 0.67, respectively.
Figure 7.2 illustrates the correlation between "R&D Spending as % of Revenue" and
"Innovation Capability." The simple regression analysis provides evidence that the
innovation capability of leading telecom-equipment companies is related to their internal
R&D spending.
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Figure 7.2 Innovation Capability vs. R&D Spending as % of Revenue Line Fit Plot
I then examine the relationship between "Revenue", "Profit" and "R&D Spending (in
million RMB)". Appendix 7.1.3 displays the results of the analysis. Figure 7.3 and 7.4
show the line plot of "Profit vs. R&D Spending" and "Revenue vs. R&D Spending".
With R2 at 0.61 and 0.72, it indicates that "R&D Spending" has strong explanation power
for both the leading companies' revenue and profit. The fact that "Profit" vs. "R&D
Spending" has an R2 at 0.72, higher than that of "Revenue" vs. "R&D Spending" implies
that it is more likely that companies with higher R&D spending have a higher profit rate
than companies with lower R&D Spending.
% of Revenue
Plot
0 4-
0.00%
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Figure 7.3 Profit vs. R&D Spending Line Fit Plot
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Figure 7.4 Revenue vs. R&D Spending Line Fit Plot
Chapter 7. Innovation Capability of the Leading Telecom-equipment Manufacturers
7.1.2 Innovation Capability as the Driving Force for the Staged
Catching-up
The first momentum of China's domestic telecom-equipment manufacturers took place
when they had access to domestically developed technology-public digital switch systems
(PDSS). Without this technology developed mainly by Wu Jiangxing and his team in
GDT, it would have been impossible for domestic firms to produce PDSS that could
compete with those of MNCs. In addition to serving as a main source of income, PDSS
also provided domestic firms with valuable R&D and manufacturing experience at the
earliest stages of their development; without that experience, it is unlikely that domestic
firms could catch up in other sub-sectors later on. Therefore, it is the self-developed
technology (PDSS) that enabled several current leading companies to transform
themselves from trading companies to equipment manufacturers. After domestic
producers such as GDT, Huawei, ZTE, and DTT developed the PDSS, they began to
steadily capture market share from the MNCs. For instance, in 1997 the market share of
domestic producers (excluding joint ventures) was over 60%, leaving MNCs with less
than half the market.
Furthermore, leading domestic firms have always focused on developing their innovation
capability, no matter what stage they were in. After accumulating a certain amount of
capital in the preparation stage, they all quickly started developing PDSS in the growth
stage. The experiences of Huawei, ZTE, and GDT were amazingly similar to each other
in the 1980s and early 1990s in terms of developing public switching systems. For
instance, ZTE started with ZX-60, then ZX500. Huawei started with C&C 800 and GDT
started with HJD-04. To facilitate the building of innovation capability, they all had
some kind of cooperation or partnership with universities or research institutes from the
beginning.
At the filtration stage, as the switch market became saturated, most of these companies
started to look at other sub-sectors such as access systems and transmission systems.
Even though the resource focus of this stage expanded to increasing manufacturing
capability, developing markets, and building good customer relationships, developing
innovation capability was kept as a priority over other capabilities and R&D remained the
most important competitive advantage of the leading domestic firms over others.
Because the leading companies accumulated strong innovation capability in developing
switching equipment technology, they were able to quickly build their innovation
capability in other emerging sub-sectors and dealt well with the transition from the
growth stage to the filtration stage.
In the globalization stage of development, the leading domestic firms have expanded
their innovation capability into virtually every sub-sector, especially in data
communications and mobile communications. Companies have started to cooperate with
the first-tier MNCs in R&D, as well as maintaining relationships with domestic research
institutes and universities. Moreover, the companies have been actively participating in
national science and technology programs. Though the resource focus of this stage is on
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improving management efficiency,60 accumulating capital for further expansion, and
developing international markets, innovation capability has been chosen as the most
critical capability to develop. The fact that leading domestic firms always choose R&D
as the most important resource to develop implies a higher return on investment in
innovation capability than any other resources.
7.1.3 Innovation Capability and Leadership of the Industry
Table 7.lMajor Domestic Firms in Telecomm-equipment Industry: Leadership and Innovation
Capacity
Rank in Telecom- Evaluation of Innovation
Company Name $ $$equipment Industry Capacity
Huawei Technology Corporation
Ab * 4i PR A 2 1
Shenzhen Zhongxin Technology Corporation
rIXi1i $tNi.A R &%] 4 2
Datang Telecom Technology Co., Ltd.
) cJ 1-h _ i V1 kN 5 3
Shanghai Bell Co., Ltd.
± * i / R if 3 4
Wuhan Telecommunication Science Institute
w~iiI ~M T~i6 5
Changfei Optical Fiber and Optical Cable Co., Ltd.
-K- 0 6{Y,1 J ff A 7 6
Source:
MII. April 2002. "2002 Top 100 Chinese Electronics Companies" Website:
http://www.mii.gov.cn.
MII. April 2001. "2001 Top 100 Chinese Electronics Companies" Website:
http://www.mii.gov.cn.
PTIC website: www.ptic.com.cn; Shanghai Bell website: www.alcatel-sbell.com.cn; State
Intellectual Property Office of P.R. China, website: www.sipo.gov.cn.
Note:
1. Shanghai Bell Co., Ltd. started in 1984 as a joint venture among Shanghai Telecom Administration,
Alcatel and Belgian government). In May 2002, Shanghai Bell became majority owned by Alcatel (50%
plus one share) and changed its name to Alcatel Shanghai.
2. Posts & Telecommunications Industrial Corporation (P M CM iA [fl AJ, PTIC) was listed
by MII as the largest electronics enterprise in China measured by sales revenue in 2001 and 2002. It was
the telecom-manufacturing arm under the then Ministry of Posts & Telecommunications (now MII). PTIC
was established in 1980. It became a state-own enterprise (SOE) in 1998, and has transformed to a holding
group in 1999. For example, Shanghai Bell one of the largest manufacturers in China, is a joint venture
between PTIC and Alcatel, until Alcatel gain majority control in May 2002. Since PTIC is such a large and
special manufacturing group, I do not include it in the innovation capability analysis.
3. For detailed information see the Appendix.
60 The companies have grown much larger, which poses challenges for these companies because managing
such large enterprises requires management expertise more than ever.
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Table 7.2 Major Domestic Telecom-equipment Manufacturers: Innovation Capacity
R&D R&D R&D Employee
Rank Rank Spending Spending Profit (% Staff (% with
Rank in in in (% of (% of of of Bachelor's
Innovation R&D R&D Revenue) Revenue) Revenue) Employee or higher
Company Name 4 Capacity Input Output 2002 2001 2002 Patent ) 2001 degree
Posts & Telecommunications
Industrial Corp. (PTIC)
ALMR P7 7 7 1.0% 3.0% 4.10% n.a. n.a. n.a.
Huawei Technology Corporation
141-11 1 1 18.8% 12.0% 16.4% 271 46.50% 85%
Shenzhen Zhongxin Technology
Corporation
WIlItI AiitR }*4PA1 2 2 2 10.3% 12.0% 7.3% 217 46% 72%
Datang Telecom Technology Co.,
Ltd.
t 4fx 4iffik 3 3 3 12.3% 11.8% 2.9% 7 41% 93.87%
Shanghai Bell Co., Ltd.
U * / R 4 6 4 5.3% n.a. 13.1% 19 n.a. n.a.
Wuhan Telecommunication
Science Institute
A aW 1 44f)f 5 5 5 6.5% n.a. 8.8% 4 n.a. n.a.
Changfei Optical Fiber and
Optical Cable Co., Ltd.
-K1 AffAVf J P 6 4 6 9.7% 57.2% 3.5% 2 n.a. n.a.
Source:
MII. April 2002. "2002 Top 100 Chinese Electronics Companies" Website:
http://www.mii.gov.cn.
MII. April 2001. "2001 Top
http://www.mii.gov.cn.
100 Chinese Electronics Companies" Website:
PTIC website: www.ptic.com.cn; Shanghai Bell website: www.alcatel-sbell.com.cn; State
Intellectual Property Office of P.R. China, website: www.sipo.gov.cn.
Note:
1. Even though Posts & Telecommunications Industrial Corporation (* I PTIC)
had the highest revenue as a telecom-equipment industry in both 2001 and 2002, it has very low innovation
capacity and its profit rate is 4.10%. Because PTIC's complicate structure and history (it is composed of
many different factories that were belong to MII before), I didn't listed PTIC in this table for comparison.
2. Huawei has gained 329 patents, according to Huawei'swebsite: www.huawei.com.cn as of June 27, 2003.
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Strength in innovation capability and self-developed technology has determined who are
the leading domestic firms in telecom-equipment industry. Table 7.1 lists major domestic
firms in the telecom-equipment industry. I rank companies' leading position in the
industry by their sales revenue and the evaluations by the Ministry of Information
Industry (MII, 2003). I create indexes of innovation capability for each company by
aggregating evaluations from professionals of the field, taking companies' R&D input
and R&D output into account. The R&D input includes two indicators: firms' R&D
spending as a percentage of the sales revenue and firms' R&D staff as a percentage of
total employment. The R&D output includes indicators such as companies' patent
numbers and participation in national S&T programs. Table 7.1 illustrates that a strong
correlation exists between companies' leadership and innovation capability. For instance,
Huawei, the leader in the industry, also heads in innovation capability.
Table 7.2 shows a more detailed investigation of innovation capability of these
companies than Table 7.1. Domestic leading firms, such as Huawei, ZTE, and DTT,
generally spend over 10% of revenue in R&D each year. For instance, Huawei spent
18.8%, ZTE spent 10.3%, and DTT spent 12.3% of their revenues in R&D in 2002. This
level is comparable to the international R&D spending standard in the telecom-equipment
industry, i.e., from10% to 20% (Table 7.3). Furthermore, Huawei, ZTE, and DTT all
achieved an R&D staff/total employment ratio over 40%. Shanghai Bell, a joint venture
with Alcatel and the Belgian government, though large in terms of size, has low
innovation capability compared with its industrial leadership. Shanghai Bell spent only
5.3% of its revenue in R&D and the R&D staff was 31% of the total employment in 2002,
significantly lower than other leading domestic firms.
Telecom-equipment MNCs in China have less R&D input than the domestic firms,
measured by R&D spending as a percentage of revenue and R&D staff members as a
percentage of employment in China. As I mentioned in Chapter 6, multinational
corporations that have a major presence in China are also global leaders in the industry.
Table 7.3 compares seven major MNCs' R&D statistics worldwide and in China. These
MNCs had an average global R&D spending of 15% of sales revenue, with Cisco,
Ericsson, and Nortel as leaders (21.4%, 20.1%, and 18.7%, respectively) and Siemens
and Nokia as distant followers (7.8% and 9.6%, respectively). In contrast, they invest
much less in R&D to their Chinese branches than their Chinese peers (R&D staff as a
percentage of the total workforce is much lower).
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Table 7.3 Major MNCs in the Telecom-equipment Industry, R&D World-wide and in China
World-wide China
Company R&D Total R&D R&D R&DName Spending Revenue R&D Staff Spending R&D Staff
(in (in Spending Total (% of per Employ Staff (% of
million of million of (% of R&D Employ- Employ- Employee -ment in in Employ-
dollars) dollars) Revenue) Staff ment ment) (in dollar) China China ment)
Alcatel
(France) 2,567 22,698 11.3 18,700 99,314 19 25,845 6500 2000 31
Cisco
(U.S.) 4,777 22,293 21.4 n.a. 38,000 n.a. 125,711 300 n.a. n.a.
Ericsson
(Sweden) 4,516 22,447 20.1 n.a. 85,200 n.a. 53,002 4500 n.a. n.a.
Lucent
(U.S.) 3,520 21,294 16.5 n.a. 77,000 n.a. 45,714 3000 467 16
Motorola
(U.S.) 4,358 30,004 14.5 n.a. 111,000 n.a. 39,261 13,000 1300 10
Nokia
(Finland) 2,672 27,925 9.6 20,463 53,849 38 49,628 5,000 300 6
Nortel
(Canada) 3,380 18,033 18.7 n.a. 53,600 n.a. 63,061 2600 110 4
Siemens
(Germany) 6,028 77,329 7.8 53,000 484,000 11 12,455 21,000 n.a. n.a.
Source: Company's global data is adapted from MIT Technology Review (2003 Jan.).
Note:
1. All data are 2002 data, unless specified. The global data of the companies are for fiscal years ending
between June 1, 2001 and May 31, 2002
2. Alcatel's R&D spending was 13.5% of revenue (euro 2.2 billion) in 2002 and 11.3% in 2001.
3. Cisco's employment in China was estimated at 300 in 2002.
4. Ericsson's employee was 61,000 as of June 22, 2003 (Ericsson website, www.ericsson.com). Because
the company has continued suffering from loss since 2001, Ericsson decided to cut its workforce to
below 60,000 by the end of 2003. (Chinanex.com)
5. Number for Lucent Technology R&D staff include Qingdao Lucent (239), Lucent Optical Network
(200), and Bell Lab Research China (28).
6. Lucent Technology's total employee was 40,000 as of Dec. 31, 2002 (Lucent website:
www.lucent.com). It was significantly different from the data recorded by MIT Technology Review,
because the company had a huge layoff in 2002.
7. Nokia claimed that it has over 38% of personnel works in R&D. (Nokia's website: www.nokia.com,
About Nokia-Research & Venturing - Career in Research as of June 2003).
8. Siemens had less than 3,752 R&D staff in other countires outside of U.S., Europe, and India in 2002.
Nearly 50% of its total R&D expenditure was in the information and communications. (Siemens
website: www.siemens.com).
9. Average R&D spending as a percentage of revenue is 15% for all seven companies.
I have reviewed ZTE's stages of development and GDT's early development of switch
technology in the previous chapter. Here, I would like to offer three examples showing
how innovation capability drove the domestic telecom-equipment companies to catch up
to the MNCs. The first example is about Huawei's vision on innovation capability: it
shows how Ren Zhenfei, the founder of Huawei, insisted on building innovation
capability from the beginning and thus gave Huawei an competitive edge over others at
later stages. The second example talks about how Huawei used its local advantage and
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innovation capability to advance in the global system for mobile communications (GSM)
and third generation mobile communications systems (3G) in later stages. The last
example demonstrates the challenges that DTT has faced in developing China's own 3G
standard, TD-SCDMA, and why government support has been crucial.
7.1.4 Ren Zhenfei and Innovation capability of Huawei
Huawei has always invested a heavy percentage of revenue in R&D, higher than any
other domestic firm or any MNC in China in the telecom-equipment industry (Table 7.2).
Huawei's high internal R&D investment is a direct result of its founder's determination
to improve the company's innovation capability. Originally an army officer, Ren
himself is definitely known to have personal charisma, reflected in his vision for his
company, even though no media have been able to interview him since he started the
company. As Huawei's founder and sole leader, Ren Zhenfei believed that the country's
"exchange market with technology" policy would lead to the loss of the domestic market
to the MNCs. Not only were the Chinese unable to obtain foreign technologies, but
domestic companies had also been put at a disadvantage. (Xiao, 2002)
Thus, Ren set up goals for Huawei at the very beginning "to develop the national industry,
not to set up joint ventures with foreign companies, to follow closely global cutting-edge
technology, to insist on self-development, to gain domestic market share, and to explore
the international market and compete against international rivals." Through these goals,
Ren aimed to build Huawei into a world-class and technologically advanced telecom
equipment manufacturer from the very beginning. He ignored the lucrative stock and
real estate businesses in the early 1990s and "was stubborn enough to put all his eggs in
one basket"-the heavy investment in R&D has ranged from RMB 80 million to over 100
million per year in recent years. Even in the earlier years of Huawei, the company had a
high R&D/employee ratio, namely, 500 R&D staff and only 200 production staff.
Ren Zhenfei and his company are well respected by many Chinese because Huawei, a
purely Chinese company, has achieved great success in the telecom equipment field,
surpassing not only domestic peers but also many joint ventures set up by MNCs.
It is worth noting that Ren Zhenfei has been appreciative of government policies that
have played a vital role in Huawei's development. Ren has commented (Xiao, 2002, p.
127) the following
..Huawei was somewhat naive to choose telecom equipment as its
business domain in the beginning. Huawei was not prepared for such an
intensified competition when the company was just established. The rivals were
internationally renowned companies with assets valued at tens of billions of
dollars. If there had been no government policy to protect (nationally owned
companies), Huawei would no longer exist...
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7.1.5 Huawei in GSM and 3G
Domestic producers, including Huawei, entered into the global system for mobile
communications (GSM) area much later than the MNCs. However, Huawei achieved
unexpected success in the value-added part of GSM, such as integrated gateways, mobile
intelligent networks, General Packet Radio Service (GPRS), and short message centers.
For instance, in the field of mobile data communication, such as short messaging,
Huawei's equipment has more than 50% of the domestic market. The key to Huawei's
success lies in its fast and precise reaction to customer requests as well as its self-
developed technology, as shown in the following examples. For instance, in 1999, China
Mobile proposed a plan of prepaid fees for cell phones. MNCs were unable to provide
the system or reacted reluctantly. Based on its accumulated R&D experience in GSM,
Huawei developed the product within a very short time. The new product-mobile
intelligent network-can be conveniently overlaid with existing networks. Within several
months, Huawei's mobile intelligent network equipment had over 30 million users and
monopolized China's domestic market for a while. Even in 2002, it had around 80-90%
of domestic market. Later, the product became popular in Southeast Asian countries as
well. 6 1
A follower in the area of GSM, Huawei has upgraded itself to keep pace with the global
development of the third generation wireless communications system (3G). Huawei
introduced "Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) 2000 1XEV-DO" with speeds up to
2.4 Megabits Per Second (Mbps) in 2002. During the same year, it had a series of
achievements with Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA). (China
Electronics News, January 17, 2003)
* At the beginning of the year, it passed the MTnet test.
* In June 2002, it made a commercial terminal call based on the R99 protocol.
* In September 2002, in its Shanghai WCDMA external experimental network, Huawei
successfully made the first world WCDMA intelligent call based on CALMIEL m.
* In October 2002, it established China's first 3G Open Lab with NEC and introduced
the smallest WCDMA large-scale base station to-date.
* In December 2002, at International Telecommunications Union (ITU), Huawei
introduced WCDMA core network equipment based on soft switches.
Huawei's achievements came from its early start and heavy investment in 3G. As early
as the end of 1995, Huawei started R&D in CDMA. In 1998 Huawei started to develop
WCDMA products. From 1998 to May 2002 Huawei invested RMB 3 billion in
WCDMA and its R&D staff has totaled 3,500, including people from its U.S., Swedish,
and domestic R&D centers. It has operated over 20 WCDMA experimental networks
worldwide. (China Electronics News, January 17, 2003)
61 China Electronic News (Chinese newspaper), January 17, 2003.
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7.1.6 DTT and TD-SCDMA
DTT and Siemens jointly developed the Chinese 3G standard, Time Division -
Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access (TD-SCDMA), which was accepted by the
Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) in May 2000 as one of the third-
generation mobile communications standards. TD-SCDMA used new technologies that
represent future directions for wireless communications, such as synchronized CDMA,
intelligent antennas, software-based wireless, and high-speed data transmission.
Intelligent antennas and software-based wireless are unique to TD-SCDMA. In addition,
TD-SCDMA is claimed to have high spectrum utilization because TD-SCDMA uses the
Time Division Duplex (TDD) model and only needs a single channel for bi-directional
communications.6 For instance, TD-SCDMA needs only 1.6MHz of spectrum resources,
while Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA) requires 10MHz of
bandwidth (5MHz in each direction).
The current (2002) allocation of international 3G frequencies is actually to TD-
SCDMA's advantage. In Europe, 3G frequencies have been auctioned for both
Frequency Division Duplex (FDD) and TDD. In Asia Pacific, except for Japan and
Korea which only auctioned FDD licenses, Singapore, Malaysia, and Taiwan auctioned
both FDD and TDD, while Australia auctioned TDD and FDD to different service
providers. The United States has cleared 31 MHz of frequency resources to be used for
TDD in 2002, but even the largest continuous frequency segment available has only
4MHz. Since WCDMA needs 10MHz and CDMA 2000 needs 8MHz for both directions,
it seems only TD-SCDMA can use the current frequency resources for 3G in the United
States. 63
Compared to other standards, TD-SCDMA has much less support and R&D investment
(Table 7.4). For instance, WCDMA has 27 companies as main supporters, which
includes NTT DoCoMo of Japan, Ericsson and Nokia in Europe. CDMA 2000 has most
support from North America and Korea, such as Qualcomm, Nortel Networks, Motorola,
and Samsung. Distinguished domestic companies, such as Huawei, ZTE, and Jingpeng,
are also supporters of WCDMA and CDMA 2000. WCDMA and CDMA 2000 have
invested $40 billion and $10 billion in their development, while TD-SCDMA has only
invested less than $1 billion. Further, worldwide, there are over 50,000 and 10,000 R&D
staff work on WCDMA and CDMA 2000, while less than 3,000 for TD-SCDMA. (Table
7.4)
For a while, it seemed the Chinese government had no special interest in this
domestically produced standard and would put the three standards in a quite equal
position; whereas the two incumbent operators, China Mobile and Unicom, seemed to
favor the other two standards (GSM-GPRS-WCDMA and CDMA-CDMA2000 IX-
CDMA2000 EV) over TD-SCDMA. DTT, however, a small company by international
62 Communication World (Chinese Magazine, Tong Xin Shi lie). August 18, 2002. p. 36.
63 Communication World (Chinese magazine), July 28, 2002, p 10-11.
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standards with only $0.2 billion annual sales revenue, started a no-return journey by
focusing almost all its attention on TD-SCDMA.
It was not until October 23, 2002, that DTT finally obtained signals of support from the
government. The government was planning for the future expansion of TD-SCDMA, as
indicated by an announcement made on that day. The Ministry of Information Industry
(MII) announced64 that it allocated 155 MHz 65 of TDD resource to TD-SCDMA and a
total of 120 MHz symmetrical FDD resource to WCDMA and CDMA 2000 (60 MHz
each). TD-SCDMA obtained 155 MHz asymmetric TDD ranges: 1880-1920MHz, 2010-
2025MH, and 2300-2400MHz. In addition to the 55 MHz of the core frequency range
assigned by IEEE, TD-SCDMA obtained the extended 100 MHz, 2300-2400 MHz, which
used to belong to the military. This frequency division demonstrates the support of the
Chinese government for TD-SCDMA, the Chinese 3G standard. Just one week later, on
October 30, 2002, responding to this announcement, seven telecom-equipment
manufacturers--Southern Hitech, Huali Group, Huawei, Legend, ZTE, China Electronics
Group, and China PuTian Group--joined DTT to form the TD-SCDMA Industrial
Alliance, with the support of three government agencies - the State Planning Commission,
MII, and the National Science and Technology Department. (Renmin Youdian, October
31, 2002).
Table 7.4 Three Standards of 3G: Support and their R&D
Government and R&D
International staff Investment
Standard Supporting Companies Organization (globally) (per year)
27 companies of WCDMA Alliance, 15 countries in EU, Japan
WCDMA including NTT DoCoMo, Nokia, and countries with GSM 50,000 $40 billionEricsson, and Chinese companies such standards, allocated
as Huawei, ZTE frequency
Over a dozen companies in CDMA U.S., South Korea andDevelopment Group, including countries with CDMACDMA 2000 Qualcomm, Motorola, Samsung, standard, allocated 10,000 $10 billion
Nortel, and Chinese companies such as frequency
ZTE, Jinpeng
TD-SCDMA Datang, Siemens China, finished frequency Less than less than
allocation recently 3,000 $1 billion
Source: Communication World (Chinese magazine), November 28, 2002, p. 14-17.
6 It is entitled as "Announcement about the Third Generation Public Mobile Communication System
Frequency Planning."
65 I note that many countries have assigned the core frequency range to either WCDMA or CDMA 2000. If
TD-SCDMA only has part of the core frequency, it will be difficult to expand globally even if it is
successful in China, thus unable to roam internationally. However, if the commercialization of the new
expanded frequency range is successful, it will potentially affect other neighboring countries since the
2300-2400 MHz frequency range is free for most of them.
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Having China's own 3G standard makes it possible for Chinese manufacturers not only to
pay no patent fee for TD-SCDMA, but also to be offered a much lower fee using other
standards. For first- and second-generation mobile communications, China paid billions
of dollars in patent fees and other intellectual property fees related to the mobile
standards. For instance, for every CDMA cell phone produced by Chinese manufacturers
and every customer initialized by China Mobile, China needed to pay a $2 patent fee to
Qualcomm. After the development of TD-SCDMA, nine companies from the WCDMA
alliance announced that it would cap the cumulative royalty rate to patent holders for its
Chinese partners to be less than 5%, much lower than for other countries. (Economic
Observation, Januaray 6, 2003)
The cumulative royalty cap--which would apply both to mass market phones and network
equipment--would limit the total patent-based royalty on any given item to 5% of the sale
price, regardless of how many patents are involved (and who holds them).66
However, there are still great challenges facing DTT and the industrial alliance before
commercialization of TD-SCDMA products. These challenges come from limited capital
resources, tight time constraints, and insufficient human resources. 67 Currently, there are
three major funding sources for TD-SCDMA: (1) government funding for the 3G
development group (the government had invested RMB 70 million by November 2002);
(2) loans from banks; and (3) DTT's funding from various sources. In 2003, the
company plans to get RMB 1 billion capital for investment. In addition to the existing
channels for capital, DTT plans to license some of its technologies to other manufacturers.
Compared to WCDMA and CDMA, which have over a decade of experience, TD-
SCDMA has less than a three-year history. Though its speed of development is much
faster than the other two, the commercialization will not be realized until 2004 or 2005.
Furthermore, acquiring more technical expertise to work for TD-SCDMA
commercialization is another task with which DTT has to deal. Because TD-SCDMA
uses the same core network, no development would need to be done for the core network
part. DTT has developed the access equipment, and it plans to introduce it (including
base station and its controller) to the market in the second half of 2003. They will
develop the chipset at the same time. DTT plans to have TD-SCDMA handsets appear in
the market in the first half of 2004.68
7.2 Channels for Acquiring Innovation Capability
I have evaluated Huawei, ZTE, and DTT as leaders in innovation capability. How have
these domestic firms achieved this status? Here I examine two major channels: in-house
66 Mobile Business Daily, May 13, 2002. "Nokia Proposes Patent Fee Cap for 3G Systems".
http://www.mbusinessdaily.com/story/INDUSTRY/MBZ20020513S002 as of Jan 31 2003. In May 2002,
Nokia proposed to promote the spread of Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA) for 3G nets
by capping the royalty rate paid to patent holders at 5%.
6 Interview #19.
68 Communication World (Chinese Magazine), November 28, 2002.
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R&D development and external alliance. I found that in-house R&D development,
supplemented with external alliance, is major revenue for leading domestic firms to build
their innovation capability.
7.2.1 Internal Development
In-house R&D has turned out to be the most important factor for domestic firms to
improve their innovation capability. Domestic leading firms have invested a large
amount of capital and devoted a large percentage of their workforces in R&D activities,
much more than most of the other electronics companies in China and multinational
corporations in the telecom-equipment industry in China. As shown in the previous
section (7.1) and Table 7.2, domestic firms invested heavily in R&D. Leaders in
innovation capability, Huawei, ZTE, and DTT, invested 18.8%, 10.3%, and 12.3% of
their revenues in R&D in 2002, listed as the top three by MII in terms of "R&D spending
as percentage of revenue" of "China's 100 largest electronics companies" in 2002.
Moreover, this level is comparable to leading MNCs' levels of R&D spending in the
telecom-equipment industry as shown by Table 7.3, whose average R&D spending was
15% of revenue in 2002. Taking Huawei, the leader in innovation capability and the
telecom-equipment industry, as an example, it was listed as the 7 th largest electronics
company in China by revenue, but its R&D expenditure topped all other companies listed
in "China's 100 largest electronics companies" in 2002.69
Furthermore, the occupation structure of their employees illustrates that leading domestic
telecom-equipment companies had 30%-40% of their workforce devoted to R&D in 2002
(Table 7.5 and Figure 7.5), significantly higher than most MNCs' operations in China
(Table 7.3). For instance, Lucent, Motorola, Nokia, and Nortel each have 16%, 10%, 6%,
and 4%, respectively, of employees working in R&D.
Table 7.5 Occupation Structure of Major Telecom Equipment Manufacturers, 2002
Year ZTE Huawei Datang GDT
Total 12916 18000 4183 2500
R&D 42% 46% 30% 54%
Marketing 32% 33% 30% 35%
Management & Other 10% 9% 17% 10%
Production 17% 12% 24% 10%
Average Age 28 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Ph.D. 2% n.a. 1% n.a.
Master and Above 31% n.a. 22% n.a.
Bachelor and Above 75% 85% 73% 85%
Source:
ZTE Annual Report 2002; DDT Annual Report 2002;
Huawei's website; GDT's website
Note:
GDT's data is for Year 2001.
69 Moreover, Huawei's R&D/Revenue ratio is the highest among all four telecom companies.
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Figure 7.5 Occupation Structure of Major Domestic Telecom Equipment Manufacturers, 2002
Source: Table 7.5.
Figure 7.6 Education Level of the Workforce, Major Domestic Telecom Equipment Manufacturers,
2002
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Source: Table 7.5,
Note: the data of "Ph.D." and "Master and Above"
data of "Ph.D" is unavailable for Huawei's workfon
are unavailable for GDT's workforce and the
An examination of the workforce's education level indicates that these companies
probably have the most educated workforce in China (Figure 7.6). Each of the four
companies has over 70% to 80% workforce with bachelors degrees and 20% to 60% with
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Master's degrees or higher. For instance, among Huawei's 22,000 employees, more than
85% have bachelors or higher degrees, and about 60% hold a master's or PhD degree.
According to one interviewee, MNCs have two disadvantages in R&D in China, which
implies that domestic firms have two advantages. 70 First, unlike major domestic
companies, such as ZTE, Huawei, DTT, and GDT, foreign firms (joint ventures or wholly
owned subsidiaries) do not have high-level R&D staff in China, but instead they are
staffed mostly with marketing and local R&D people (for simple customization). This
view is in line with the view of Amsden et al (2000) that higher-level R&D, i.e.,
exploratory and advanced development, should be located close to production or markets.
The reason could be that MNCs worry about leaking of their tangible knowledge,
especially in a country that has issues with enforcement of intellectual property. Second,
while foreign firms are suffering separation of their marketing people from the core R&D
staff in the home country, domestic firms have their marketing people closely connected
with their R&D staff. Thus, once domestic firms grasp the needs of service providers
through marketing people (and sometimes even through the R&D people themselves),
their R&D departments can develop solutions and provide the desired products and
services in a timely fashion.
Corresponding with a large investment in R&D are the R&D facilities of the companies.
Huawei and ZTE both have over ten R&D facilities within China and abroad. DTT has
two R&D centers in Beijing and Shanghai, while GDT has one R&D center in Beijing.
Huawei has six R&D centers in Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing, Hangzhou, Xi'an, and
Chendu, as well as the Huawei Technology Center in its Shenzhen headquarters.
Furthermore, Huawei has five overseas R&D offices: in Dallas and Silicon Valley in the
United States, and in Sweden, India,71 and Russia. These overseas offices connect the
company closely with the latest developments in microelectronics and telecom
technology. (Huawei, ZTE, DTT, and GDT's websites)
Since 1986, ZTE has built 12 R&D facilities within and outside China (Table 7.6).
Among all these R&D facilities, ZTE regards its Nanjing R&D Institute as the most
72distinguished. It developed the ZXJ large switching system, the first brand product of
ZTE, and has undertaken R&D of key projects of the national "863 Plan." These R&D
centers and joint laboratories have enabled ZTE to utilize the skilled labor pool of the
locations and continue to learn from its technologically advanced partners.
70 Interviewee #13.
71 The Huawei India Software R&D Institute became the first Chinese company to obtain the certification
from the CMM 4 International.
72 Interviewee #8 and #13.
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Table 7.6 ZTE R&D Facilities
Name Date Location Main Activities
Septem-
ber 1993 Nanjing
developed ZXJ10 large switching system, data network, network
value-added service products and network core equipment;
undertaking R&D of key projects of National "863" Plan; current
five series of products: data network, wired network, intelligent
network, network billing and Soft Switch.
Shanghai R&D
Institute
Shanghai R&D
Institute II
Shenzhen R&D
Institute
Beijing R&D
Institute
Xi'an R&D Institute
August
1994
July
1997
covers an area of almost 5000 square meters; currently engaged in
research and development of router of ISDN, access server of IP,
Shanghai POTS based on ISDN network, ATM, HFC and CATV.
engaged in research and development of mobile communication
system.GSM 900/1800 mobile communication system ZXG10 has
been widely applied at home and abroad; the first Chinese mobile
communication network planning & optimization software -C
PlanMaster has been successfully applied to network construction;
has developed GSM dual-band series handsets (ZTE189, ZTE289
and ZTE389), CDMA UIM handset (ZTE802) and PHS handset.
Shanghai 3G product of WCDMA (ZXW10) is being researched now.
mainly engaged in research and development of SDH transmission
series, videoconferencing system, telecom power supply,
centralized monitoring system, automation of electric substation
1986 Shenzhen and production testing equipment.
October
1998
April
2000
Chongqing R&D Septem-
Institute ber 2000
ZTE Post Doctoral
Station
Shenzhen TI-ZTE
DSP Joint Lab
National Technology
Center
R&D Center of
Mobile
Communication
Engineering
Technology
Beijing
Xi'an
engaged in research and development of WDM and new generation
of optical transmission system.
engaged in research and development of wireless communication
technology
engaged in research and development of intelligent services and
Chongqing network management products.
Novem- has presented 10 R&D projects and come to over 20 cooperation
ber 1998 Shenzhen agreements with key universities and domestic research institutes.
Septem- engaged in tracing and introducing the latest DSP technology and
ber 1998 Shenzhen training R&D presonnel.
April engaged in research following, project selection and project
1999 n.a. management
May
1999
Holding Company in July
Korea 1999
n.a.
the center is strongly supported by Shenzhen municipal government
in financing and policies.
ZTE Korea FutureTel Co., Ltd. is engaged in the research of
S. Korea CDMA handset.
Source: the author, summarized from ZTE's website: www.zte.com.cn as of 10/22/2002.
7.2.2 External Alliance
External alliance will facilitate the building of innovation capability, however, that is
only complementary to internal development. All four companies have joint R&D
facilities with domestic and foreign companies and institutes. Most foreign cooperation
started in the filtration stage and globalization stage, especially globalization stage.
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Among them, Huawei has the most cooperation with international MNCs. Huawei has
actively undertaken joint R&D laboratories with foreign companies, such as Texas
Instruments (TI), Motorola, International Business Machines Corporation (IBM), Intel,
Ageare, ALTERA, SUN, Microsoft, and NEC, focusing on various telecom technologies.
In addition to its own R&D facilities, ZTE has joint laboratories with Beijing University
of Posts and Telecommunications (BUPT), Motorola, and Xi'an Electronic Engineering
Institute in China. Similarly, DTT has joint R&D activities with domestic and
international partners, such as MII Beijing Design Institute, Electronics S&T University,
TI, BUPT, and JAS South Korea, in addition to its two R&D centers in Beijing and
Shanghai. GDT also has wide cooperation with different institutes and companies
domestically and abroad, such as China HP, C&S Technology and Space from South
Korea, etc. Details of the four companies' joint efforts can be found in Appendix 7.4.
In my view, Huawei, as well as ZTE and DTT, have utilized their cooperation with
foreign MNCs who are leaders in late technologies as a complementary approach to
developing its innovation capabilities in addition to its internal development. As Hu,
Jefferson, and Qian (2003) pointed out, the contribution of technology transfer was found,
through their analysis of Chinese large and medium size enterprises, to be conditional on
its interaction with in-house R&D. Chinese firms generally do not consider foreign
cooperation as an effective tool for technological improvement, but may be used as a
complementary tool. For instance, one of the senior R&D managers at Huawei's Beijing
R&D center pointed out (quoted in Smith-Gillespie, 2001, p. 82),
"Huawei does not view R&D cooperation with foreign companies as an effective
mechanism to gain technological competitiveness," since "there is no reason for foreign
firms to transfer their most advanced core technologies to a Chinese partner over whom
they do not have management control."
7.3 Factors Affecting Improving Innovation Capability
The case studies have confirmed that government involvement in accumulating
knowledge-based assets is crucial for improvement of the innovation capabilities of
domestic firms in the telecom-equipment industry. It has helped to build a positive
feedback system that rewards the companies' efforts in building innovation capability
and developing proprietary technologies.
The positive feedback system for innovation capability is composed of:
- (1) network clustering of R&D functions, which makes innovation easier as
firms communicate and exchange ideas--location matters
- (2) disintegration of the global value chain, which acts as a catalyst for
innovation in specific areas
- (3) sub-sector linkage, which rewards innovation efforts by faster diversification
into other sub-sectors
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7.3.1 The Government
The Chinese government has used the national S&T programs to encourage R&D
activities by domestic companies. These programs select companies and research
institutes for the projects according to their strengths in the corresponding fields, and
provide them with funding for cutting-edge research. For instance, ZTE has been
involved in 19 projects of the "863 Plan." Huawei, DTT, and GDT have gained several
research projects from the "863 Plan" as well.
Sometimes the government also directly provided funding for technology improvement
of certain key products to the firms studied here. For instance, the Construction Bank
loaned RMB 0.7 billion to Great Dragon in November 1996 for technology improvement
of a specialized circuit board production line and a development center. The
effectiveness of this kind of aid is still in doubt for firms' long-term innovation capability.
There are two distinguished national S&T development programs: the Torch Program
and "863 Plan." Initiated in 1988, the Torch program73 aims to make technological
development more market-oriented and facilitate commercialization of technology.
Sponsored by the State Science and Technology Commission, the main tasks of the Torch
Program include:
1. Develop a favorable environment for high tech industry.
2. Set up high-tech zones and high-tech business start-up service centers.
3. Execute Torch projects in seven high-tech industries mainly geared towards the
market need.
4. Facilitate international cooperation of Chinese firms in high-tech industries.
5. Train high-quality human capital.
The National High-tech Development Plan or "863 Plan" aims to foster high-quality
fundamental research in China. The history of the plan can be traced to March 3, 1986,
when four respected scientists, Wang Dayan, Wang NieChang, Yang Jiaxi, and Chen
Fangyong, wrote a letter to the State Council, advising on how to catch up with the
developed countries and develop China's own technology in high-tech industries. This
letter drew great attention from Deng Xiaoping, who later requested the State Council
react quickly. In the following half year, the State Council organized about 200 scientists
and researched strategies for developing high technology, which finally led to the
National High-tech Development Plan Outline ("863" Plan Outline), approved by the
State Council. Considering the prevailing situation in China, a developing country that
has limited resources for developing all kinds of high technologies, the 863 Plan
suggested that China should focus on 7 areas and 15 topics. The 7 areas are:
biotechnology, astro-technology, information technology, laser technology, automation,
and energy technology. The "863 Plan" will select experienced scientists and
researchers for these projects. As a government organized national science and
7 Souce: http://www.chinatorch.gov.cn/
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technology program, the "863 Plan" especially encourages participation from domestic
enterprises.
Projects in "863 Plan", most of which are basic research7 5 (or even pure science), are
impractical to conduct at the individual company level because of their high cost/benefit
ratio and long (or infinite) time horizon (Amsden, Goto, and Tschang, 2000). Through
participating in national S&T projects, companies can become familiar with the
knowledge breakthroughs in the field, thus facilitating higher-level R&D at the company
level, such as applied research, exploratory development, and advanced development. 76
The gathering of R&D staff from different companies and universities has helped to form
virtual networks among participants, which has stimulated innovation and encouraged
idea exchanges, and to some extent has brought effects similar to those of physical
network clusters.
For instance, even though ZTE claims that it has received little financial aid directly from
the government for its R&D, it has emphasized that the government has helped ZTE and
other domestic firms to grow by providing a good industrial environment, especially
through encouragement of companies' R&D activities by awarding national S&T projects
to those companies. The following illustrates ZTE's involvement in national S&T
technology programs chronologically. (ZTE website, 2002)
0 1996: ZTE was chosen by the Ministry of Science and Technology (MST) as one of
the high-tech enterprises to spearhead the "Torch program."
0 1998: MST awarded ZTE for its excellent performance record in the Torch Program
during 1996 and 1997.
* 1998: The State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) designated ZTE as one of
the national "Centers of Technology Development".
* 1999: ZTE took part in the "863 Plan" for the development of various
communications technologies in 3G, integrated access over optical fiber, and optical
transmission systems.
* 2000: ZTE took part in another three technologies' development in "863 Plan": the
base band processing for 3G base station systems, the 3G core network, and 3G
systems integration.
* By the end of 2002, ZTE took 19 projects in "863 Plan", covering 3G, high-speed
data communications, integrated access systems, and optical transmissions. The
seven finished projects covers topic in WCDMA, core router, OADM and integrated
access systems
74 Source: www.863.org. 2003. "History of 863".
75 Basic research aims to search for new knowledge for radically new marketable products and pure science
searches for intrinsic knowledge.
76 For a detailed description of R&D categorization, please see the paper "New Classification of R&D for
International Comparisons (With a Singapore Case Study)" by Amsden, Goto and Tschang (2000).
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Table 7.7 DTT's R&D projects that are funded by the government, 2001
Finishing Date
9/1/1999
2/21/2001
3/26/2001
7/6/2001
7/6/2001
2/21/2001
n.a.
8/1/01
11/7/1999
Category
"863 Plan" Project
"863 Plan" Project
"863 Plan" Project
"863 Plan" Project
"863 Plan" Project
"863 Plan" Project
National Electronics
Development Fund
National Debt Supported
Project
National Debt Supported
Project
Name
WCDMA
Integrated Access System
China High Speed Information
Network Core Router
Optical Cross Connection
Equipment (OXC)
OADM
Full-Service Network Access
System
DWDM
Data Mobile Communication GSM
cell phone SIM chip
Partners
n.a.
China S&T University,
BUPT
National Defense S&T
University
Tshinghua University
Tshinghua University
Electronic S&T U., MII 34
Research Institute
n.a.
Source: summarized from DTT's website
Note: The wireless communication branches of Datang started WCDMA project on September 1st, 1999.
The project DWDM was approved by MII to be supported by tapping into China's national debt on August
1st, 2001.
DTT has participated actively in R&D projects funded by the government, especially
because, as noted above, DTT started as the first public company formed by a state-
owned research institute. Its deep historical connection with the government, but most
importantly its strength in innovation capability, gave it a great advantage in winning
government funded projects in the telecommunications area. For instance, in 2001 alone,
DTT had six projects that were funded by the "863 Plan"; one project that was funded by
the National Electronics Development Fund; and two projects that were funded as the
National Debt Supported Projects. These projects had a wide range, covering almost
every aspect of telecom-equipment, from access systems and transmission systems to
data communications and mobile communications (see Table 7.7).
7.3.2 Network Clustering
Does geographical clustering contribute to the development of innovation capability of
domestic firms in China's telecom equipment industries? If so, how has it contributed? I
answered these two questions in the following discussion.
The network cluster theory attributes firms' technological capabilities to informal
linkages through geographical proximity. The concentration of R&D functions of the
studied firms by location has confirmed that space does matter. A few locations such as
Beijing and Shanghai have become the best sites for R&D for domestic firms as well as
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multinational corporations when they enter the filtration stage. For instance, Beijing
hosts the R&D centers of Huawei, ZTE, DTT, and GDT, with most of them clustered in
the Zhong Guan Cun area (which is called "China's Silicon Valley") along with
numerous other IT companies. That the firms located R&D functions in (and in some
cases even moved their R&D headquarters to) these locations indicates that the firms
place a high value on network clusters that provide proximity to elements they need to
build technological capabilities, formally or informally. The results correspond to those
of Jefferson and Zhang (2002), who found that there exists a strong association between
overall R&D productivities of cities and their composite measure of citywide R&D
capabilities in eleven East Asian cities, including five cities in China.
In addition to domestic network clusters, domestic firms have also taken advantage of
international network clusters to improve their technological capabilities, as shown by the
R&D locations of some firms. For instance, Huawei has overseas R&D centers in Silicon
Valley, Dallas, Bangalore (India), and Sweden, to take advantage of network clusters that
involve the most advanced technologies in data communications, signal processing,
software development, and wireless communications. Similarly, ZTE has its CDMA
R&D institute located in South Korea, whose R&D and usage of third-generation CDMA
cell phones is far ahead of the rest of the world.
7.3.3 Disintegration of the Global Value Chain
Configuration technologies refer to those technologies matching the complexity of
systems technologies, but that are designed to allow great flexibility in development and
application (Shen, 1999). Williams (1997) pointed out that information and
communications technologies (ICT) in particular are increasingly taking the form of
configurational technologies because both modular design and the use of open standards
can facilitate the substitution of internal components.
Bjorkman et al (2001) explaines that the change of telecom operators' business range is
the driving force for the industry to move from "monolithic" to "component-based
network elements." With the convergence of communications services involving voice
and data, service providers now provide a diverse range rather than a single kind of
service. This affects the telecom-equipment manufacturers who choose to specialize in
one area rather than providing equipment for a diverse range of services. Service
operators thus need to deal with several vendors offering equipment for different services.
Because of these changes, a "component-based system architecture" model thus has
replaced the original monolithic one, in which manufacturers provided telecom operators
with monolithic equipment. As Bjorkman et al. stated, several forums have been set up
to facilitate the component-based network architecture, such as Multiservice Switching
Forum (MSF), Opensig and OpenArch, IEEE P1520, The International Softswitch
Consortium (ISC), Parlay, and IETF.
Corresponding to Shen and Bjorkaman's analysis, Smith-Gillespie (2001) reviewed the
development of global telecom markets, and concluded that the industry is heading
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toward the separation of component manufacturing from system provision, and
component suppliers possess much of the industry's knowledge and technology.
The telecom-equipment industry's trend towards configuration technologies has made
innovation in specific areas possible and faster for domestic producers. It also
contributed to cooperation between the major Chinese telecom system providers and
international components suppliers. The major Chinese telecom companies have been
able to focus on building their key technologies and acquiring other parts from suppliers.
Smith-Gillispie (2001) documented the technology supplier relationships between
Huawei and other MNCs, such as IBM Microelectronics, Motorola Computer Group,
Texas Instruments, VocalTech, Intel, IBM, and SDL, in the area of data communications.
ZTE, similarly, has TI, Motorola, and Vertel Software that provide certain platforms for
them to develop advanced applications.- The R&D manager from ZTE explained that this
strategy, which allows the company to concentrate on developing its own "core
technologies" and purchase the rest from suppliers, can satisfy customers'
"comprehensive solutions" requests. (Smith-Gillispie, 2001)
7.3.4 Sub-sector Linkage
Sub-sector linkage rewards innovation efforts through faster diversification into other
sub-sectors. The accumulation of innovation capability in one sub-sector has been used
to develop products in other sub-sectors of the industry, especially when the industry has
new sub-sectors emerging continuously. This "immature" nature of the industry has
provided firms in the developing world with many chances to catch up.
The shortened time needed by domestic companies to catch up with foreign MNCs'
technology clearly shows that there exists strong sub-sector linkage in China's telecom
equipment industry. Pyramid Research (1999) observed a trend that the technology
development cycle for the Chinese manufacturers has become shorter and shorter, as
illustrated by Figure 7.7. As indicated by this research, China required just ten years to
move from importing to successfully developing its own ten-thousand-line switch
equipment. Domestic producers entered the area of optical transmission in the early and
middle 1990s. However, by 1998 domestic manufacturers produced fifty percent of new
optical transmission systems. Currently, ATM broadband switching equipment is only
behind the leading MNCs by one or two years. Similarly, in the area of access systems,
domestic producers now supply 50% of the market need. In the area of mobile switching
base stations, even starting late and still far behind, China has again made impressive
progress since 1998. For example, Chinese firms progressed from importation to
successful development of their own GSM Systems in only four years.77 The three
companies studied here have quickly diversified their R&D and products from switches
to other sub-sectors. The accumulated knowledge and expertise in switching R&D has
77 In other sub-sectors, such as mobile communication and data communication, foreign products have
retained most of the market share.
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provided them with bases from which to explore other sub-sectors. The effect is to
accelerate the process of catching up.
Figure 7.7 Indigenous Technology Development Cycle
Source: Pyramid Research (1999a), adapted from Smith-Gillspie(2001)
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It is now evident that developing and using sub-sector linkages has become necessary for
firms to progress; otherwise, firms will fail to keep up with the industry and be forced to
exit. For instance, GDT, which was the leader in switch technology in the early 1990s,
has been slow to diversify to other sub-sectors. As the market demand for switches has
decreased, the company has gotten into serious trouble. How to quickly reorient it and
catch up with its peers in other sub-sectors is a great challenge that GDT is facing now.
7.4 Chapter Conclusion
Using simple regression analysis (in 7.1) and some examples, I have demonstrated that
innovation capability and self-developed technologies have been the key to Chinese
domestic firms' catching up with the MNCs and have determined who are the leading
domestic firms in these industries. Furthermore, I have found that in-house R&D
development, supplemented with external alliance, is a key channel for domestic firms to
build up their innovation capabilities.
The Chinese government has used the national S&T programs, such as the "Torch
Program" and the "863 Plan", to encourage commercialization of technologies and
fundamental research in China. Through a selection process that awards projects to
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companies with a strong innovation capability, the government's involvement has
rewarded companies' efforts in building innovation capability and developing proprietary
technologies. The government's involvement in accumulating knowledge-based assets
has enhanced the function of the positive feedback system that awards company's effort
in building their innovation capability. The positive feedback system is composed of:
network clustering, disintegration of the global value chain, and sub-sector linkage, all of
which value the same quality-innovation capability.
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Appendix 7.1 Regression Analysis of Innovation Capability
Regression Results, Leadership
Rank in Evaluation
Telecom- of
equipment Innovation
Companies Industry Capacity
Huawei 2 1
ZTE 4 2
DTT 5 3
SH Bell 3 4
Wuhan Telecom Sci. Ins. 6 5
Changfei 7 6
and Innovation Capability
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.8285714
R Square 0.6865306
Adjusted R Square 0.6081633
Standard Error 1.1710801
Observations 6
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 12.014286 12.014286 8.7604167 0.0415627
Residual 4 5.4857143 1.3714286
Total 5 17.5
Standard Lower Upper
Coefficients Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 95.0% 95.0%
Intercept 1.6 1.0902162 1.4675988 0.2161194-1.4269318 4.6269318 -1.4269318 4.6269318
Evaluation
of
Innovation
Capacity 0.8285714 0.2799417 2.9598001 0.0415627 0.0513271 1.6058158 0.0513271 1.6058158
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Regression Results, Innovation Capability and R&D Spending
R&D
Spending
Innovation R&D as % of
Companies Capacity Spending Revenue
Putian 7 613.26 1.00%
Huawei 1 3049.63 18.80%
ZTE 2 1129.78 10.30%
DTT 3 390 12.30%
SH Bell 4 793.29 5.30%
Wuhan Telecom Sci. Ins. 5 178.53 6.50%
Changfei 6 250 9.70%
Note: R&D Spending in millino RMB in 2002
Innovation Capacity (Y) vs. R&D Spending (X)
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.717842727
R Square 0.515298181
Adjusted R Square 0.418357817
Standard Error 1.64752244
Observations 7
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 14.42834906 14.428349 5.3156204 0.0692897
Residual 5 13.57165094 2.7143302
Total 6 28
Lower Upper
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 95.0% 95.0%
Intercept 5.422488042 0.876599539 6.1858212 0.0016099 3.1691209 7.6758552 3.1691209 7.6758552
X Variable -
1 -0.001554756 0.00067435 2.3055629 0.0692897 -0.0032882 0.0001787 -0.0032882 0.0001787
Innovation Capacity (Y) vs. R&D Spending as a % of Revenue (X)
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.821775553
R Square 0.675315059
Adjusted R Square 0.610378071
Standard Error 1.348419693
Observations 7
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ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 18.90882166 18.908822 10.399544 0.0233397
Residual 5 9.091178343 1.8182357
Total 6 28
Standard Lower Lower Upper
Coefficients Error t Stat P-value 95% Upper 95% 95.0% 95.0%
Intercept 6.857790217 1.022285421 6.7082931 0.0011144 4.2299262 9.4856543 4.2299262 9.4856543
X Variable - -
1 -31.30599612 9.707790173 -3.2248324 0.0233397 56.260624 -6.3513678 -56.260624 6.3513678
Regression Results, Revenue, Profit and R&D Spending
R&D
Companies Spending Revenue Profit
Huawei 3049.63 16228.95 2654.37
ZTE 1129.78 10926.14 797.2
DTT 390 3163.18 90.43
SH Bell 793.29 15101.07 1984.25
Wuhan Telecom Sci. Ins. 178.53 2744.49 201.47
Changfei 250 2571.98 90.79
Note: Revenue, Profit, and R&D spending are all in million RMB.
Profit (Y) vs. R&D Spending (X)
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.8487109
R Square 0.7203102
Adjusted R Square 0.6503877
Standard Error 649.49144
Observations 6
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 4345600.3 4345600.3 10.301558 0.0326012
Residual 4 1687356.5 421839.13
Total 5 6032956.8
Coefficients
Intercept 138.76229
613.26 0.860946
Standard
Error
370.59334
0.2682406
t Stat
0.3744328
3.209604
Lower
P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 95.0%
0.7270869 -890.17192 1167.6965 -890.17192
0.0326012 0.1161892 1.6057027 0.1161892
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95.0%
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Revenue (Y) vs. R&D Spending (X)
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.7831571
R Square 0.613335
Adjusted R Square 0.5166687
Standard Error 4461.7145
Observations 6
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 126306695 126306695 6.3448713 0.0654332
Residual 4 79627585 19906896
Total 5 205934280
Standard Lower
Coefficients Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 95.0%
Upper
95.0%
Intercept 3975.9089 2545.8098 1.5617462 0.1933758 -3092.4069 11044.225 -3092.4069 11044.225
X Variable
1 4.6415626 1.8426922 2.5189028 0.0654332 -0.4745818 9.7577069 -0.4745818 9.7577069
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Appendix 7.2 External Alliance of Domestic Manufacturers
Table 7.8 Part of Huawei's Joint R&D Facilities
Partner
Agere
IBM
Intel
Date
9/1/2001
9/20/2000
n.a.
Lucent Technologies n.a.
Motorola 1997
NEC 10/23/2002
Sun 12/20/2000
Texas Instruments 9/18
Purpose
Under the terms of the multi-million dollar deal, Huawei will
use Agere's network processors and other chip products in its
line of networking equipment.The two companies will also
co-develop chip products as well, according to Agere.
As part of an agreement whereby IBM will supply Huawei
with key components, the two companies have launched a
collaborative R&D effort to make their respective products
and technologies work more closely together, allowing
customers to incorporate both in their products.
Huawei and Intel have signed a memorandum of
understanding in order to establish a joint laboratory within
Huawei's Shenzhen headquarters. The laboratory will
develop components based on Intel's 'Internet Exchange
Architecture'.
Huawei and Lucent announced in 2000 the establishment of a
joint lab to focus on microelectronics and optoelectronics.
According to Huawei, the two parties will enter into closer
technical cooperation based on the incorporation of Lucent's
advanced components into Huawei's products. The joint lab
will also serve as a platform for both companies to exchange
technologies via a variety of technical seminars and
conferences. The joint lab will also work with Lucent's Bell
Labs which has facilities in Beijing and Shanghai.
Motorola and Huawei set up joint laboratories for
communication system research in 1997. On August 9, 2000,
it entered the agreement for development of GSM Equipment
and end-to-end solutions
NEC and Huawei jointly established "3G Internet Open Lab"
in Shanghai. The objectives of establishing the Open Lab are
to create an open platform to support the 3G mobile
developments in China and to provide end-to-end total mobile
solutions for mobile operators. Through developing new
applications by third party, network providers and mobile
operators can work hand-in-hand to develop a value chain in
order for clients to achieve a leading market position and reap
in their profits.
Joint Laboratory
Huawei and Texas Instruments have established a joint
laboratory within Huawei's facility in Shenzhen to develop
digital signal processors (DSPs) for its equipment.
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Source: Data about IBM, Intel, Lucent, and Texas Instrument were from (Smith-Gillspie, 2001, Table
6.1, p. 83), others summarized by the author from the websites of Huawei (www.huawei.con.cn ).
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Table 7.9 ZTE's Joint R&D Facilities
Partner Purpose
Beijing University of Posts On November 13, 1999, a joint lab was set up in Beijing with BUPT to
& Telecommunications perform research on optical communication systems, particularly in the
(BUPT)' development of OADM equipment. This is one of the major tasks of the
government's '863' program (see Chapter 5).
On August 15, 2000, a second joint lab was set up in Shenzhen with BUPT
to carry out research on optical transmission systems.
University of Electronic ZTE and UEST (a 'national key university') have set up a joint R&D center
Science & Technology of to focus on wireless communications, particularly in third-generation
China (UEST) 2 wireless technology.
Texas Instruments (TI) ZTE and TI have established a joint laboratory within ZTE's Shanghai
Institute II to focus on the development of the latest DSP (digital signal
processing) technology. TI will provide a software design platform and
technical support.
Motorola ZTE has set up a joint lab with Motorola in Nanjing. The cooperation will
be based in the fields of data and mobile communication. Phase I of the
project is devoted to developing data communication products such as IP
phone gateways and access servers.
Source: ((Smith-Gillspie, 2001), p.96, Table 6.5
Note:
1 BUPT began R&D activities on high-speed digital optical fiber communication systems and DWDM
systems at the end of the 1970s. Several key products have emerged from the university's research, such
as coherent optical communication systems, 8x2.5Gb/s OTDM optical transmission systems, bi-
directional DWDM systems, optical internet, key components of WDM optical fiber systems, systems
architecture configurations, and ATM optical exchange technology.
2. UEST is a national key university that trains engineers in the field of information technology and is
involved in the national 'informatization' initiative.
Table 7.10 DTT's Joint R&D Facilities
Starting Date partner Joint Facility/Joint Research Area
3/9/1999 MII Bejing Design Institute Joint Research Plan
6/1/1999 Electronic S&T University(ESU) DTT-ESU Optical Communication Research Center
8/1/1999 TI Beijing, Xi'an DSP Joint Technology Applied Center
1/1/2000 TI DSPS Beijing Laboratory
BUPT-Datang Telecommunication Technology Research
9/7/2000 BUPT Center
6/20/2001 South Korea, JAS CDMA Indoor Coverage System
Source: Summarizedby the author from DT's website.
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Table 7.11 Cooperation Activities of GDT
Partner Activities
January 1998
April 1998
August 1998
November 1998
February 1999
April 26, 1999
August 1999
August 31, 1999
August 19, 1999
January 7, 2000
June 19-20, 2000
July 15, 2000
Source: GDT.
Russia Government
MIC, U.S.
Beijing University
Cuba Government
China HP
Israel NBASE
NDSC
Guizhou Province Information
Center
Columbia Compass
Fujian Dongwang Network
C&S Technology, South Korea
Space, South Korea
Russia Telecom and GDT's
Cooperation in various fields
Information Technology Area
China Enterprise
Management Cases Projects
$3 billion cooperation plan
Intelligent Network
Cooperation
Cooperation in Data
Communication , $50 million
worth projects
"863 Plan" approved
Information Development
Cooperation Agreement
Joint Venture
Strategic Partner Agreement
Joint Development
Agreement
Joint Development
Agreement
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Appendix 7.3 Opportunities and Challenge
ZTE's Opportunities and Challenges
ZTE has actively expanded into the international market. Its products can be found in more than
forty countries in Asia Pacific, South Asia, Middle East, North America, Eastern Europe, Latin
America, and Africa. Currently, ZTE has formed two overseas joint ventures: one in Pakistan
and another in the Republic of Congo (former Zaire), operating cell phone, toll, and international
services. 8 ZTE is said to be preparing for an IPO on the NASDAQ, pending approval from
regulatory authorities. However, ZTE feels that it still does not have enough knowledge of
international markets to go to the U.S. Stock Exchange and it is short of such expertise.79
In August 2002, ZTE announced that its foreign shares would be listed on the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange. The international capital obtained will be used for (1) R&D investment (mainly in the
areas of mobile communication, data communication, and optical transmission), (2) international
market expansion (to set up global-sales networks and decrease production costs through new
global logistic centers), and (3) global acquisition for key technologies (to speed up cycles for
developing new products and to attract international technical expertise). The company hoped
the new movement to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange would not only set up new channels for
investment capital, but also help to build an international recognized brand name. Further, it
hoped that the transparency and efficiency of its operations could be improved. 0
According to its manager, ZTE has grown rapidly and thus the largest problem facing ZTE is
efficient management. ZTE now has 12,000 employees distributed in more than a dozen
locations; the sheer size of the company has posed serious challenges to ZTE. How to manage
such a large company is very different from several years ago when the company had only several
hundred or a thousand people. ZTE officials stated that they need to learn from their peer Huawei
who has asked help from IBM to strengthen its management.81
Huawel's Opportunities and Challenges
Huawei's technology leadership has brought Huawei higher revenue and profit compared with
other domestic producers. For instance, revenue has increased from RMB 12 billion in 1999 to
RMB 25.5 billion in 2001. However, since 2001, the company seems to have had difficulty in
maintaining growth amid decreased spending by operators and uncertainty around 3G mobile
services. Huawei reported revenues ($2 billion) and profits ($319.8 million) for 2002, far below
the previous projection of $4.2 billion in revenue for the year. 82
Huawei has stated8 3 that the challenges it faces are technology advancement, management, and
lack of capital. Technology advancement has always been the competitive advantage of Huawei,
but it is not easy to keep this leadership amid the fierce competition. From in-house R&D
78 On December 14, 2000, ZTE and the Republic of Congo's Ministry of Telecommunications signed joint
agreement which ZTE will operate as a telecom service in Congo.
79 Interviewee #13.
80 Communication World (in Chinese), September 8, 2002, p. 11-12.
81 Interviewee # 13.
82 www.chinanex.com as of Oct. 28, 2002.
83 Interviewee #2.
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activities to cooperation with domestic and foreign companies and institutes, it has tried multiple
approaches to improve its technological capacities. So far, Huawei has advanced itself from a
follower to a leader in various fields of industrial technology. Mobile communication, mentioned
above, is one of these examples.
Moreover, Huawei has realized that such a large enterprise needs a modem management system.
Huawei therefore invited IBM to improve its management system. Furthermore, as a private
company, Huawei cannot get investment capital it needs from the stock market, unlike other
public companies such as ZTE, Datang, and GDT. The availability of capital will remain a
constraint on Huawe's future development.
Cisco's Suit against Huawei - Challenges from Globalization
Another challenge for Huawei comes from its effort to market globally. As the largest telecom
equipment producer in China, Huawei has a very good understanding of the competition rules and
business environment in China. However, in the international market, even though it is a
significant low-cost competitor, it seems that Huawei still needs to learn a great deal in terms of
international rules of competition. In January 2003 Huawei was sued by Cisco, which claimed
that Huawei had unlawfully copied Cisco's intellectual property. 84 It alleged that Huawei had
misappropriated Cisco's IOS software, including source code, copied Cisco documentation and
other copyrighted material, and infringed numerous Cisco patents. 85 Later, Cisco filed new
papers claiming that Huawei was attempting to remove evidence from the U.S. by taking the
products off its U.S. website.86
Quite ironically, not long ago, Cisco CEO John Chambers was asked if it was possible Huawei
was violating Cisco's intellectual property rights. He responded that he had confidence that the
Chinese government and World Trade Organization would "do the right thing" to prevent or stop
unfair business practices. In a statement, Cisco stated that Huawei had refused Cisco's numerous
attempts to resolve these issues. Mark Chandler, vice president and general counsel for Cisco,
said, "As a result, Cisco has no choice but to protect its technology and the interests of its
shareholders through legal action."87
84 Cisco filed the suit in the U.S. Court for the Eastern District of Texas.
85 Cisco's main charges were around Huawei's Quidway routers and switches. First, Cisco alleges that
Huawei copied portions of the Cisco IOS source code and included the technology in its operating system
for its Quidway routers and switches. Cisco alleges that Huawei's operating system contains a number of
text strings, file names, and bugs that are identical to those of Cisco's IOS source code.
Cisco also claims that Huawei copied extensively from Cisco's copyrighted technical documentation and
included whole portions of Cisco's text in Huawei's user manuals for Quidway routers and switches.
In addition, Cisco charges that Huawei copied Cisco's command line interface (CLI) and corresponding
screen displays. Cisco asserts that "Extensive" portions of Cisco's CLI and help screens appear verbatim in
Huawei's operating system for its Quidway routers and switches.
Lastly, Cisco charges that Huawei is infringing at least five Cisco patents related to proprietary routing
protocols and has included these technologies in its Quidway routers and switches.
(http://www.nwfusion.com/newsletters/optical/2003/0I27optical2.html as of March 10, 2003)
86 Huawei denies all of Cisco's allegations and said it had stopped the sale and distribution of the products
in the US. The company said Cisco "is using the litigation process to enhance its market position." The
company said it is developing other products that will not be subject to Cisco's claims. (www.igigroup.com
newsletter as of February 7, 2003).
87 http://www.nwfusion.com/newsletters/optical/2003/0127optical2.html as of March 10, 2003.
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If what Cisco alleged is true, then Huawei still is far from catching up in the area of data
communications. The protective atmosphere in China for domestic firms, which might prevent
Cisco from suing Huawei in China, does not exist in the international market. The lessons for
Huawei are that the firm should follow the international rules of competition and have a good
understanding of the host country market.
Datang's Opportunities and Challenges
In 2001 DTT's revenue fell 14.4% to 2.1 billion RMB and its profit fell 48.4% to 36.1 million
RMB compared with 2000. The fact that the company has lost central office switch (CO) market
share to rivals and spent heavily on R&D has eroded the company's bottom line. 8 Datang has
been slow in expanding production to other telecom-equipment areas, such as data
communication, optical transmission, and mobile communication. Most of its products compete
with those of other domestic producers, such as Huawei, ZTE, and PTIC, without any strong
advantage in performance and price.
One manager8 9 from Huawei commented that even though Datang is very strong in R&D, and has
great achievements in R&D projects, this research-oriented company has difficulty in converting
R&D results into products. Furthermore, data from MII indicates that Datang had little revenue
from exports in 2001, which implies that Datang is far behind its rivals in developing
international markets. DTT's future is said to (by the analyst from ChinaNex) be precarious as
the company still carries the baggage of its past as a government research entity while in
desperate search of a winning business model. 90
As I have shown, companies such as Datang and GDT have had unsatisfactory performance in
recent years. Even though Datang is the leader in many fields of research, it has had trouble in
converting its R&D results to products. Except for Datang's collaboration with Siemens, Datang
and GDT have no foreign collaboration, unlike Huawei and ZTE. Datang needs to develop
quickly its resources of management expertise, its skills of converting R&D results to products,
and its access to the international market.
GDT: From Leading to Lagging Behind
In recent years, GDT has suffered from a decline in revenue, especially from sales of its core
central office products, as demand has diminished and competition has risen. As a result, the
company has slid in market share in almost all product categories. For example, MII ranked GDT
28th in telecom/electronics sales in 1998, but only 54th in 1999. The company declined to
participate in the rankings in 2000 and MII removed the company from the list in 2001 for poor
financial performance. In 2001, GDT reported only 400 million RMB ($48.2 million) in revenue
and 90 million RMB ($10.8 million) in operating loss, much worse than the company had
expected.
Thus, GDT changed from being the leader in domestic switch products to being the least
competitive company among the four major telecom equipment manufacturers. GDT's rise and
fall in the past decade indicates the fierce competition in China's telecom equipment market.
88 www.chinanex.com as of Oct. 20, 2002.
89 Interviewee #2.
0 www.chinanex.com as of Oct. 20, 2002.
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Analysts say the main reason for GDT's decline is that it missed the opportunity for an IPO in
1998 and lacked a competitive mechanism within its capital and management structure. The
company also failed to pursue new technology and develop products in demand.9'
On July 28, 2002, GDT started its third restructuring to resolve the problems that the company
faced: (1) ownership and management structure, (2) proprietary technology ownership, and (3)
capital structure. Though GDT has a separate committee of shareholders, board of directors, and
control commission, the inherent multi-interest corporate structure has led to continuous conflicts
among different parties. For instance, the shareholders represent capital providers, technology
providers, debt owners, and suppliers. Under such a structure, it is unavoidable to make random
decisions, as well as changing the management team and the company's strategies relatively
frequently. Consequently, the company missed good opportunities for growth even in the areas
in which it had strong roots. For instance, GDT started R&D in access equipment one year
ahead of other companies, but it was unable to seize the growth opportunities later.
Ownership of proprietary technology is another problem that keeps plaguing GDT. In 1996
disputes occurred between technology owners of HJDO4, which affected GDT's normal operation
severely. The problem was finally resolved after one year's negotiation and bargaining, but this
left the situation that even though the switch technology belongs to GDT, the company does not
have full control over it.
Insufficient capital is another bottleneck for GDT's development. GDT has only one way to
obtain investment capital-bank loans. To accommodate its high operation cost, GDT has
borrowed a large amount of cash from its production units. To make things worse, it also takes a
long time to receive the payment from GDT's customers. At the beginning of 1999, GDT got
contracts, but it could provide no products. The situation soon stimulated a vicious cycle-
because the customers could not get their ordered products, they slowed down their purchasing
and decreased orders from GDT, which dramatically decreased the cash GDT could receive.
GDT then borrowed more cash from its production units to balance its operation cost; but, short
of production capital, the production units were not able to produce orders normally. (Yao,
2002)92
91 www.chinanex.com as of Oct. 20, 2002.
92 Yao, Chuanfu. 2002. "Julong's Restructuring, save or reborn?", People's Posts and Telecommunications
(Chinese Newspaper, Ren Min You Dian), November 19, 2002.
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8 Staged Catching-up of PC Manufacturers
Domestic PC manufacturers have experienced a catching up process that is similar to that
of the domestic telecom-equipment manufacturers. In this chapter, I identify the distinct
stages of the process by focusing on leading domestic firms' development paths and I
examine government intervention at the industry and the firm level.
I organize the chapter in the following way. I start the chapter with a brief introduction
of the global PC market in terms of demand, supply, and industry trend, as well as the
demand and supply of China's PC market. In Section 8.2, I investigate the catching up
of domestic firms with the MNCs in China and identify the four distinct stages for their
development. In Section 8.3, I analyze the Chinese government's policies surrounding
(or directed at) the PC industry and how those policies affect MNCs versus domestic
firms.
8.1 Global PC Industry
The personal computer (PC) industry has, overall, been one of the most dynamic
segments of the electronics industry since the early 1980s, both in terms of growth and
the creation of new models of firm and industry organization.
8.1.1 The Global Production Network
The global PC industry was a pioneer in developing a new form of industrial
organization-the global production network, which is based on horizontal specialization
rather than vertical integration. Firms compete within a horizontal industry segment and
grow by capturing market share and achieving economies of scale, rather than by
extending vertically into upstream or downstream activities (Dedrick et al., 2002).
Global relocation of economic activities has implications for the competitiveness of
companies and prosperity of countries (Berger et al., 1999). Global multinational
corporations have been founded either to establish central-controlled production and
distribution networks with local subsidiaries carrying out sales and service functions in
national markets, or to establish highly autonomous national or regional business units
with full responsibility for product development, manufacturing, distribution, and service
functions within each market (Dedrick et al, 2002).
The globalization of the PC industry has to pay a debt to International Business Machines
Corporation (IBM), who created the dominant IBM PC architecture in the middle of
1960s, an open modular architecture that allowed suppliers to develop components and
peripherals that utilized a standard interface with the core CPU and operating system,
standards set mostly by Intel and Microsoft (Langlois, 1992). PC component and
peripheral manufacturers thus can design products with little interaction with the PC
assembler, as long as they meet the interface standards. Since then, joined by new
companies, these historically vertical computer companies have transformed themselves
to specialize in one industry segment or another (e.g., PCs, motherboards, hard drives)
and concentrate most of their resources on one or two major activities. Before, these
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companies operated in all industry segments and carried out the major functions of
product innovation, operations, and customer relations internally. (Dedrick et al, 2002)
Table 8.1PC Components and Their Major Producing Countries/Region
% of Raw-
Material
Components Major Producing Country Cost
Hard Disk Drive United States (Seagate) 18
Monitors P.R. China 17
CPU United States (Intel) 16
DRAM United States, Taiwan 6
CDRom P. R. China Based manufacturers 6
Others (Motherboards, etc.) P.R. China 37
Total n.a. 100
Source: SaloMon Smith Barney, 2000.
Note: n.a. = not applicable.
The global production network has a strong flavor of geographic specialization. Table
8.1 reveals which country produces the majority of each of the components. Formed by
the middle of 1990s, the global PC industry is characterized by U.S. firms specializing in
design, advanced components (such as microprocessors), software, and services, Asia
providing much of the hardware manufacturing, and Europe mostly producing hardware,
software, and services for its own markets (Dedrick et al., 2002).
8P1.2 PC Manufacturers
As a PC is a modular product assembled from standard parts that can be produced almost
anywhere by anyone, a PC assembler adds limited value, and there is little innovation
involved in the assembling process.93 Given the low entry barrier to the PC industry,
what makes a good PC manufacturer? The value added part of PC assemblers comes
directly from customer relationships, or indirectly through branding, marketing, and
quality assurance. Therefore, the successful market players must have a well-recognized
brand, reliable quality, large production scale, and a strong distribution network. All
these qualifications require considerable time to develop. (HSBC, 2000)
Currently, Dell, HP, IB3M, Fujitsu-Siemens, and NEC are the top five global PC
manufacturers in terms of market share. According to International Data Corporation
(IDC), two giant PC makers, Dell and HP, shipped a total of 10 million PCs, over 30% of
the worldwide market share in the third quarter, 2002. Dell accounted for 16.0% of the
desktops, notebooks, and Intel- and Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (AMD)-based servers
shipped worldwide, a 23% growth in 2002 compared with 2001. In contrast, HP's
This can be seen by the declining profit margin captured by PC manufacturers: PC makers captured 49%
of the profits in the PC industry in 1990, while component suppliers, including Intel and Microsoft captured
51%; the share of PC manufacturers dropped to 27.5% in 1995, and in 2000 to just 13% (Dedrick et
al.,2002).
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shipments accounted for slightly less, at 15.5% of the market share.94 IBM kept a distant
third with a 6.0%. Fujitsu-Siemens and NEC rounded out the top five worldwide with
4.3% and 3.3% of the market share, respectively. 95
8.1.3 Market Trends
There are two distinguishing characteristics in the current PC market. First, the global-
market demand has slowed recently. Second, PC component prices have dropped sharply.
PC demand has grown at double-digit rates since the late 1970s, driven by dramatic
improvements in hardware performance and rapidly growing software applications. The
demand has accelerated in the late 1990s, as falling component costs allowed the PC
makers to lower prices while software applications, especially internet and multimedia
software, drove the demand higher. In mid-2000, however, PC demand declined sharply
mainly because: (1) the worldwide economic growth rate slowed, (2) corporations
slashed their IT expenses to save money, and (3) consumer demand was satiated. In
addition, few applications require more powerful hardware.
Recently, component costs have kept decreasing and this has benefited computer
manufacturers. For instance, Intel cut Pentium IV, Pentium III (PII) CPU prices in late
January 2001. Other components prices also dropped sharply from their mid-2000 highs.
For the CPU processor, the battle between Intel and AMD has caused faster processor
cycles and kept prices low.96 The component supply side looks benign for all computer
manufacturers, and especially for those with large volume. The prices of RAM are
unlikely to increase significantly, because the semi-conductor industry continues to
struggle with over-capacity. For instance, the Intel CPU Px PII 800 chip's price dropped
from close to $600 in May 2000 to around $200 in January 2001. During the same period,
Intel's 64M (8Mx8) P100 DRAM price dropped from $6.8 to less than $3.97 Peripherals,
such as printers, scanners, digital cameras and Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs,
electronic handheld information devices), have come down in price, and that is also
beneficial for computer manufacturers as they usually bundle peripherals as part of
special deals to lure customers.
In addition to falling demand and prices for components, Dedrick and Kraemer (2002)
identified the following key industry trends:98
94 Gartner Dataquest's data however shows that Dell and HP have a 15.8% and 15.7% market share,
respectively, together comprising about 30,000 units of shipment in Q3 2002. Gartner, Inc. provides
research and analysis of the information technology industry. Check the following website for detailed
information of the company: www.dataquest.com.
95 http://www.zdnetindia.com/biztech/enterprise/news/stories/68832.html as of 12/26/2002
96 Intel periodically slashes processor prices aggressively when introducing new chips. New components
come on to the market at a premium, but Intel does huge price cuts in older, obsolete components.
97 ING Barings, 2001, p. 3 . (Figure 4 and Figure 5).
98 Internet and electronic commerce have helped PC manufacturers respond to the increasing the clock-
speed, and demand for customization; Dell and Gateway's mass customization is a classical example.
Some PC manufactures have outsourced much of the production process to concentrate their resources in
one or a few key elements in the production process. (Dedrick et. al, 2002; Kraemer et. al, 2002b).
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e Competitive advantage in the PC industry is driven more by sales, distribution,
and customer relationships than by manufacturing or product innovation. 99
e There is a shift toward mobility in data communications and computing, which
has boosted sales of mobile IT products (notebooks, PDAs, and other devices).
The increased sales indicate new opportunities for growth and innovation on the
part of PC manufacturers, but also pose challenges as firms in the PDA and
wireless industries begin to compete with PC manufacturers.
* Offering solutions representing a combination of hardware and services (rather
than just hardware PC) to customers has been the new strategy taken by many PC
manufacturers, imitating IBM's business. However, the transition requires a
strong local presence, leading to higher overhead costs and a loss of economies of
scale.100
8.1.4 Demand for PCs in China
In 1990, China had only 500,000 PCs for more than 1.2 billion people. By 2000, the 1.3
billion Mainland Chinese purchased more than seven million PCs in a single year
(Kraemer and Dedrick, 2002a). The urban penetration rate is 7% and around 30% for
large cities, such as Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangzhou. This rate is still very low
compared to the penetration of North America and Western Europe, where the PC
penetration rate could be above 70% in large cities. Also, 60% of the Chinese population
still live in rural areas, compared with 10-30% in North America and in Western
Europe. 10' Thus, analysts from KIM ENG (2001) estimated that Mainland China's
market still has a long way to go before even coming close to saturation. In addition,
demand will fluctuate, but in the long-term it will continue to be strong (KIM ENG,
2001).
8.1.5 Supply of PCs in China
Corresponding to the rising demand in recent years, China's PC production has also
increased dramatically. Table 8.2 reveals the fast growth path of China's PC production
as a percentage of the world market from 1985 (0.0%) to 1999 (5.5%), especially the
outstanding growth of the period from 1995 (1.9%) to 1999 (5.5%). Currently, domestic
producers supply the majority of the PCs to China's market. All top three PC
manufacturers to China's market were domestic ones, namely Legend, Founder, and
Tongfang in the third quarter of 2001 (Table 8.3). Further, China's domestic PC
producers have moved fast in entering the international market. During the same period,
99 Dell's direct sales model works well for the United States, United Kingdom, and a few other countries
where the direct sales channel is well established, while in other high-growth markets, such as China, India,
and Korea, it's still questionable whether or not this model can work well. (Dedrick et. al, 2002).
100 Gateway withdrew from overseas markets and concentrates on the United States, perhaps out of concern
for this requirement. (Dedrick et. al, 2002).
People's Daily (May 19, 2002) estimated that China's population is around 60% rural. The Daily
Statistics Canada (www.statcan.ca) estimated that in 1996, 31.4% of Canada's population, about 9 million
people, lived in predominantly rural regions. The US 2000 Census classifies 25% of the total population as
rural (United States Department of Agriculture, website: www.usda.gov). Belgium had 97.3%, and the
United Kingdom had 89.5% population dwelling in urban areas in 2002. (www.un.org).
128
Chapter 8. Staged Catching-up of PC Manufacturers
Legend, Founder, and Tongfang were ranked the first, seventh, and tenth largest
producers in the Asia-Pacific market.
Table 8.2Top 10 countries' share of global computer production
Country 1985 1990 1995 1999 1999 Rank
United States 49.2% 27.0% 26.5% 26.5% 1
Japan 18.9% 29.2% 25.2% 16.7% 2
Singapore 1.2% 3.9% 7.3% 7.7% 3
Taiwan 1.0% 3.3% 5.6% 6.5% 4
China 0.0% 0.4% 1.9% 5.5% 5
United Kingdom 4.6% 5.1% 4.7% 5.0% 6
Germany 5.7% 5.6% 2.8% 3.4% 7
Ireland 1.5% 2.1% 2.2% 2.9% 8
Malaysia 0.0% 0.2% 1.8% 2.8% 9
Brazil 2.8% 2.6% 2.3% 2.7% 10
Others 15.1% 20.6% 19.7% 20.3% n.a.
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% n.a.
Source: Kraemer and Dedrick, 2001, p.8 . (Calculated from Reed Electronics, Yearbook of World
Electronics Data, 2000).
Table 8.3 China & Asia Pacific PC Market Share, 2001Q3
China
Tong- Great
Company Legend Founder fang Dell IBM TCL ACER Wall Hisense HP Others Total
Share 32 10 5 5 4 3 3 3 3 2 30 100
Asia Pacific
Tong-
Company Legend IBM Compaq Dell Samsung Hongji Founder HP Trigem fangOthers
Share 14 7 6 5 5 4 4 4 2 2 47 100
Source:International Data Corporations.
Merrill Lynch's (2000d) analysts have summarized several characteristics of China's
current PC industry:
* The growth of China's PC industry is the fastest in the world and driven by domestic
factors.
e The driver of China's PC growth has been in transition from corporate spending to
individual purchases because retail prices have recently fallen under an affordability
threshold.
* Foreign brands mainly sell to the corporate sector, while local brands target the
consumer market. Foreign brands lose because of their lack of price-value appeal and
after-sales services.
* PC margins are not universally sinking in China. Some companies, such as Legend,
maintain their margin by beefing up their time-to-market and shortening inventory
turnaround.
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8.2 Catch Up in Stages: China's PC Industry
Domestic producers are the driving force that pushed China's computer industry from
being non-existent in the 1980s to becoming the world's third-largest computer producer
in 2002.1 China's computer industry is developed through the staged catching-up of
domestic firms with the MNCs. In this section, I examine the catching-up process of the
domestic firms with the guidance of staged catching up theory. Furthermore, I review the
development path of three leading firms-- Legend, Founder, and Great Wall-as their
experiences represent the experience of successful firms during the catching-up process.
8.2.1 The Development of the Industry
The development of China's PC market from 1991 to 2002 was phenomenal, as it is
illustrated in Figure 8.1. The market expanded during the 11-year period at an increasing
pace--the total sales have an exponential growth from nearly zero million units in 1991 to
nearly 12 million units in 2002.
Figure 8.1 The Growth of China's PC market: 1991-2002
China's PC market:Total Sales (million unit)
1991-2002
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Source: Xu, 2002, p. 51., MII, 2003, and Kraener and Dedrick, 2001, p.8 (Yearbook of World Electronics
Data, 2000).
The celebrities of this fast expansion are the domestic PC manufacturers. They caught up
with the MNCs in market share and thus upgraded China from importing to producing
most of the PCs for the domestic market. Figure 8.2 vividly displays the process of
domestic firms' catching up vis-A-vis the MNCs. Domestic firms started with a 40%
market share in 1991; during 1993 to 1995, domestic firms shared half of the market with
102 China's sales reached $23 billion in 2000. Chinese PC exports increased from $227 million in 1990 to
more than $10 billion in 1998 (ManufacturingNews.com, 2002). PC export in 2002 reached 3 million units
in 2002 (MII, 2003).
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the MNCs; after 1995, the share for domestic firms kept rising until it was just under 90%
in 2000. Correspondingly, the share for MNCs kept dropping to just over 10%.
Figure 8.2 Domestic and Foreign Brand PCs' market share in China's PC market, 1991-2002
Source: Xu, 2002, p. 51., MII, 2003, and Kraemer and Dedrick, 2001, p.8 (Yearbook of World Electronics Data, 2000).
According to the staged catching-up theory (Chapter 3), there are four stages of the
catching-up process and each has distinct characteristics. Based on the characteristics of
the market and industrial structure, I divide the catching up process for China's domestic
PC industry into the four distinct stages declared by the theory: the preparation stage
(early 1980s to late 1980s), the growth stage (late 1980s to early 1990s), the filtration
stage (early 1990s to middle/late 1990s), and the globalization stage (middle/late 1990s to
present, i.e., 2002). Table 8.4 describes major events during different stages of the
industry. The following paragraphs explain why this division is appropriate.
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Table 8.4 Development of the Chinese Computer Industry
Date Event
1980 First domestic micro-computer DJS-062
1981 Huaguang ESP prototype passed test
First nationwide IT exhibition
1983 Wubizixing, Chinese-language input method, was invented by Wang Yongming
Yinghe I, China's first mainframe computer was built
Yan Yuanchao developed the first Chinese version of DOS operation systems, CCDOS
The State Council launched a team, led by Vice Prime Minister Li Peng, to promote the
1984 electronic industry
The Computer Bureau of MEI released its strategy for the domestic PC industry: transfer,
absorb, develop, and innovate
Deng Xiaoping's speech: Computing skills need to be taught first to our kids. Thereafter
the Ministry of Education established computing training center in 27 cities
Legend's predecessor, the New Technology Company, was established
1985 China Computer Associate was founded
GW 0520CH, the first domestic PC with Chinese language processing capacity, was
released. This marked the beginning of China's domestic PC industry
HP China was established in Beijing
Founder's predecessor, Peking Like New Technology Company, was founded by Peking
University.
Great Wall's predecessor, China Computer Development Company (CCDC), was founded
1986 by the Fourth Ministry of Electronic Industry.
Founder ESP entered the market and was sold to more than 40 newspapers and printing
1987 houses within a year
1988 Ufsoft released the first Chinese financial software product
Intel China was established
The State Council approved "Torch Program"
1989 Jinhan released WPS, the first Chinese world processing product
Legend brand PC's debut
1990 National Artificial Intelligence Computer Research Center was established in Beijing
1991 State Council announced "Computer Software Protection Regulation"
1992 Legend released first 486-based PCs in China
Great Wall signed a contract with Microsoft and officially purchases MS-DOS5.0
Large-scale computer Ying He II was built
IBM China was established in Beijing
1993 Newly restructured MEI viewed the computer industry as a main sector of IT industries
Legend's annual sales of motherboards surpassed 5 million units
Legend released the first Pentium (586)-based PC in China's market
DEC, AST, COMPAQ expanded their operation in China
1994 Legend went public on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong
1995 Founder went publish on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong
Microsoft China Ltd. And Microsoft China Research Center was established in Beijing
1996 Led by Vice Prime Minister Zou Jiahu, the State Council IT team was founded
Domestic brands captured 18% of brand PC market share
National 909 Project launched to produce Large Scale Intergraded Circuit (LSIC)
Dong Da Aer became first publicly-listed domestic software company
1997 Ying He III mainframe computer was built
Great Wall Shenzhen Ltd., Xiang Computer went public
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Jingshan WPS97 was released. In a year, WPS97's sales exceeded Msword97
1998 Ministry of Information Industry was established
Legend built its millionth computer
Source: Adaptedfrom Xu (2002, p. 53-54).
Throughout the preparation stage (early 1980s to late 1980s), China's computer market
was small and almost negligible, as was the domestic computer industry. Table 8.4
shows that the most significant events during this period were several computer-related
research achievements, such as the first domestic micro computer-"DSJ-062"-in 1980,
the first domestic mainframe computer-"Yinghe I"-in 1983, and the first domestic PC
with Chinese language processing capacity-"GW 0520 CH"-in 1985. Furthermore, major
domestic firms such as Legend, Founder, and Great Wall, were all established during this
period, even though they did not manufacture computers at the time. Whether or not
Chinese firms start to produce computer related products is an important criterion for me
to draw the line between the preparation and growth stage.
In the mid-1980s, many startup companies were formed to provide foreign-brand PC
distribution, computer training, and computer services and they clustered in the
ZhongGuanCun Area in Beijing. The ZhongGuanCun area was designated in 1988 as
the first high-tech development zone in the country' 03 and later was called "the Silicon
Valley of China" because of the dense clustering of high-tech companies in the area. The
area provides close proximity to several leading Chinese universities and research
institutes such as Peking University, Tsinghua University, and the Chinese Academy of
Sciences (CAS). In fact, the two most dominant PC manufacturers-Legend and Founder-
themselves are closely affiliated with Peking University and the Institute of Computation
Technology of CAS.
I call the period from the late 1980s to the early 1990s the growth stage of the China's
PC industry because domestic companies started manufacturing products for previously
untapped segments of the market; this is one of the prominent features of the growth
stage described by the staged catching-up theory. During the early and mid-1980s,
Chinese language processing was the biggest barrier for PC development in China.
Consequently, in the late 1980s, Chinese language-input methods, a localized operating
system, Chinese-language add-on cards, Chinese-language typewriters, and Chinese
typesetting systems became key product categories for local companies to deliver PC-
related technology. Companies with such technologies soon distinguished themselves
from those involved only with trading and distribution. (Xu, 2002).
The filtration stage (early 1990s to middle/late 1990s) was characterized by direct
confrontation between domestic and foreign producers (including MNCs that set up
subsidiaries in China) in China's PC market. The difference between the growth stage
and the filtration stage is that during the growth stage, Chinese firms did not directly
compete against the MNCs, while during the filtration stage, they did. At the start of the
filtration stage-the early 1990s, the IT market was boosted by increasing demand and
resulted in an amazing annual growth rate of 200% in 1992. The Chinese government
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lowered the import tariffs on electronic goods in the early 1990s, thus attracting more
foreign producers to sell PCs in China's market. Meanwhile, following the footsteps of
Hewlett Packard (HP) and Intel, who established operations in China in 1985 and 1988,
respectively, more MNCs, such as IBM, DEC, AST, and Compaq expanded their
operations in China in the early 1990s. These foreign producers brought fierce
competition to China's PC market and they posed a great challenge to domestic
producers. The domestic brand PCs, however, fought back after several years of struggle.
During this stage, domestic firms also explored different ways of improving themselves
as modern enterprises. For instance, Legend, Founder, and Great Wall all went public for
more capital for expansion, and Legend and Founder have also restructured their
management teams.
The globalization stage is characterized by domestic firms' dominance in the domestic
market and their expansion in the international market. In 1996, Legend became the
domestic market leader while the leading domestic firms started exploration in the
international market, starting from the Asia Pacific market. This symbolized the start of a
new stage of China's PC industry--the globalization stage. During the globalization
stage, domestic PC companies dominated China's domestic market; for instance, they
had an 83% market share in the first half of 2000.104 Although foreign firms have
generated most of the country's exports, domestic PC companies have grown fast and
aim to become major players in the world's markets. To compete in worldwide markets,
Asia-Pacific is the first step. Legend, Founder, and Tongfang, the top three PC
manufacturers in China's market were listed in 2001 as being among the 10 largest PC
producers in the Asia-Pacific market. Legend has led both China's domestic and the
Asia-Pacific markets with distinguished market-share percentages-33.0% in China and
13.6% in Asia Pacific in the third quarter of 2001 (Table 8.3). (KIM ENG, 2002).
8.2.2 Legend, Founder, and Great Wall
Having explained Chinese domestic PC manufacturers' development as a group, I now
focus on examining the evolution of the three leading domestic producers-Legend,
Founder, and Great Wall-during the staged development of the industry (Tables 8.5 and
8.6). Even though they are the three largest domestic PC manufacturers in China with
total revenue of several billion dollars in 2002, their sizes are not comparable to
international giants such as IBM and HP, who achieved $85 billion and $45 billion sales
revenue in fiscal year 2002 alone. The Blue Giant "IBM" and has about 300,000
employees world-wide, while HP has about 86 thousand employees, much larger than
even the largest domestic firm (Legend) with its 12,000 employees (MIT Technology
Review, 2003).
The companies' annual data in revenue and employment illustrate their exponential
development paths during the first three stages and stabilized growth at the globalization
stage (Figures 8.3 and 8.4).
10 4 ING Barings. 2000. "China Research, Legend Holdings." Analyst Report. September 2000.
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Table 8.5 Legend, Founder, and Great Wall, Major Statistics
8.2.2.1.1 Sales Profit
Date of Employ- Revenue (in US $
Company Name Establishment ment (in US$ billion) million)
Legend Computer Group Corporation
a VR R i 9 1984 12,000 3.9 169.3
Peking University Founder Group Co.
I L I-,?,- E L 1% NJ 1985 6,000 1.4 29.5
China Great Wall Computer
Corporation
P SKAitaA%2 f J 1986 n.a. 2 n.a.
Source: Company's websites and MII, 2003.
Note: Great Wall's Revenue is RMB 16.2 billion, about $1.96 billion, Eastcom's renenue is RMB 10.5
billion, about $1.27 billion, both are 2001's data.
Table 8.6 Legend, Founder, and Great Wall, Founding Organization and Major Products
Founding
Company Name Organization Major Products/Services
agent sale (1984-); Chinese language add-on
cards (85-88); mother boards (1987-); PC
(1990-); system integration (1994-); network
Legend Computer Group Corporation China Academy products (1996-); internet portal (1999-);
of Science wireless data technical development (2000-)
electronic publishing and multi-media system
(1985-); Chinese language add-on cards (88-
95); distribution (1993-); Pcs (1995); system
Peking University Founder Group Co. Peking integration (1995-); internet software (1999-);
1LFA La Y I % M J University on-line bookstore (2000-)
PCs (1984-); PC Monitors (1995-); other PC
Ministry of components, distribution (1995-); magnetic
China Great Wall Computer Corporation Electronic heads and hard disks (1995/12-); system
EP P9 0 I A& 'z OAJ Industry integration (1996-);network products (1999-)
Source: Xu (2002, p. 46-47).
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Figure 8.3 Sales Revenue for Legend, Founder, and Great Wall, 1984-2002
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Figure 8.4 Sales Revenue for Legend, Founder, and Great Wall, 1984-2002
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Legend Computer Group Corporation (Legend, WM R iAJ) is the leading PC
manufacturer for both China's domestic market and the Asia-Pacific region, excluding
Japan. The company became the captain for the domestic market in 1996 and has kept its
leading position since then. Legend has two public companies: Legend Holdings Ltd.,
and Digital China Group, on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Legend Holdings went to
Initial Public Offering (IPO) in April 1994, while Digital China Group was spun off and
went public in June 2001. Legend's business covers PCs and other access devices,
motherboards, foreign-brand distribution, and Internet services. PC manufacturing and
agent sales of foreign-brand computer products are the two main sources of revenue.
Legend Holdings' core business includes system integration and manufacturing Legend
Brand PC peripherals, PCs, and motherboards. Almost 90% of its operating profit is
from Legend Brand PC peripherals and PCs. Legend started with only eleven employees
in 1984 and grew to 12,000 employees and sales revenue of RMB 21.4 billion ($3.9
billion) in 2002. Corresponding to the exponential growth of its workforce, the company
has enjoyed an average annual growth rate of 40% (Figure 8.3).
Founded in 1985, Peking University Founder Group Corporation (Founder, 4ALLA*71YE
% M 2?J) is the second largest PC manufacturer in the Chinese domestic market and one
of the ten largest PC manufacturers in the Asia-Pacific market, with total assets of RMB
6 billion and sales revenue of RMB 14.5 billion ($1.4 billion) in 2002. However, PC
manufacturing is only one of the main businesses of Founder in which it takes pride.
With 6,000 employees, Founder has three main businesses in IT: software development,
systems integration, and hardware manufacturing. 05 It provides information-systems
integration to the media industry (newspaper, preprinting, and TV and broadcasting).
Founder is the world leader in pictographic-language, electronic-publishing-systems
technology. For instance, Founder's Chinese electronic-publishing system has an 80%
share of the world market. Furthermore, it provides large-scale information systems for
the banking, insurance, taxation, and security industries in China. Founder also leads the
industry in systems integration in the media and financial sectors. In 2000, Founder
entered other businesses, including an Internet retailing business (an on-line bookstore),
broadband, mobile communications, etc. (Founder, 2002)
Founded in 1986, China Great Wall Computer Corporation (Great Wall, 9p M [Rt#LA%
M 1 -4J) was the first domestic PC manufacturer, and it is the largest computer-component
manufacturer and OEM supplier in China. With a sales revenue of RMB 16.2 billion ($2
billion) in 2001, Great Wall has two core businesses: Internet value-added service and IT
equipment manufacturing (including PCs and their components, such as power supplies,
monitors, boards, magnetic heads, software, etc.). Great Wall currently has four listed
public companies, three on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and one on the Hong Kong
Stock Exchange. It has 14 wholly owned companies, majority-stake in 11 companies, and
12 holding companies. (Great Wall, 2002)
105 Founder has also started to explore the fields of mobile communication, broadband, and rare earth and
neo-materials. Founder owns four publicly listed companies: (1) Founder Holdings, Limited, (2) EC-
Founder Co., Ltd, (3) Shanghai Founder Yanzhong Science & Technology Group Co., Ltd, and (4) PUC
Founder (Malaysia), along with 17 wholly owned subsidiaries and joint ventures. (Founder, 2002)
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8.2.3 Major Domestic Companies' Development during the stages
Legend in Stages
I examine how Legend has developed itself through the stages by dividing Legend's
development into four periods: 1984-1987, 1988-1993, 1994-1997, and 1997-present,
which correspond to the four development stages of China's PC industry described earlier.
The early 1980s to the late 1980s was the "preparation stage" of China's computer
industry; during this period, hundreds of companies were established in the
ZhongGuanCun Area, including Legend. In November 1984, Legend was founded as a
"New Technology Development Corporation of the Institute of Computing", an entity of
the Institute of Computing Technologies (ICT), Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS),
with an investment of RMB 200,000. Legend started by providing computer services to
customers, including testing, installation, and maintenance of PCs. It then took the
opportunity to develop the Legend Chinese language add-on card, the first product of the
company and one of the most successful Chinese language add-on cards at the time. The
reputation and market success of the Legend add-on card attracted the attention of some
international PC manufacturers, such as AST,106 who decided to choose Legend as their
distributor and partner to customize and distribute their PCs for the Chinese market (Xu,
2002).
Legend's development from 1988 to 1993 corresponded to the "growth stage" of the
industry as it focused on expanding its manufacturing capacity to produce its own brand
name PCs. In the late 1980s, there were no technologically advanced PCs that suited the
Chinese market, so Legend, in cooperation with AST, focused on customizing PCs for
the Chinese market. Legend intended to expand its manufacturing capacity, however, it
was not able to obtain a PC manufacturing license at the time from the government,
because the industry was strictly regulated and it was very difficult to obtain a PC
manufacturing license. Thus, Legend established a joint venture in Hong Kong with two
other partners-Daw Inc., a small computer-related trading firm in Hong Kong, and China
Technology Corporation, a state-owned corporation in China. Later, it acquired Quantum
Design Inc. (QDI), a small Hong Kong-based PC motherboard manufacturer. With
market know-how from Daw, financial capital from China Technology, and
manufacturing capacity from QDI, Legend was able to increase its sales revenue quickly
through production of motherboards and Legend's PCs. In 1989, Legend submitted its
brand of PCs for the technical test administered by the Torch Program 0 7 and thus gained
permission to manufacture in Mainland China. (Zhu, 2000)
In the third period of its development (1994-1997), corresponding to the filtration stage,
Legend focused on marketing its own brand PC. During the early- and mid-1990s, with
an exploding domestic demand for PCs, international PC products, capital, and services
all entered the Chinese market. Furthermore, the PC technology of China's market
106 The cooperation between Legend and AST ended in 1995 when Samsung acquired AST.
107 This is an important program sponsored by the National Science and Technology Committee, see detail
in Chapter 7.
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lagged behind the U.S. market by only one or two months, significantly shorter than
before the 1990s when it was as much as ten months behind. With capital accumulated
over the past decade, a strong presence in the international motherboard market, and
experience in distribution networks and after-sale services, Legend quickly established
itself as the number one producer in the domestic market and has maintained leadership
since 1996 (Zhu, 2000).
During Legend's fourth development period (1997-present), China's PC industry entered
the globalization stage; Legend advanced itself to become the leading manufacturer in
the Asia-Pacific market. Meanwhile, Legend went through a progression of
organizational and operational restructuring to upgrade itself to a modem enterprise. For
instance, it established a stock-option program for the founders, a rare practice at the time
for domestic companies. Further, Legend introduced younger managers, who later
became the central force of the company. Most outstanding, in September 1998 Legend
took over its parent-Institute of Computer Technology-and reformed it as Legend's
central research institute. (Lu, 2000; Zhu, 2000; Xu, 2002)
Similar to Legend, Founder and Great Wall developed their firms through the four stages.
The following sections review their early histories in the preparation stage in order to
examine how they gained momentum through development of their own technologies
that distinguished them from their many competitors at the time.
Founder at the Preparation Stage
Founder was established at Peking University 08 with an investment of RMB 400,000 in
the summer of 1985 as an enterprise affiliated with the university.109 The company was
named "Peking Like New Technology Company" (Like) and was led by one professor
from Peking University-Lou Binglong. Its first product was the Huaguang Electronic-
Publishing System, a commercialized version of the Chinese-language electronic-
publishing system invented by Professor Wang Xuan. (Lu 2000; Xu, 2000; Xu 2002)
In May 1987, with an investment of RMB 1.2 million from a "peasant entrepreneur,"" 0
another university-affiliated company-Beida New Technology Service Company (Beida)
was established to trade PCs. Because of the high profit, more funding soon became
available to enable Beida to trade PCs, including Jingshan-brand Super PCs, on a larger
scale. In 1988, Like and Beida were merged into the Beida New Technology Company
(New Tech) and renamed in 1993 to the Peking University Founder Group Company.
New Tech began distributing a Chinese-language add-on card (Beida Super Card). It
became one of the four best-known Chinese-language add-on cards"II and generated
profits for Founder of more than RMB 100 million from 1988 to 1995. (Lu 2000; Xu,
2000; Xu 2002)
108 Peking University is also called Beijing University.
109 In March 1984, seven professors at Peking University proposed that the university establish an
enterprise.
110 Fu Hongjiang of Yuyuantan Village, a Beijing suburban government.
"1 The other three best-known Chinese-language add-on cards are Juren, Wangma, and Legend.
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Founder PC
Before Founder started manufacturing its own PCs in 1995, Founder had acted as a sales
agent for several foreign-brand PCs since 1992 and became the main distributor of
Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) brand PCs in 1993. Utilizing its skills in PC
marketing, sales-network development, and after-sale services that were built through
agent sales, Founder started to design, manufacture, and market its own brand PCs and
monitors in December 1995. From second quarter 1999, Founder has been listed as one
of the ten largest PC manufacturers in the Asia-Pacific region, and the second-largest PC
manufacturer in China's market.
Currently, the PC division of Founder has about 1500 employees. Founder's PC sales
have grown tremendously within the seven short years since Founder entered the market.
Reviewing Founder's PCs, three products distinguish themselves. Founder's ZhuoYue 98
computer was the first domestic PC that "bundled with the Internet", i.e., this kind of PC
has Internet services set up at the time the consumer purchases it. After ZhuoYue 98,
several companies learned from Founder and designed internet-bundled PCs. When
Founder's ZhuoYue 3000 computer entered the market in 1999, its keyboard had added
several function keys. ZhuoYue A+ entered the market in June 2002 and attracted
consumers with its black-color design motif. In addition, because CD-ROM drives break
easily, customers find it useful that this product's CD-ROM drive can be easily added on
or taken off. (Interviewee # 25, 2003)
Great Wall at the Preparation Stage
Great Wall, a state-owned and state-run company, was founded in December 1986 to
commercialize GW 0520 CH, a domestically designed and manufactured IBM-
compatible PC. As early as 1983, the Ministry of Electronic Industry (MEI) organized
an annual nationwide conference on PC development. At this conference, the country's
computer experts agreed to adopt the IBM standard in China and identified that the
biggest hurdle to domestic PC development was to build a Chinese-language processing
system. Yan Yuanchao, a technician who worked for the Sixth Research Institute of MEI,
participated in the project and developed the Chinese Character Disk Operating System
(CCDOS), software that could input and display Chinese characters. Yan further
proposed a Chinese-language add-on card to save the memory required by the software.
In 1984, the first Chinese-language add-on card, Great Wall (GW) 0140 card, was
developed. (Lu, 2000; Xu, 2002)
In June 1985, Great Wall's 0520CH PC (GW 0520 CH), the first domestically designed
and manufactured IBM-compatible PC, was exhibited. In addition to its better
performance than IBM PCs or NEC PCs in areas of monitor technology and
compatibility, the computer amazed the audience with its Chinese language processing
capability provided by the GW 0140 card.'2 On December 12, 1986, with an investment
112 Since the start of GW 0140 cards, several other companies entered the Chinese-language add-on card
business, such as Legend, Founder, and Juren, who developed Legend cards, Super Card, and Juren Cards,
respectively.
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of RMB 3 million from the MEI, China Computer Development Company (CCDC), the
predecessor of Great Wall, was founded to commercialize the technology of GW 0520
CH. Wang Zhi, the deputy chief of the Computer Industry Administration Bureau of
MEI, was named general manager of the company. Great Wall thus started to
commercialize the PC initially developed inside the MEI's research institute. (Lu, 2000)
8.3 The Role of the Government
The Ministry of Information Industry (MII) has been the chief government party that set
policies for the computer industry. MI plans China's information infrastructure,
develops its national computer policies, and licenses government supported companies.
In addition to the computer industry, MIl also supervise China's telecom-equipment
industry. Because the convergence of computer and telecommunications in the last two
decades, the State Council combined the Ministry of Electronic Industry (MEI) and the
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) into MII to avoid conflicts between
the two ministries on a number of issues (Caroll, 1998). Dedrick and Kraemer (1998)
pointed out that this change eliminated bureaucratic competition that could paralyze the
policies, as seen in Japan and Korea.
To develop China's PC industry, MII has two different sets of policies for foreign and
domestic firms: for foreign firms, aiming at leveraging access to China's market in
exchange for technology and investment; for domestic firms, stimulating their growth
through regulation and subsidies (Kraemer and Dedrick, 2001). During the1980s and the
early 1990s, several MNCs started to set up operations in China in response to China's
invitation to help develop its PC industry (Tale 8.4). As a prerequisite for granting
production licenses and market access, the Chinese government required MNCs to
transfer technology and form alliances with domestic companies. Thus, MNCs such as
HP, Toshiba, and Compaq formed joint ventures with local companies; IBM, for example,
formed five joint ventures with Great Wall in order to market its own products and gain
access to local distributional channels in China's rising computer market. (Lu, 2000)
The Chinese government took several steps to give domestic firms time to establish
themselves: discouragement of import, encouragement of export, and obstacles to foreign
firms (Kramer and Dedrick, 2001). The government imposed high tariffs and taxes to
discourage direct import in the growth stage of development; for instance, the tariff was
82% in 1992. It encouraged exports by creating "export processing zones" where
imported materials used in production would be free from duties and taxes when the
resulting products were directly exported. Furthermore, it slowed the entry of foreign
firms and increased their costs through a rigorous certification process encompassing
quality, local content, and export limits. (Kraemer and Dedrick, 2001)
However, intervention from the government mostly occurred at the earlier stages of the
industry. The government made China's PC market more open to foreign producers as
the industry moved to the filtration stage--it reduced tariffs, from 82% in 1992 to 35% in
1993, and again to 15% in 2000 (Kraemer and Dedrick, 2001; Xu, 2002). Domestic
firms by that time had gained the ability to compete with the MNCs.
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Overall, the government's policy towards domestic computer companies was largely
indirect. The industry was affected by government policies intended to reform state
enterprises: separating politics from enterprise management, converting from military
enterprises to civilian production companies, commercializing research results, and
forming joint ventures with foreign firms. (Kraemer and Dedrick, 2001)
Even though there were few government interventions, leading PC manufacturers have
benefited from the support of affiliated government institutes. The institutes initialized
and facilitated domestic firms' growth by providing them with access to the technologies
developed by state R&D institutions. Legend and Founder are closely affiliated with the
Chinese Academy of Sciences and Peking University. Great Wall's initial PC was
developed inside MEI research institutes. As a spin-off from MEI's research institute, it
is evident that Great Wall has gained strong support from MEI for its growth and
cooperation with IBM. These companies have had easy access to their parent institutes'
resources-technical expertise, financial support, and the well-respected reputations of the
institutes. However, these affiliations also had disadvantages. Little autonomy and too
much intervention from the supporting institutes have hampered the ability of the
companies to operate as modern enterprises and make rational business decisions in
response to the market. Eventually, all three companies have realized such problems and
started various degrees of restructuring to resolve the problem.
Of the three companies discussed in this chapter, Great Wall has gained the most
government support since its establishment. With his family background1 13 and his
extensive government experience in the Computer Bureau, the company's first president,
Wang Zhi, was able to access considerable government support. Other top managers of
the company were also able to do so."4 Great Wall enjoyed privileges provided by the
government, such as access to institutional buyers1 5 and loans from state-owned
banks,11 6 and connections with top multinational companies (Xu 2002). These privileges
were not available to other companies, such as Legend and Founder. Because of Great
Wall's associations with the government, many foreign corporations, such as IBM,
Microsoft, and DEC, formed joint projects with the enterprise (Great Wall's website,
2002).
The close connection with the government brought privileges for Great Wall (GW) but
also problems. Great Wall had to sacrifice some autonomy in exchange for these
privileges; the firm was asked to maintain a certain level of local content in its PCs,
sometimes from particular factories. In the late 1980s, GW-brand PCs were composed
of roughly 50% locally produced components, most of which had serious quality
113 Wang Zhi is the third son of Wang Zhen, one of the most powerful politicians in China in the 1980s.
114 For instance, Lu Ming, who later became CEO of Great Wall, was the son of a well-known general in
the People's Liberation Army (PLA).
1s In the late 1980s and earlier 1990s, the government usually required the institutional buyers, who needed
quotas from the government, to buy only GW 0520 CH PCs. (Xu, 2002).
116 For instance, Great Wall obtained a loan of RMB 287 million to expand its Shenzhen operation in
December 1992. This project is the only major project listed in the national Eighth Five-Year Plan for PC
manufacturing.
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problems. This poor quality hindered the development of the company. Great Wall tried
to resolve the problems by seeking foreign cooperation and internalizing the production
of components.
In addition, the nature of state-ownership and running of the firm brought a negative
effect: ineffective management. The high-profit margin of its PC business at the time
permitted the firm to ignore the issue. Compared with other companies, such as Legend
and Founder, Great Wall had less marketing and after-sale services. (Xu, 2002)
8.4 Chapter Conclusion
I have examined the development of China's PC industry and explained that domestic
firms have caught up with MNCs through a catching-up process that can be described by
the four distinct stages of the staged catching-up theory: preparation stage (early 1980s
to late 1980s), growth stage (late 1980s to early 1990s), filtration stage (early 1990s to
middle/late 1990s), and globalization stage (middle/late 1990s to present, i.e., 2002). The
evolution of China's market, domestic and foreign brand market shares, revenue, and
employment data, and the individual development histories of Legend, Founder, and
Great Wall, all have confirmed that China's PC manufacturing industry has gone through
the preparation, growth, and filtration stages and is now at the beginning of the
globalization stage.
Although there are no detailed data available to analyze how effective these policies were
in slowing foreign producers' progress in China's PC market, the window of opportunity
provided by the government certainly helped domestic firms to grow at the earlier stages.
More importantly, it seems that the support from affiliated government institutes
provided needed knowledge-based assets to fertilize the growth of leading domestic firms
and thus pushed the industry transit from the preparation stage to the growth stage. I will
study this in more detail in the next chapter.
The government's policies towards domestic computer companies were largely indirect
and China's PC market has been quite open since the early 1990s. The openness of the
market triggered China's PC industry to move from growth stage to the filtration stage.
If Chinese domestic firms were incompetent at the time, they might have been wiped out
from the market. In fact, that happened to many domestic firms at the time. However,
several large domestic firms competed with the MNCs intensely, and they not only
survived the battle but rose to become leaders afterwards. What has made these firms
succeed in their competition with the MNCs? The next chapter studies the role the cause
of leading domestic producers' competitiveness--innovation-has played in their
development.
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9 Innovation Capability of the Leading PC
Manufacturers
Like with telecom-equipment manufacturers, innovation capability and self-developed
technologies have allowed Chinese domestic firms to catch up with the MNCs in the PC
industry. In this chapter, I analyze the role of innovation, channels to acquire it, and the
role of the government during the catching-up, focusing on three leading firms, namely,
Legend, Founder, and Great Wall.
I have organized the chapter as follows: I first investigate the role that innovation has
played in the development of leading domestic firms in Section 9.1. In Section 9.2, I
study two major channels for leading domestic firms to acquire innovation capability: in-
house R&D development and external alliance, as well as technology transfer through
the joint ventures of one particular company, Great Wall. In Section 9.3, I further
explore the factors, such as the government involvement, network clustering,
disintegration of the global value chain, and sub-sector linkages, that have enhanced the
building of innovation capability of these firms. I present concluding remarks in Section
9.4.
9.1 The Role of Innovation Capability
Earlier, I have shown that China's PC industry has successfully gone through the
preparation, growth, and filtration stages, and has entered the globalization stage. What
has driven the industry to upgrade itself through the stages and especially what has made
leading firms succeed in competition against the MNCs? My study has demonstrated that,
for leading domestic PC manufacturers, innovation capability and self-developed
technologies have been the key to catching up with the MNCs. This session presents the
regression analyses of the top 10 PC producers in China and examples on how these
companies have built their competitiveness through innovation capability.
9.1.1 Innovation Capability in Catching-up
Strength in innovation capability and self-developed technology has determined who the
leading domestic firms are in the PC industry. Table 9.1 illustrates a close relationship
between industrial leadership ranking and the innovation capability ranking of domestic
PC producers.' 17 Corresponding to the dominant position of domestic producers in terms
of market share, eight of the top ten PC producers in China are domestic (Table 9.1).
117 c rank ompany's leadership in PC industry by their sales revenue in PC products. I build my own
innovation capability ranking in the following way: Similar to the telecom-equipment industry, I asked my
interviewees to rank top domestic PC firms in terms of their innovation capability. Based on the ranking, I
built an aggregate rank index for innovation capability, taking R&D input and R&D output of these
companies into account. The R&D input mainly refers to firms' R&D spending as a percentage of revenue.
The R&D output includes indicators such as the number of patents held by the company, participation in
the national S&T program, and evaluation by their peers.
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Meanwhile, Legend, Founder, and Tongfang lead in both industry and innovation
capability.
The computer hardware industry is less R&D intensive than the telecom-equipment
industry. In general, computer manufacturers spend significantly less than telecom
equipment manufacturers. For instance, in 2002, global computer giants such as IBM,
HP, and Apple each spent between 6.2% and 8.2% of their revenue in R&D, while
telecom-equipment manufacturers generally spent 10%-20% of their revenue in R&D.
Nevertheless, my study shows that the stronger the innovation capability a domestic PC
producer has, the stronger its leading position in the industry. The only exception is
Great Wall. Great Wall, even though listed as the third place in terms of production,
ranks low in its innovation capacity. Great Wall spent only 0.4% of its revenue in R&D,
significantly lower than any other domestic PC producers. The fact that Great Wall's
profit was quoted as 1.5%, significantly lower than Legend (3.6%) and Founder (4%) in
2001, indicates that Great Wall is not as competitive as its sales revenue implies.
Therefore, if industrial leadership also means competitiveness rather than the size of the
sales, Great Wall's industrial leadership should be discounted.
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Table 9.1 Top Ten Producers in PC Industry: Leadership and Innovation Capacity
Rank in Rank in
Rank in PC Electronic Innovation
Company Name S $ Ownership Industry Industry Capacity
Legend Computer Group Corporation
V V P R S Domestic 1 3 3
Peking University Founder Group Corporation
1L,3 )Y41 > J Domestic 2 10 1
Joint
China Great Wall Computer Corporation Venture
T 1 ff4 1 (IBM) 3 7 8
Dell Computer (China) Co., Ltd.
(j4L jt I,) FR MNC (Dell) 4 n.a. n.a.
Trigem Computer (Shenyang) Co., Ltd. MNC
2SLLJJ$Ii ('&t#f) 1 >R A (Trigem) 5 n.a. n.a.
Tsinghua Tongfang Co., Ltd.
iM 7Y R fR Domestic 6 19 2
Langchao Electronic Information Industrial
Group Corp.
M %Rjlf p 1 Domestic 7 20 4
TCL Holding Co., Ltd.
TCL M 4 PR Domestic 8 6 6
Guangzhou Qixi Computer Holding Co., Ltd.
i'lH'.bi 82iM fl Domestic 9 50 7
Hisense Group Co.
*f FR2 Domestic 10 8 5
Note:
1. Great Wall established five joint ventures with IBM from 1995 to 2000 to produce a wide range of
computer components and provide computer services. By 2000, Great Wall had received $100 million in
investment from IBM.
2. Dell Computer established its China Customer Center in 1998 in Xiamen, Fujian Province in P. R. China.
Dell is well known for its low R&D Spending. It spends around 1.5% of revenue in R&D in 2000.
(CAHNERS RESEARCH; EUROPEAN ELECTRONICS MARKETS FORECASTS -- Electronic
Business, 8/1/2001).
3. Trigem Computer (Shenyang) Co., Ltd was established in 1999 in Shenyang by Trigem Computer Co.,
Ltd as a wholly owned subsidiary.
4. Unlike other PC manufacturers listed here, TCL and Hisense have a diverse range of electronic products.
PC only occupies a small portion of their revenue, as shown by their leading ranking in electronic industry.
5. Evaluation for Great Wall is based on 2001's data.
6. Hisense's R&D as % of revenue is based on 2001 data.
7. For detailed information see Table 9.4 in Appendix.
Source:
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Gao Sumei (MII). 2003. "2002 China PC Production and Sale Analysis." Website:
http://www.mii.gov.cn.
MI. April 2002. "2002 Top 100 Chinese Electronic Companies" Website: http://www.mii.gov.cn.
MII. April 2001. "2001 Top 100 Chinese Electronic Companies" Website: http://www.mii.gov.cn.
Great Wall website, www.greatwall.com.cn; Dell China Website, www.dell.com.cn; Trigem
(Shenyang) website, www.tg-sy.com; Qixi website: www.hedy.com.cn.
State Intellectual Property Office of P.R. China, website: www.sipo.gov.cn.
9.1.2 Regression Results on Innovation Capability
In the appendix of this chapter, I adopt the linear regression model to investigate the
relationship between "Leadership in the PC Industry" (dependent variable, Y) and "Rank
in Innovation Capability" (independent variable, X). Appendix 9.1 displays more
detailed information on innovation capability of the top 10 PC producers. Appendix 9.2
illustrates the regression analysis results using the data of the leading domestic PC
producers, excluding Great Wall for the reason noted above. The model is significant,
with an R2 value at 0.76 and the actual rank in the PC industry of each data point is quite
close to the predict rank by the model (Figure 9.1), which indicates a strong explanatory
power of innovation capability to leadership in the PC industry.
Rank in Innovation Capability Line Fit Plot
12
S*Rank in PC Industry
U 6 7- N Predicted Rank in PC
4 .Industry
It 2
0
0 5 10
Rank in Innovation
Capacity
Figure 9.1 Rank in PC Industry vs. Rank in Innovation Capability Line Fit Plot
I further investigate the relationship between "Rank in Innovation Capability" and "R&D
Spending" in Appendix 9.3. With an R2 value at 0.46 and the line plot illustrated by
Figure 9.2, it confirms that "R&D Spending" is quite relevant in explaining ranks in
innovation capability.
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Figure 9.2 Rank in Innovation Capability vs. R&D Spending Line Fit Plot
In Appendix 9.4, 1 examine the relationship between "Revenue" and "R&D Spending" of
domestic PC producers. The result shows that the model is significant with a high R
value at 0.82 and a very nice line plot (Figure 9.3). Analysis in Appendix 9.3 and 9.4
demonstrate that "R&D Spending" plays a significant role in explaining the innovation
capability and leadership of the domestic firms in the industry.
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Figure 9.3 Revenue vs. R&D Spending Line Fit Plot
The development histories of the leading PC companies and their key products is perhaps
more intuitive than the numbers in revealing the causal relationship of innovation
capability to industrial leadership. Therefore, in addition to the above simple regression
analysis, I give examples showing how innovation has positively affected the
development of leading domestic firms (Legend and Founder) throughout their entire
development history. I demonstrate that during the earlier years (late 1980s and early
1990s), innovation made Great Wall the industrial leader of domestic PC manufacturers.
In Section 9.2, I explore Great Wall's declining innovation capability and
competitiveness and its choice of forming a joint venture with IBM.
First, all three PC manufacturers of this research started their companies with innovation
and self-developed technology. Legend's first product was a self-developed Chinese-
language add-on card. Great Wall started with its GWO140 Chinese language add-on
card and the first domestic PC, GW 0520 CH PC. Founder, on the other hand, started by
commercializing its innovation of fourth generation digital publishing technology. There
were many companies manufacturing Chinese language add-on cards at the time, but
only a few finally won the market with their high quality products. This implies that
technological innovation is the key for these companies to start gaining an advantage
over other firms, since a company's technological innovation capability was reflected by
the ability to make a high-quality Chinese language add-on card. Specifically, Founder,
led by scientist Wang Xuan, directly leapfrogged to develop the most advanced
generation (the fourth generation) of modem typesetting technology for electronic
publishing systems while most of the world still worked with third-generation electronic
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publishing systems. Interestingly, each technological innovation involved some kind of
Chinese characteristic that might discourage an MNC from making efforts to develop it.
I consider the existence of such opportunities critical to create room for these companies
to grow in the first place.
As an industry, PC manufacturing requires less R&D input than the telecom-equipment
industry. Nevertheless, domestic PC producers have gained market share by making PCs
with the most technologically advanced components rather than keeping one or two
cycles behind to seek only a low-cost advantage. For instance, in the middle 1990s,
Legend stirred a market war by advertising its most advanced PC with a reasonable price
for Chinese customers. Through its continuing R&D effort, Founder had been able to
keep its monopoly position for about a decade in electronic publishing and its other core
business areas. The experience of these Chinese PC manufacturers indicates that
innovation capability and self-developed technology have been key factors in catching-up.
9.1.3 Founder: Ji-Gong-Mao and Leapfrogging by Innovation
Founder has characterized its development as Ji-Gong-Mao (Technology-
Manufacturing-Trade), i.e., develop a key technology first, build its manufacturing
capacity, and then establish distribution channel(s) for it.1"8 Innovation and self-
developed technology have played vital roles throughout the history of Founder's
development. When the company was just established, the innovative fourth-generation
electronic- typesetting technology, based on Wang Xuan's Huaguang model, built a solid
foundation for Founder as a leader in the electronic publishing industry. In August 1990,
the company launched China's first long-distance satellite newspaper page transmission
system (Founder, 2002). In 1993, the Founder-93 Color Electronic Publishing System
was developed. The continuous innovation and development of electronic publishing
systems enabled Founder to remain a leader in the PC business. Founder's later
movement to Gong (manufacturing) and Mao (trade) was based on the commercialization
of its Ji (R&D) results.
As mentioned earlier, Founder's leapfrogging by innovation can be best illustrated by its
development of fourth-generation electronic- typesetting technology, which started as a
government-funded project in the 1970s. At the time, while other industrialized countries
developed computer technology rapidly, China was trapped in its "cultural revolution."
China resumed its contact with the West after the visits of President Nixon and the
Japanese president in 1972. The government realized that China was far behind in
computer technology, and was urgently intent on developing the technologies that could
input and output the complicated Chinese characters to overcome this hurdle to
development. In August 1974, a project aimed at Chinese-language information
118 The "Ji-Gong-Mao" characteristic is in direct contrast with Legend's "Mao-Gong-Ji," which will be
discussed later.
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processing technology and digital typesetting, Project 748, was initiated.' In addition
to the most fundamental Chinese-language phototypesetting, the project included two
other sub-projects: Chinese-language information database technology and long-distance
Chinese-language information transmission technology. At the time, newspapers in
China still used the traditional lead type method to typeset pages - manually organizing
thousands of Chinese characters laboriously.
The key person on Project 748 was Wang Xuan, a professor at Peking University. 2 0
After studying three generations of modem typesetting technologies,12 ' Wang Xuan
decided to leapfrog directly to the most advanced fourth-generation technology of
modem typesetting. In 1976, Wang Xuan invented a mathematical system that could
resolve the problem of storing Chinese characters. The system compresses the font
information significantly, because it categorizes Chinese characters by breaking each
character into several separate strokes. In October 1978, Peking University and
Shandong Weifang Computer Corporation (Weifang) signed a contract to jointly develop
an electronic publishing system based on Wang's method; Weifang would produce the
hardware and be in charge of sales and after-sale services. (Lu, 2000)
From 1979 to 1987, Wang and the research team developed four improved systems of the
fourth-generation modem typesetting technology and the series were named "Huaguang."
In July 1979, Wang and his colleagues and engineers from Weifang completed a
prototype of the fourth-generation Chinese typesetting system, Huaguang 1.122 In
September 1983, Huaguang II, an improved system, was tested. In September 1986,
Huaguang III, the first commercialized product, and one that uses an imported
microcomputer and a new version of Raster Image Processing System (RIP), was
completed and passed its test operation. In early 1987, Wang Xuan designed Huaguang
IV, a smaller and faster system based on large-screen typesetting technology and the
personal computer. (Lu, 2000)
The leapfrogging from second-generation to fourth-generation modem typesetting
technology helped China to regain the market share for domestic electronic typesetting.
119 Five agencies jointly proposed Project 748: the Fourth Ministry of Machine Industry, the First Ministry
of Machine Industry, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Xinhua News Agency, and the State Bureau of
Publishing Affairs Administration.
120 After learning of Project 748 through his wife, in 1975, Wang Xuan submitted a proposal, titled
"Regular and Non-Regular Strokes, Shapes, and Parameters - Chinese-Language Compression Methods,"
to the University for participating in Project 748. Wang Xuan participated in building China's earliest
mainframe computers and studied Chinese-character input methods.
121 The first-generation modern typesetting technology was based on manual phototypesetters and the
second-generation uses phototypesetter machines to provide fonts of characters on filmstrips. Both
generations of technology were invented by U.S. entrepreneurs in the 1940s and 1950s. The third-
generation system was invented by Germans in 1965; representations of characters were formed by raster
imaging on high-resolution cathode ray tubes (CRTs) (Account drawn from Brailsford, 1988).
122 Dissatisfied with Weifang's poor quality control and after-sale services, Peking University decide to let
New Tech (Founder's predecessor) produce and sell a Founder series of the Huaguang system, Founder
Electronic Publishing Systems (Founder EPS) at the end of 1988, while Weifang still produced and sold
under the name of Huaguang.
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Because of the advanced technology and lower unit pricem of the Huaguang systems,
foreign laser-typesetting companies had all exited China's market by the end of 1989. In
1999, Founder EPS enjoyed an 80% share of China's publishing market. (Lu, 2000)
9.1.4 Legend: Mao-Gong-Ji and Technology Failure?
Many analysts have used Mao-Gong-Ji (Marketing-Manufacturing-Technology, i.e., first
focusing on marketing, then manufacturing, then technology development) to describe
Legend's growth (Xu, 2002). Legend started as a sales agent to accumulate experience in
distribution and management. Afterwards, Legend built its manufacturing capacity and
its brand-name products.
Although I agree that marketing and manufacturing capabilities were crucial, I disagree
that Legend has placed them first, while ignoring the importance of technology
development in its history. From the very beginning, Legend distinguished itself from
many other PC companies at the time by its first product-the Legend Chinese add-on
card, which was developed by ICT scientists. It was this product that attracted the
attention of international PC manufacturers, who later asked Legend to be their
distributor. Furthermore, Legend accumulated its capital at the initial stages through
services provided by Legend's employees, who were mostly ICT scientists and research
staff. It was the knowledge of these people that served customers and built the good
reputation of Legend. In this sense, the technology brought the opportunity for Legend's
development of other capabilities. Legend had the advantage of technological capability
over other computer companies at the time; it seemed more determined to develop other
capabilities that were needed by the company, such as sensitivity to the market.
Some have argued that technology has sometimes encumbered, rather than facilitated, the
company's development (Xu, 2002). For instance, even Liu Chuanzhi, the company's
founder and number one person, once said, "technology has failed sometimes"(Xu, 2002).
The minimization of the role of technology development comes from the conflict
between company management and R&D forces when the R&D direction does not reflect
the market need. Is this a technology failure or a management disappointment?
In my opinion, market-led technology development is the primary reason for Legend's
success. From the first product, Legend's Chinese add-on card, to the Legend-brand PC,
to Internet-bundled PCs, Legend was creative and swift to follow the market's lead.
Using advanced technology rather than imitating others was their key strategy to gaining
industrial leadership. Therefore, it is unfair to say that technology sometimes fails the
company. The right choice of technology and the right direction of technology
development matter most. The management team of Legend has a deep understanding of
the market as well as of the technology. This gives them the advantage in making the
smart choice as the market develops.
123 For instance, Huaguang III was sold at RMB 1.8 million (approximately $0.22 million), while a
Chinese-language electronic publishing system made by HTS Corporation of the U.S. sold at $ 4.3 million.
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9.1.5 Great Wall: First Domestic PC and the Great Wall Model
The early success of Great Wall was closely associated with the first domestically
designed IBM-compatible PC "GW 0520 CH" and with the pioneering vision of Wang
Zhi, known as "the Great Wall Model." As described earlier, Great Wall was established
in 1986 to commercialize the "GW 0520 CH" computer. Without the innovation and
self-developed technology--"GW 0520 CH" -- it would have been impossible for the
company to establish and get a head start. Wang Zhi, on the other hand, played an
essential role in making the company grow in its own way. As the deputy director and an
engineer, Wang Zhi considered building China's domestic PC sector as early as 1983.
During his participation in negotiations with multinational companies, such as IBM and
Microsoft, he realized that market-oriented operation is critical for a company's
development.
Wang Zhi has exercised three innovative methods, which became well known as the
"Great Wall Model." First, to obtain better quality, Wang Zhi employed a bidding
method in manufacturing "GW 0520 CH" PCs. Second, to establish a distribution
network, Wang Zhi adopted IBM's "dealer distribution" model, which was drastically
different from the "integrated buy-and-sell" model used by state-owned enterprises at the
time. In the 1990s Great Wall improved its distribution networks by creating a chain of
principal distributors who provided products to secondary distributors, who in turn sell
those PCs to end-users. This distribution system helped to bring about Great Wall's
market success and prompted IBM to withdraw its IBM 5550 PCs from the local market.
Third, to differentiate Great Wall products from clone PCs, the company set up specialty
shops. With all these efforts, Great Wall became one of the best-known brand names in
the domestic market only one year after its birth. From 1986 to 1994, Great Wall
remained the largest domestic PC producer in China. (Xu, 2002)
9.2 Channels for Acquiring Innovation capability
Computer manufacturer leadership is closely related to innovation capability. For
instance, two PC industrial leaders, Founder and Legend, are listed as first and second in
terms of innovation capability; especially Founder, who has been listed by the
government as one of the first six national level pioneer enterprises engaged in innovative
technologies. How have they achieved their innovation capability? Why has Great Wall
not achieved a similar level of innovation capability in later stages? I investigate the two
main channels through which firms build their innovation capability: in-house R&D and
external alliance. I also study why joint venture experience with IBM has been
unsuccessful as a channel for Great Wall to build their innovation capability.
9.2.1 Internal Development
Though data for MNCs' R&D spending in China is not all available, it is most likely that
MNCs will spend a very small portion of revenue on R&D, assuming their spending
pattern is similar to the MNCs in the telecom-equipment industry in China. Among the
ten top PC manufacturers, domestic firms generally spend a larger percentage of their
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revenue in R&D than MNCs or firms with joint ventures, such as Great Wall and Dell
China (Table 9.4). For instance, Legend and Founder each spent 2.9% and 4.3% of
revenue in R&D in 2002, while Great Wall spent only 0.4%. This level of R&D spending
is slightly lower than most of the global leaders, such as IBM, HP, and Apple, which
spent 6.2%, 6.5%, and 8.2% of their revenue, respectively, in R&D in 2002. But it is
higher than Dell, who spent only 1.5% of revenue in R&D in 2002.
In addition to their R&D spending, Legend and Founder also set up R&D centers
engaged in technology advancement. For instance, Legend set up Legend R&D Institute
in 1999 and later developed a two-tier R&D system, which includes 47 R&D labs.
Legend had over one thousand R&D staff and started to construct Legend Beijing R&D
Mansion in 2002.
Table 9.2 Founder's Corporation Technology Centers
Institute Main Activities
Founder R&D Center
Founder Information
Technology Institute
Founder Information Product
Institute
Founder Lanthanide
Technology Institute
the most important R&D base for Founder, mainly responsible for Founder's
general media-related R&D directions, new product development, and R&D
resource accumulation; has two State-level Research Laboratories in Text
Processing and Electronic Publishing System; the world's most distinctive
R&D base for Chinese electronic publishing systems; one of the world's
major research bases for multi-language electronic publishing systems; more
than 400 researchers, half of whom have master's or doctoral degrees.
developed the soup-to-nuts computer and server products; more than 100
researchers, most of whom have master's or doctoral degrees
DSP development and application, network products (modem, graphical
terminal, workstation, WBT, router, hub, network card, etc.), display
products (CRT monitor, LCD monitor), office automation and teaching
equipment (projector, teaching PC), and other high-tech application products
(Anti-Fake Tax Controller, Note Processor).
R&D in lanthanide technology; world leader in separation technology of
lanthanide and functional materials
Source: Founder's website as in January 2003.
Founder, corresponding to its first position in innovation capability, evidently has a larger
R&D department compared to other high-tech companies in China. As one of the first
six national-level pioneer enterprises engaged in innovative technologies, Founder has
established a Corporation Technology Center that consists of Founder R&D Center,
Founder Fingerprint Technology Institute, Founder Information Technology Institute,
Founder Information Products Institute, and Founder Lanthanide Technology Institute.
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These R&D centers conduct R&D activities in media technology (electronic publishing),
computer, network technology, and new material technology (see Table 9.2).
Founder has insisted on developing its own intellectual property for more than 10 years.
Currently, Founder has 1000 software engineers devoted to software development. It
leads the world in technologies such as Chinese word processing and fingerprint
recognition. The Founder Software Base was included in the National Torch Project.
9.2.2 External Alliance
Though it is difficult to say whether or not the affiliated relationship is really external to
the companies studied here, affiliations have been critical to support companies'
innovative activities at their earlier stages. Legend, Founder, and Great Wall all have a
technologically oriented entity as their founding organization; namely, the Institute of
Computing Technology of Chinese Academy of Science, Peking University, and Ministry
of Electronic Industry, respectively. These institutes provide rich soil for these
companies to grow.
The technical expertise gained from the institutes has become part of the companies'
initial innovative capabilities. For instance, because of the affiliated relationship, Peking
University played a vital role in providing R&D resources to Founder, especially through
its Institute of Computer Science and Technology. It provided technologies, such as
Founder EPS in 1988 and the core technology'2 4 for Founder-93 Color EPS in 1993. It
also helped in launching the long-distance satellite newspaper-page transmission system
mentioned above, and also an integrated newspaper management network in 1994. In
July 1995, Founder R&D Center was established as a result of merging the research
institute and company, so that the R&D achievements of the institute would stay inside
the company.
Furthermore, all the companies studied here have strategic alliances or R&D partners in
various areas, domestically or internationally, especially in the areas of their core
competence or where they intend to build their competence. This phenomenon indicates
that strategic alliance seems to be an effective way to keep up with cutting-edge
developments and to quickly ramp up companies' technological capabilities. For instance,
as the market leader in the Chinese and Asia-Pacific PC industry, Legend has actively
partnered with world-class leaders in various technology areas. It has strong working
relationships with Intel and Microsoft. It has established joint ventures with Computer
Associates and D-Link for software and networking products in China. Legend has
established joint laboratories with National Semiconductor and Texas Instruments to use
its partners' strengths to develop Internet appliances and other networking products.
(Table 9.3)
124 A dual-processor solution that increased the speed of character generation and improved the quality of
color images relative to traditional electronic color separators.
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Table 9.3 Legend's Technological Partnership
Partner Nature of Relationship
Intel Strong working relationship
Microsoft Strong working relationship
Computer Associates A joint venture by Legend and Computer Associates to develop software for theChina Market
Joint venture capitalized at $10m in which Legend holds 57% and the remainder
D-Link is held by D-Link to design, manufacture, and distribute networking products for
the China market
IBM A strategic alliance with IBM to customize and distribute IBM software productsto China
National Semiconductor A jointly established laboratory by Legend and National Semiconductor todevelop internet appliances, such as set top boxes and thin clients.
Texas Instruments A jointly established Digital Signal Processing laboratory by Legend and TexasInstruments to develop products, such as the ADSL modem.
Source: Legend website, as of January, 2003.
9.2.3 Technology Transfer through Joint Ventures
Great Wall and IBM set up five joint ventures from 1994 to 2000. The joint ventures'
products and services ranged from IBM and Great Wall PC manufacturing, to circuit-card
assembling, magnetic-resistant head gimbal assembling (for IBM's hard disk drives and
electronic components), to computer-leasing services. By 2000, Great Wall had received
$100 million in investment from IBM. With the help of IBM's financial capital and
manufacturing experience, Great Wall has transformed itself from a pure PC
manufacturer to a leader in PC component manufacturing and an IT giant (in terms of
revenue) with a wide range of businesses. (Xu, 2002)
Great Wall had very low internal investment in R&D; for instance, it invested RMB
71.34 million in 2001, only 0.4% of its sales revenue, much lower than Legend and
Founder (3.0% and 4.5% respectively). It is not clear how much the joint ventures have
contributed to the development of Great Wall's R&D capability. However, it seems that
instead of being an independent domestic PC manufacturer in design and development,
Great Wall became a low-value-added manufacturing site in IBM's global value chain.
9.3 Factors Affecting Improving Innovation Capability
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Through my case studies, I have confirmed that government involvement in accumulating
knowledge-based assets is crucial for the improvement of innovation capability of
domestic PC manufacturing firms. It has helped to build a positive feedback system that
rewards companies' efforts in building innovation capability and developing proprietary
technologies. The positive feedback system for innovation capability is composed of
network clustering of R&D functions, disintegration of the global value chain, and sub-
sector linkage.
As discussed in Section 8.3, unlike the telecom-equipment industry, the government's
policy towards domestic computer companies has been largely indirect. PC
manufacturing was treated as part of the general enterprise reform. However, at the early
stages of development, sustenance from their affiliated state-owned research institutes
provided knowledge-based assets needed for the growth of Legend, Founder, and Great
Wall. At later stages, national S&T programs such as the "Torch Program" and "863
Plan" (details of these programs can be found in Chapter 6) encouraged the improvement
of R&D capabilities of domestic PC manufacturers.
Studies of this chapter confirm that Beijing, particularly the ZhongGuanCun area, is the
favorite location for R&D functions; this is shown by the fact that Legend and Founder
have both located their R&D headquarters in ZhongGuanCun, where CAS and Peking
University, their affiliated state institutions, reside. At the same time, they have chosen
various locations for their manufacturing. For instance, Legend has chosen Shanghai,
Beijing, Huiyang (Guangdong Province), and Xiamen (Fujian Province) as its
manufacturing base for PCs, various computer products, and cell phones. They have a
well-developed sales network covering both domestic and overseas markets. Legend has
a regional platform or sales office in most of China's provincial capital cities, as well as
several overseas branches in the United States, United Kingdom, Holland, France,
Germany, Spain, and Austria.
As discussed earlier, the computer industry is increasingly taking the form of
configurational technologies because of modular design and the use of the open standards
of the IBM PC architecture. The new industrial organization that was pioneered by the
global PC industry is based on horizontal specialization rather than vertical integration.
Therefore, firms compete by specializing in a horizontal industry segment, rather than by
extending vertically. This trend towards disintegration of the global value chain has
made innovation in specific areas possible for domestic PC manufacturers. The major
Chinese PC manufacturers have been able to focus on building their strength in specific
areas, such as sales, distribution, and customer relationships, as well as innovation
capability, by using available configurational technologies and acquiring decreasing-cost
components from international suppliers.
Moreover, I find that Legend, Founder, and Great Wall have diversified into various sub-
sectors of the industry through linkages between those sub-sectors (Table 8.6). For
instance, Legend started with agent sales and language add-on cards, diversified into
motherboard production in 1987, PC manufacturing in 1990, system integration, network
products, internet portal, and wireless data from the middle to the end of 1990s. Founder,
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on the other hand, embarked on the electronic publishing system in 1985, and then moved
to Chinese language add-on cards and PC distribution in late 1980s and early 1990s. It
began PC manufacturing, along with system integration and Internet software in 1995,
and later on set up an on-line bookstore. Great Wall started with China's first domestic
PC in 1984 and diversified itself to a broad range of business-PC monitors, other PC
components, distribution, and magnetic heads and hard disks in 1995. It later entered
into system integration and network products in 1999. It needs to stress that the linkages
between different sub-sectors can make diversification easy only when one has developed
its own proprietary technology in one of the sub-sectors.
9.4 Chapter Conclusion
This chapter reveals that innovation capability and self-developed technologies have been
the key for leading domestic PC producers to catch up with the MNCs. Innovation
capability is a strong factor in the current leadership position of Legend and Founder and
the earlier leading position of Great Wall. All three firms started with some
technological innovation after their establishment. This fact is contrary to the popular
categorization of these PC manufacturers, which labels Legend and Founder as "Mao-
Gong-Ji" and "Ji-Gong-Mao," respectively. There were many companies manufacturing
Chinese language add-on cards at the time, but Great Wall and Legend and a few others
finally won the market of Chinese language add-on cards with their high-quality products
because of their strength in innovation capability. So did Founder, who leapfrogged to the
fourth-generation technology of modem typesetting.
Legend and Founder have built their innovation capability mainly through in-house R&D,
supplemented with external alliances. Moreover, my research reveals that reliance on
joint ventures, as a means to build innovation capabilities, seems to have been ineffective
for Great Wall.
This chapter also demonstrates that, even though government involvement is mostly
indirect for PC manufacturers, sustenance from their affiliated state-owned research
institutes at the early stages of development, along with other national S&T programs,
played a vital role in the growth of Legend, Founder, and Great Wall. The Chinese
government's involvement helped these companies to build their innovation capability
and develop proprietary technologies through a positive feedback system composed of
network clustering of companies' R&D functions, the trend of disintegration of the global
value chain of the computer industry, and sub-sector linkages shown by the companies'
fast diversification into other sub-sectors.
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Chapter 9 Appendix - Regression Analysis
A 9.1 Top Ten PC Producers in China, Innovation Capability
Table 9.4 Top Ten Producers in PC Industry: Innovation Capability Analysis
Rank Rank in R&D R&D
in PC Rank in Innova- Revenue Spending Spending
Owner- Indus- Electronic tion (million (million (% of
Company Name 5 ship try Industry Capability RMB) RMB) Revenue) Patent
Legend Computer Group
Corporation
II eN 4P ADomestic 1 3 3 32876.58 961.46 2.9% 112
Peking University Founder
Group Corporation
ILb JL))YI&N ADomestic 2 10 1 11662.97 505.59 4.3% 7
China Great Wall Computer Joint
Corporation Venture
q1M_:A nV kMo (IBM) 3 7 8 16228.03 71.34 0.4% 5
Dell Computer (China) Co., Ltd. MNC
(rpm) itTh(ptial) (Dell) 4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. <1.5% n.a.
Trigem Computer (Shenyang)
Co., Ltd. MNC
4Jii(&PH~) IM 4 (Trigemn) S n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Tsinghua Tongfang Co., Ltd.
A Vn")1_ *__ P ADomestic 6 19 2 5228.35 125.89 2.4% 37
Langchao Electronic
Information Industrial Group
Corp.
Domestic 7 20 4 5103.27 139.12 2.7% 8
TCL Holding Co., Ltd.
TCLDomestic 8 6 6 21111.96 58600 2.8% 40
Guangzhou Qixi Computer
Holding Co., Ltd.
J+1-L4 ItMR IfPRq Domestic 9 50 7 1711.60 75.00 4.4% n.a.
Hisense Group Co.
Domestic 10 8 5 16157.33 163.53 2.1% 54
Note:
1. Great Wall established five joint ventures with IBM from 1995 to 2000 to produce a wide range of computer
components and provide computer services. By 2000, Great Wall had received $100 million in investment from
IBM.
2. Dell Computer established it China Customer Center in 1998 in Xiamen, Fujian Province in P. R. China. Dell is
well known for its low R&D spending. It spent around 1.5% of revenue in R&D in 2000. (CAHNERS RESEARCH;
EUROPEAN ELECTRONICS MARKETS FORECASTS -- Electronic Business, 8/1/2001).
3. Trigem Computer (Shenyang) Co., Ltd was established in 1999 in Shenyang by Trigem Computer Co., Ltd as a
wholly-owned subsidiary.
4. Unlike other PC manufacturers listed here, TCL and Hisense have a diverse range of electronic products. PC only
occupies a small portion of their revenue, as shown by their leading ranking in the electronic industry.
5. Evaluation for Great Wall is based on 2001's data.
6. Hisense's R&D as % of revenue is based on 2001 data.
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Source:
Gao Sumei (MII). 2003. "2002 China PC Production and Sale Analysis." Website: http://www.mii.gov.cn.
MII. April 2002. "2002 Top 100 Chinese Electronic Companies" Website: http://www.mii.gov.cn.
MII. April 2001. "2001 Top 100 Chinese Electronic Companies" Website: http://www.mii.gov.cn.
Great Wall website, www.greatwall.com.cn; Dell China Website, www.dell.com.cn; Trigem (Shenyang)
website, www.tg-sy.com; Qixi website: www.hedy.com.cn.
State Intellectual Property Office of P.R. China, website: www.sipo.gov.cn.
A 9.2 Regression Results, Leadership and Innovation Capability
Rank in Rank in
PC Innovation
Companies Industry Capability
Legend 1 2
Founder 2 1
Tongfang 6 3
Langchao 7 4
TCL 8 6
Qi Xi 9 7
Hisense 10 5
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.8755758
R Square 0.7666331
Adjusted R Square 0.7199597
Standard Error 1.8185552
Observations 7
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 54.321429 54.321429 16.425486 0.009798
Residual 5 16.535714 3.3071429
Total 6 70.857143
Standard Lower Upper
Coefficients Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 95.0% 95.0%
Intercept 0.5714286 1.5369596 0.3717915 0.7252838 -3.3794455 4.5223026 -3.3794455 4.5223026
Rank in
Innovation
Capacity 1.3928571 0.3436746 4.0528368 0.009798 0.5094148 2.2762994 0.5094148 2.2762994
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A 9.3 Regression Results, Innovation Capability and R&D Spending
R&D
Rank in Spending
Innovation (million
Companies Capacity RMB)
Legend 2 961.46
Founder 1 505.59
Tongfang 3 125.89
Langchao 4 139.12
QiXi 7 75
Great Wall 8 71.34
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.6767644
R Square 0.45801
Adjusted R Square 0.3225125
Standard Error 2.2938656
Observations 6
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 17.786055 17.786055 3.3802101 0.1398359
Residual 4 21.047278 5.2618195
Total 5 38.833333
Standard Lower Upper
Coefficients Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 95.0% 95.0%
Intercept 5.8197983 1.2982501 4.482802 0.0109662 2.2152706 9.4243259 2.2152706 9.4243259
R&D
Spending
(million
RMB) -0.0052804 0.0028721 -1.8385348 0.1398359 -0.0132547 0.0026938 -0.0132547 0.0026938
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A 9.4 Regression Results, Revenue and R&D Spending
(1) Not including Great Wall
Companies
Legend
Founder
Tongfang
Langchao
TCL
Qi Xi
Hisense
Great Wall
Revenue
(million
RMB)
32876.58
11662.97
5228.35
5103.27
21111.96
1711.6
16157.33
16228.03
R&D
Spending
(million
RMB)
961.46
505.59
125.89
139.12
586
75
163.53
71.34
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.9063502
R Square 0.8214707
Adjusted R Square 0.7857648
Standard Error 5076.1746
Observations 7
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 592823796 592823796 23.006605 0.0048987
Residual 5 128837741 25767548
Total 6721661537
Coefficient Standard Lower Upper
s Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 95.0% 95.0%
Intercept 2438.6528 2985.0679 0.8169505 0.4511123 -5234.6959 10112.001 -5234.6959 10112.001
R&D
Spending
(million
RMB) 30.032774 6.2613674 4.7965201 0.0048987 13.937443 46.128105 13.937443 46.128105
(2) Including Great Wall
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.8228459
R Square 0.6770754
Adjusted R Square 0.6232546
Standard Error 6262.1913
Observations 8
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ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 493332571 493332571 12.580188 0.012118
Residual 6 235290242 39215040
Total 7 728622813
Standard Lower Upper
Coefficients Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 95.0% 95.0%
1.602790
Intercept 5237.0175 3267.4381 1 0.1601014-2758.1214 13232.156 -2758.1214 13232.156
R&D Spending
(million RMB) 25.945878 7.3151764 3.546856 0.012118 8.0462727 43.845483 8.0462727 43.845483
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10 Case Analysis for Cell-Phone Manufacturers
Gaining from near zero percent to 30% of domestic market share, Chinese domestic cell-
phone manufacturers have grown rapidly during the last three to four years. Instead of a
detailed analysis as for the telecom-equipment and PC manufacturers, in this chapter, I
focus on using the staged catching-up theory to analyze the development of main
domestic cell-phone manufacturers in the growth stage and their future in the filtration
stage. Domestic cell-phone producers have gone through the preparation and growth
stage, and just entered the filtration stage at the end of 2002.
Before starting the case analyses of the five selected domestic cell phone manufacturers
in China, I introduce both the global and China's domestic cell-phone markets in Sections
10.1 and 10.2. From Section 10.3 to 10.7, I present the brief history of these five cell-
phone manufacturers, namely, TCL, Haier, Hisense, Eastcom, and Panda Electronics,
review their entry to the cell phone market, compare their competition strategies, and
analyze the relationship between innovation capability, growth and the long-term
sustainability of these firm. I present concluding remarks in Section 10.8.
10.1 Global Cell-Phone Market
In order to understand the global cell-phone market, it is important to comprehend the
evolution of mobile systems. Therefore, I start this section by introducing three
generations of mobile systems. Then I examine the demand and supply of the global and
China's cell-phone markets. At the end of this section, I will focus on analyzing the third
generation mobile communications systems (3G) market.
Evolution of Mobile Systems
Since the start of mobile communications, mobile systems have experienced evolution
through three generations, as shown in Figure 10.1. The first generation (IG) is analog
mobile systems. The second-generation (2G) uses digital technology and includes four
different standards. Three of the 2G standards have developed into two systems: General
Packet Radio Service (GPRS) and Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) 2000 IX,
which we call 2.5G, a generation in between 2G and third-generation mobile systems
(3G). Currently, Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM, 2G standard) and
GPRS are used in most European countries, while CDMA One (2G standard) and CDMA
2000 IX are used in North America. Three dominant 3G standards are: Wideband
CDMA (WCDMA), CDMA 2000 1XEV, and Time Division Synchronous Code Division
Multiple Access (TD-SCDMA), a new standard that was developed jointly by the
Chinese Academy of Telecommunications Technology (DTT) and Siemens. (For details
of TD-SCDMA, please refer to Chapter 7.)
Each standard segment of a mobile system includes base transceiver stations (BTS), base
station controllers (BSC), and mobile switching centers (MSC) as equipment for service
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providers. In addition to this equipment, each standard
handset for end users.
has a corresponding mobile
Figure 10.1 The Evolution of Mobile Systems
IG 2G 2.5G 3G
Source: adapted from Ericsson'5 , 2001.
Note: I added TD-SCDMA to the source figure.
G= generation.
Demand for Mobile Communications Systems
In 2002, mobile-handset subscribers world-wide totaled about one billion in number,
including 650 million GSM and 120 million CDMA users, with China and the United
States as the leading markets, followed by Japan, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom,
France, South Korea, Spain, and Brazil, as the 3rd to the 10th largest markets,
respectively. China was the largest cellular market with about 170 million mobile
subscribers.126 With a population of 1.3 billion, China's cell phone market was far from
saturation, compared with other large markets, especially the other leading cell phone
markets, for instance, the United States, which was the second largest. With 137 million
subscribers and a population of 280 million, the U.S. subscription rate is already close to
50% (Table 10.1).
125 http://www.ericsson.com/annual-report/ 2 0 0 1/eng/br/leading.shtml as of Oct. 28, 2002.
126 The latest statistics shows that there was 1.3 billion global mobile phone users at the end of June 2003.
China had 200 million and US had 140 million. (http://www.cellular.co.za/stats/stats-main.htm, as of July
2003)
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Table 10.lWorld's Largest Mobile Markets
Country Subscribers (millions)
China 170
United States 137
Japan 70.2
Germany 64.4
Italy 47
United Kingdom 45
France 34
South Korea 32
Spain 28
Brazil 27
Source: Summarized from various sources (www.umtsworld.com/industry/marketshare.htm as of Oct.
28,2002
Supply of Mobil Communications Systems
In the market for mobile handsets, Nokia has maintained a large lead (around 35% of
market share), primarily because GSM subscribers are the majority of the customers in
the mobile handset market (Table 10.2.) Motorola follows with a 15% market share, less
than half of Nokia's. Following Nokia and Motorola, Samsung, Siemens, and
Sony/Ericsson round out the top five in the worldwide market.
Moving away from the traditional integration of production, R&D, and marketing by cell-
phone manufacturers, the cell-phone industry is heading towards a high division of these
functions among different companies. Experts have described the global value chain of
the cell phone as "chip design in Europe, whole cell-phone design in Korea, and
production in China." For instance, Ericsson announced in January 2001 that from April
1st, 2001, Ericsson will subcontract production and sales to Flextronics and will
concentrate on technology development, design, brand expansion, marketing, and after-
sale services.
Table 10.2 Global Markets for Mobile Handset, 2001, Q1& Q2 of 2002
Company 2001 Q1 2002 Q2 2002
Nokia 35.6% 34.7% 35.6%
Motorola 10.0% 15.5% 15.7%
Samsung 7.5% 9.6% 9.5%
Siemens 7.4% 8.8% 8.4%
Sony/Ericsson 7.3% 6.4% 5.3%
Others 32.2% 25.0% 25.5%
Total (in million units) 399.5 93.8 98.7
Source: Gartener Dataquest.
summarized from http://www.umtsworld.comlindustry/marketshare.htm as of Oct.29, 2002.
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Third-Generation, Mobile-Communications Standard (3G)
WCDMA, CDMA 2000, and TD-SCDMA are the three main competing standards of
third-generation systems. The WCDMA standard was developed in Europe; the CDMA
2000 standard was developed by Qualcomm of the United States; and the TD-SCDMA
was developed by Datang Telecommunications of China. To support their own
companies and decrease the cost of transition , countries choose a 3G standard mostly
corresponding to the 2G standard that they are currently using. For instance, 15 countries
in the European Union, Japan, and other countries using GSM generally support
WCDMA, while the USA, South Korea, and other countries with the CDMA standard
generally support CDMA 2000.
As Table 7.4 of Chapter 7 indicates, WCDMA leads CDMA 2000 and TD-SCDMA in
terms of R&D staff, R&D investment, and number of supporting firms. Even though
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT) DoCoMo 27 had the only 3G
WCDMA commercial network by the end of 2002, the market for WCDMA mobile
equipment has already been contested (see Table 10.3). Ericsson and Nokia are two
distinct leaders in terms of market share. Siemens has claimed that it would become the
second largest 3G vendor, even though currently it has only 15% of the market share.
Siemens has focused in Asia by cooperating with NEC and by conducting R&D with
Chinese companies, for instance, Datang. Meanwhile, Lucent has sold WCDMA to
Japan and Germany.
Table 10.3 WCDMA equipment sale volume market share (late 2001)
Company Share
Ericsson 33%
Nokia 32%
Siemens (NEC) 15%
Nortel 8%
NEC (Siemens) 4%
Alcatel 4%
Lucent 3%
Motorola 1%
Source: Gartener Dataquest.
summarized from http://www.umtsworld.com/industry/marketshare.htm as of Oct.29, 2002.
At the end of 2002, six countries and fifteen telecommunications service providers have
begun using CDMA networks. Motorola has been the most successful manufacturer in
the CDMA 2000 market. In Japan and South Korea, many CDMA cell phones have
127 NTT DoCoMo is the world's leading mobile communications company with more than 44 million
subscribers, as of October 2002, and sales of 5.1 trillion yen (consolidated, Japanese GAAP) in fiscal
year 2001 (ended March 31, 2002). DoCoMo was formed in July 1992 to take over the mobile
communications operations and sales of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT DoComo,
2003).
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appeared in the market as a result of support from cell-phone producers. Services on 3G
networks have been accepted by users. For instance, KDDI of Japan started a CDMA
2000 IX network on April 1st, 2002, and obtained over one million subscribers by June
2002, quickly surpassing the number of subscribers of NTT DoCoMo, which had started
its WCDMA network 8 months before KDDI (CEN, 2002a). New services, such as
instant pictures and geographic positioning (using GPS), have attracted users. In South
Korea, over 7 million people subscribed to CDMA 2000 IX in 2002. The combination of
support from the government and a strong industrial alliance of SK Telecommunications
as a service provider and Samsung and LG as CDMA equipment manufacturers has put
South Korea ahead of other countries in mobile communications (CEN. 2002a).
In May 2000, IEEE announced acceptance of TD-SCDMA, submitted by Datang, as one
of the third-generation mobile communications standards. This Chinese 3G standard
has been at the center of attention since then. I provide details of TD-SCDMA and its
developer, Datang, in Chapter 7.
China's 3G market has an estimated value of RMB 1000 billion. Commercializing
WCDMA or CDMA 2000 in China would mean more patent fees would be paid by
China. In 2002, China operated both GSMIGPRS and CDMA networks and the
government was testing the three main 3G standards, i.e., WCDMA, CDMA 20001X,
and TD-SCDMA. Whether or not TD-SCDMA will be accepted by service providers is
still unclear. 128 Equipment manufacturers are currently developing their equipment for
multiple standards to increase their chance of market success in the future
(Communication World, 2002).
10.2China's Cell Phone Market
Before 1999, China's domestic cell phone production appeared in only MNCs'
subsidiaries and a few domestic firms, such as Motorola, Nokia, Eastcom, and Panda
Electronics. I call this period the "preparation stage" of China's cell-phone industry. The
Chinese government announced "State Council Document No. 5" in 1999 as a means to
control foreign production and to stimulate domestic cell-phone production. Within only
four years (1999-2002), domestic firms expanded their market share from 3% to close to
30%. I call these four years the growth stage of China's cell phone industry, since it has
the main characteristics of the growth stage described by the staged catching-up theory:
increasing demand and supply of the market, high profit for producers, the growth of
domestic producers in different market segments of the industry, etc. At the end of 2002,
over 30 cell-phone producers existed in China. As domestic firms' market share
expanded, production capacity has been increasing faster than demand; domestic firms
are starting to compete more directly with the MNCs in the local market. I view this as a
sign of entering the filtration stage when the market starts to saturate, fierce competition
happens, and some incompetent producers are forced out of the market.
128 China Mobile and China Unicorn, two mobile service providers who have 3G licenses, will most likely
use WCDMA and CDMA 2000. It is estimated that the government will require China Telecom to use
TD-SCDMA in exchange for its 3G license (www.Chinanex.com, June 2003).
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Document No. 5
The Chinese government's role in the development of China's cell-phone industry could
be best reflected by "Document No. 5", an official statement from the government for
supporting the domestic cell-phone industry in 1999.
Before 1999, the Chinese government put few constraints on the field of R&D,
manufacturing, and marketing of cell phones. Lou PeiDe, an official of MII, said, "with
such a high-tech product, we would encourage anyone who would like to try"(Financial
Biweekly, 2002a, p. 82). At the time, cell phones were luxury goods for only a few rich
people. The R&D- and capital-intensive nature of the cell phone had made it the domain
of only a few MNCs, such as Motorola, Nokia, and Ericsson, and had kept domestic
producers away. However, as the economy developed quickly in the 1990s, more people,
especially those in business, were eager to own a cell phone for its convenience. Further,
because of the long wait to get their land-based phone connected, many customers would
rather choose a cell phone as their communication tool. From 1992 to 1997, the number
of cell-phone subscribers in China increased from 179,000 to 13.23 million. Foreign cell-
phone producers dominated this large market. The government was surprised at the
rapid growth of the market and started to think about "how to support domestic producers,
constrain foreign producers, and let the domestic producer grow" (Finance, 2002, p. 82).
In this context, in 1999, the State Council announced "Comments on facilitating
development of China's mobile communications industry," also called State Council
Document No. 5. One of the drafters explained that the document was intended to
constrain foreign producers in China's cell-phone market. (Finance, 2002a)
Document No. 5 indicated that the government would financially support the domestic
development of mobile communications. The government would use 5% of the fixed-
line phone installation fee for R&D and production of domestic mobile systems and cell
phones. This is partially a special fund established by MII for supporting industrial R&D
in the telecom-equipment industry, which is about 3 billion RMB per year. 40% will go
to supporting R&D within the mobile communications industry (Smith-Gillespie, 2001).
In addition, it would allocate RMB 1.4 billion of the national debt to developing domestic
cell phones. Meanwhile, to constrain foreign manufacturers' production, foreign
producers would need to meet three requirements: (1) they must establish an R&D center
in China; (2) the ratio of products for the domestic market to products for export should
be less than 4:6, i.e., foreign producers in China should export at least 60% of their cell
phones; (3) localization, i.e., foreign producers would be required to use local suppliers'
products for certain components.
The most important element of the document is the license distribution. The document
announced that the setting-up of wholly owned subsidiaries and joint ventures would be
controlled by the central government. Anyone (foreign or domestic producers) involved
in production of cell phones, or importing of equipment and components would need to
get a permit from the central government. Cell-phone production is listed as a controlled
category in the "Foreign Investment Industry Catalog." At the end of 1999, MII
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designated 8 joint ventures and 9 domestic producers129 as the first group of cell-phone
producers, measured by criteria such as capacities in R&D and manufacturing.
Domestic Producers
Domestic producers started manufacturing mobile handsets much later than the MNCs
and were far behind the foreign producers led by Motorola, Nokia, and Ericsson.
However, their progress has been astonishing. From holding 3% of the domestic market
share in 1999 to nearly 30% at the end of 2002, domestic firms have progressed
dramatically within four short years (Tables 10.4). In 2002, Nokia, Motorola, and TCL
are the three leading cell-phone producers in China's market. In the appendix of this
chapter, Tables A1O. 1 and A10.2 give a detail account of leaders in sales (measured by
units) in 2001. Though Nokia and Motorola still kept their first and second positions in
terms of sales in 2002, the other leaders in 2001, such as Siemens, Ericsson, and Panda
Electronics, were surpassed by TCL in 2002, and domestic producers' market share
doubled from 15% in 2001 to 30% in 2002.130
Table 10.4 Market Share of Chinese Domestic Cell-Phone Producer
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 H1 20002 Q3 20002 2002
Domestic share n.a 0% 3% 10% 15% 18% 26% 30%
Total (million units) n.a n.a n.a n.a 79.23 n.a n.a n.a
Total subscribers (million 13.23 n.a 43.23 n.a n.a n.a n.a. 170
Source: various.
In the following sections, I will examine five of these firms, namely TCL, Haier, Hisense,
Eastcom, and Panda Electronics (see Table 10.5). I have chosen these five companies as
my cases according to the criteria that I set in the methodology section (Chapter 5), i.e., if
they are the major players in the industry and have had great impact in the industry.
Table 10.5 summarizes the main characteristics of these five companies in terms of cell-
phone production. I devote the rest of the chapter to revealing the relationship between
innovation capability, growth, and a firm's long-term sustainability by analyzing how
leading cell-phone producers, such as TCL, Haier, and Hisense, have built up their
innovation capability during the process of growth, and how other former leaders, such as
Eastcom and PEG, were discouraged to do so because of their cooperation with MNCs.
In the appendix, Table 10.8 gives a brief introduction of the products and services of
these five companies, since most of them devote only a small portion of their business to
cell-phone production.
129 The nine domestic producers are: Xiahua Electronics, Eastcom, ZTE, Konka, Haier, Southern High-tech,
Bird, China Kejian, and TCL.
130 The following additional facts also illustrate that domestic handsets are on their way to gaining market
share: (1) Shengzhen Guowei's cellular phone HB97's outlook and quality have reached international
standards and are being exported to European countries; (2) ZTE has developed a domestic dual-frequency
cellular phone; (3) Eastcom's EC528 has obtained domestic and foreign certification and licenses.
171
Chapter 10. Case Analysis for Cell-Phone Manufacturers
Table 10.5 Major Domestic Cell-Phone Manufacturers Characteristics
Cell-phone Manufacturers
TCL Holding Co., Ltd.
TCL % M fR & J
Haier Group Co.
;/I% NJ A
Hisense Group Co.
k i V M R& W
Eastern Communications Group Co. Ltd.
7Y f i'L R J
Panda Electronics Group Co., Ltd
1M " ,M S, FR n]
Cell-production Characteristics
Largest domestic cell-phone producer in 2002,
"partial technological innovation with Chinese
characteristics", innovative concept of using cell-
phone as a decorative good rather than just a
communication tool
2 " largest electronics company in China, leading in
innovation by satisfying customers' need first
(developing low radiation phone, phone with firewall
function, etc), very distinguished 24-hour continuous
development model that uses its &D resources in
China, US, and Europe, expanding in global market
Well-known for its heavy R&D investment, started
cell phone production in 2001, but progressed fast,
introduced the first color screen CDMA phone in
China
Started production in 1990, cell-phone production as
its main business, joint venture with Motorola since
1994, problem of creating its own brand-name phone
Pioneer in Cell-phone production, joint venture with
Ericsson started producing analog cell phone in 1994,
lack of motivation for innovation and developing its
own brand-name
Source: The author, summarized from 10.3 to 10.7.
10.3TCL Holding Co., Ltd (TCL)
Established in 1981 with only RMB 5,000 in Huiyang, Guangdong, TCL is now a large-
scale state-owned enterprise whose business covers four categories: consumer electronics,
telecommunications, information appliances, and electrical components. TCL has
experienced substantial growth since its founding date and has maintained a 50% annual
growth rate during the past 10 years. In 2001, TCL generated sales revenue of RMB 21.1
billion, with a profit of RMB 715 million."3 (TCL, 2002)
TCL Mobile
13m TCL brand value (the total sales value for the products with "TCL" brand name) was RMB 14.4 billion,
listed as No. 5 domestically.
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The Chinese people first started to recognize the TCL brand name through its telephones.
It has been called the "King of the Telephone" because its market share in the land-based
phone market has stayed No. 1 since 1988. TCL entered the cell-phone market because
of the large profit margin of the cell phone in the late 1990s as the company was looking
for new growth opportunity in electronics (Interview #3, 2003). TCL started to enter
mobile communications in March 1999 by setting up TCL Mobile Communications Co.,
Ltd. (TCL Mobile), after TCL obtained a license from MII for producing cell phones.
(TCL, 2002)
In 2002, TCL produced over 6 million TCL brand cell phones and was the champion
among domestic producers, trailing only Motorola and Nokia. Cell-phone production
brought TCL Mobile US $1 billion sales revenue, which accounts for one-fourth of the
sales revenue of the total TCL Group and two-thirds of its profit. Of its 2500 employees,
TCL Mobile has about 2100 marketing staff, 300 R&D staff, and 100 management staff.
In addition, the company has 4000 manufacturing workers. (Interviewee #3, 2003)
What was the secret of TCL Mobile to champion domestic producers in 2002? I would
argue that TCL has distinguished itself from other domestic producers by successfully
applying the principle of "partial technological innovation with Chinese characteristics"
in developing its cell-phone products. Their innovative conceptualization of the cell
phone as a decorative good rather than a simple communications tool is such an example.
The history of TCL mobile also indicates that the nature of the cell phone as a consumer
product means that marketing and appearance of the product play a much more important
role than for telecom equipment.
R&D
TCL Mobile has followed the principle of "partial technological innovation with Chinese
characteristics" to gain a technological advantage, i.e., TCL has tried to lead only certain
aspects of technology and develop products that suit the Chinese consumer. For
instance, out of a dozen patents of TCL Mobile, most of them are for design of
appearance. In regard to key technologies, TCL realizes that the cell-phone chip is very
standardized nowadays, and is not something TCL can become proficient at in a short
time. TCL regards systems integration, i.e., how to add application software to the chip,
as proprietary technology, and sometimes does its own systems integration, while at other
times cooperating with others, for instance, Ericsson. (Interviewee #3, 2003)
TCL understands that the cell phone business requires much more R&D input than its
other business segments. Every year, TCL Mobile devotes 5% of its revenue to R&D,
higher than the 3% R&D spending of revenue of the TCL Group in general (CEN, 2002b).
The company has a TCL Mobile Communication Research Institute, which is composed
of over a dozen Ph.D.'s and Master's degree holders. It has an overseas R&D center in
Silicon Valley in the United States. In 1998 TCL established a technology center that
was honored as a state-class R&D center in January 2000.
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The Cell Phone as Jewelry
TCL's success is closely associated with its innovative concept of cell phones as
decorative goods rather than just communication tools. The first popular TCL cell phone,
TCL 999D, was a diamond cell phone and attracted great attention when it came on the
market in 2000. The uniqueness of the cell phone was that its cover was decorated with
diamonds. The CEO of TCL Mobile, Dr. Wan Mingjian, observed that some people like
to buy expensive watches, such as Rolex, not just for the function of a watch but also for
its appearance. As the company was exploring ways of defining TCL cell-phone
products, the phenomenon stimulated his imagination: the cell phone could attract
customers by its appearance, just like those watches. Wan discussed the idea with other
managers and they agreed that this concept would appeal to Chinese consumers,
especially those who would like to demonstrate their financial success. (Interviewee #3,
2003)
10.4 Haier Group (Haier)
Haier Group was incorporated in 1984 as the Qingdao Refrigerator Factory.132 With
30,000 employees, this large state-owned enterprise produces a wide range of household
electrical appliances in 86 categories and with 13,000 specifications. The domestic
market share of Haier refrigerators, freezers, air conditioners, and washing machines is
30%. Haier operates 18 design institutes, along with 10 industrial complexes (including
one in the United States and one in Pakistan).133 In 2001 its sales revenue reached RMB
60.2 billion. Haier products also have a significant presence in the international market:
Haier ranks as the world's fifth largest manufacturer of white electronic goods, and it has
the largest global market share in refrigerators. (Haier, 2002)
Cell Phones
Haier entered the cell-phone market in 1999 by establishing Qingdao Haier Mobile
Communications Co., Ltd. It obtained licenses for producing both GSM and CDMA cell
phones. The following describes the major milestones that Haier has achieved in its cell-
phone development. (Haier, 2002)
e May 2000, Haier became the first producer whose cell phones passed the radiation
test in China.
* July 2001, Haier developed the lightest GSM cell phone in the world, which weighed
only 69g. In the same month, Haier's PDA and chord ringing cell phone came onto
the market.
132 In 1984, with RMB 1.47 million debt, Haier had only 800 employees, and produced only one product-
refrigerators. Haier's development can be divided into three stages: (1) brand-name stage (1984-1991):
building its brand through refrigerators and establishing a comprehensive quality-management system; (2)
diversification stage (1992- 1998): diversifing products, expanding market; (3) globalization stage (1998-
present): bringing the Haier brand to the international market and expanding both markets and production
sites internationally.
133 The other eight complexes' locations are: 5 in Qingdao, 1 in Hefei, I in Dalian, and 1 in Wuhan
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" August 2001, Haier announced its "5A Diamond Service Plan", targeting the after-
sale service market.
* October 2001, Haier's CDMA cell phone passed the network test of China Unicorn.
* May 2002, Haier became the first company to be certified as a 3C enterprise
(Consumer Electronics, Communications, Computers) by the government.
The list of the events above implies Haier has led in innovation capability by putting
themselves in consumers' shoes-developing products that quench the need of the
customers. The first low radiation cell phones, cell phones with the lightest weight in
China, and the first cell phones with a fire wall function in China are all such examples.
The following illustrates the development of Haier's Tianzhi Star T6000 cell phone, the
first cell phone in China with the firewall function.
Tianzhi Star T 6000
In June 2002, Haier developed the first cell phone that has a firewall function for
incoming calls, named Tianzhi Star T6000. The user can block calls from ten phone
numbers. The firewall function can also be used in reverse: the user can block calls from
all other phone numbers except the ten preset phone numbers. In addition to the firewall
function, the cell phone has two other new functions: FM radio and mobile QQ (instant
messaging for mobile phones). The new functions of the cell phone attracted much
customer attention and achieved great market success. (Haier, 2002)
How Haier developed Taizhi Star T6000 is an interesting story. It started with a letter to
Haier Information Center from a customer in February 2002. He was bothered by
unwanted phone calls at night, but he could not turn off his cell phone because he was on
call for his job. He had written to several companies and asked if they could develop a
cell phone with a firewall function to filter out unwanted calls, similar to those in
computer networks. However, most companies were reluctant to say yes, mainly
because of the difficulty involved in developing such a function, the long-development
process, and huge investment. After he heard of Haier's development of a washing
machine for washing melons, he then wrote to Haier with the same request.
Haier started market research immediately and found that 80% of customers reported
being bothered to varying degrees by unwanted calls. This convinced Haier to develop
cell phones with this function. Usually it takes two years to develop a new cell-phone
product, but Haier decided to develop this product within the shortest possible time and
made a 180-day plan. How could Haier achieve such an ambitious, seemingly
impossible goal? The secret weapon lay in its 24-hour continuous development model,
which had already succeeded in its development of "Network Blue-Tooth Home
Electronics." Haier used time differences to combine its R&D resources in Asia, Europe,
and the U.S. For instance, the first development team in Asia would pass its results of the
day to the second team in Europe through the Internet; then, the second team would
continue the development and pass its result of the day to the third team in the United
States. The third team would pass the results back to the first team. This way, Haier
could achieve 24-hour continuous development. While the whole world was watching
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the world cup football game, Haier's engineers worked continuously and finally finished
development of phones with firewall functions on June 15, 2002.
The development process of T6000 caught the attention of others. One Silicon Valley
company heard about Haier's development and realized the market potential of this
function. It proposed to add its own new technology-the mobile QQ-to the phone.
Similarly, another U.S. company added its FM radio module to T6000. Domestic
producers' cell-phone software development mostly depends on foreign technologies.
However, a firewall for incoming messages, a technological innovation by Haier, leapt
ahead of foreign producers. (Haier, 2002)
Export
In 2001, Haier obtained a license from the British Approvals Board for
Telecommunications (BABT) in the United Kingdom and exported 300,000 cell phones
to the United Kingdom, leading all other Chinese domestic producers. Haier's unique
strategy is calledfirst difficult, then easy (Xian Nan Hou Yi), which means, enter the
market of developed countries first, build one's brand name, then enter the developing
countries from a higher position with experience accumulated in the advanced markets.
(Interview# 28, 2003) The fact that Haier started to globalize its cell-phone products
even though the industry just entered into the filtration stage is related to Haier's global
networks for its other businesses, such as refrigerator, microwave, and air conditioning.
With the networks built by these businesses, it is easy for Haier to tap into the same
foreign markets. Nevertheless, the domestic market still remains the main destination for
Haier's cell phones. Thus, for China's cell-phone industry, it seems that there is a blurry
boundary between the filtration stage and the globalization stage, as some domestic cell
phone producers, such as Haier, already start to export to the international market.
10.5 Hisense Group Corporation (Hisense)
Founded in 1969, Hisense Group Corporation (Hisense) is a large state-owned company
located in Qingdao, Shandong Province. With ten thousand employees, this high-tech
company specializes in consumer electronics, household appliances, and information
technology. With sales revenue of RMB16.1 billion in 2001, Hisense was ranked as one
of the "Top 10 Chinese Electronics Manufacturers" in 2000. Hisense's main products
include: televisions, air conditioners, refrigerators, computers, DVDs, CDMA mobile
phones, software, and network apparatuses. (Hisense, 2003)
Brief History
In December 1969, with only thirty people and a fixed asset worth only RMB 170,000,
"Number Two Radio Factory of Qingdao," Hisense's predecessor, was founded to
manufacture "Red Lantern" brand radios. Immediately after its establishment, the factory
was chosen by the Qingdao city government to develop a black-and-white television. A
group of technicians from the company were sent to Tianjin 712 Factory for training, and
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they developed the first vacuum-tube television with a 14-inch screen in China three
months later. Afterwards, through continued efforts of technical innovation, the company
replaced the manual mode of production by a mechanical one and developed transistor
TV receivers. (Hisense, 2003)
Joined by three other companies, "Number Two Radio Factory of Qingdao" was renamed
in February 1979 as "Qingdao Television Factory" to produce televisions. The first
take-off of the company occurred in 1985, right after the company imported the
technology and equipment for producing color TVs in 1984 from Matsushita of Japan.
With RMB 37.48 million, the main economic indicators of the factory took first place
among the electronic enterprises of the Province and the TV industry of the country.
The second peak of its development came in 1989, when its output capacity surpassed 0.4
million, and it won three successive "domestic firsts" and two international gold awards
for its televisions. The factory became one of the 500 largest enterprises and 100 top
electronics enterprises in China. (Hisense, 2003)
At the time Zhou Houjian was appointed as the leader of the company in 1992, television
was still its dominant product. Under Zhou's strategy of "developing without solely
relying on television, and engaging in but not being confined by electronics," the
company has carried out a series of radical reforms and expanded quickly in various areas
of business since 1993, when the company adopted "Hisense" as its official corporate and
brand name. Hisense set up several joint ventures to produce electronic components,
cash registers, and other IT and telecommunications products, including Lucent (Qingdao)
Technologies Co., Ltd. Worthy of mention is Hisense's principle during the color TV
price war that broke out among China's domestic TV manufacturers in October 1996:
Zhou announced that Hisense would not reduce its prices to unreasonably low levels, but
rather maintain its market share by its high technology, fine quality, and excellent service
to its customers. (Hisense, 2003)
R&D
Hisense is well known for its strength in R&D and heavy R&D investment. Hisense's
president, Zhou Houjian, once commented that "Haier has advantages in marketing and
advertising, while Hisense has advantages in R&D and human resources."' 34 Hisense
spent 4.7% of sales revenue in 2001 in R&D, while other companies in the electronics
industry spent only 3% or less (MII, 2002). 135 Newly developed products account for
30% of the company's turnover. A new product comes out on average every 2.5 days.
Of the 10,000 employees in Hisense, 42 hold doctor's degrees, 380 hold master's degrees,
and over 4000 hold bachelor's degrees, and many of these are active in various
subsidiary-level and central-level R & D areas. In addition to its in-house investment in
R&D, Hisense has long-term, technological, cooperative relations with the Chinese
Academy of Sciences, prestigious universities (such as Tsinghua University, Beijing
University, Beijing Aeronautical Engineering University, Xi'an University of
Communications, Shandong University, Qingdao Oceanography University, and Qingdao
1 Talk with 100 CEOs (3), Gongshang Publish House, 1999, p. 12.
135 Haier spent 3.8%; Legend 3%, Founder 4.5%, Great Wall 0.4%, Panda 0.5%, TCL 2.5%, etc.
177
Chapter 10. Case Analysis for Cell-Phone Manufacturers
University) and MNCs, such as AT&T, Intel, IBM, Panasonic, Toshiba, Sanyo, HP, and
Siemens. (Hisense, 2003)
Hisense has committed itself to a strategy of "developing high technology, producing
quality products, providing top-level service, and creating a world-famous brand," which
it has implemented by technological innovation, product-line optimization, and capital
investments. As an industrial base for the state's "863 Plan," every year Hisense
undertakes more than 10 state-level research projects. Hisense has a nationally certified
technology center and a national post-doctoral scientific research station. It has also been
designated as a National Experimental Unit for Intellectual Property Protection and a
National Technology Innovation Base. (Hisense, 2003)
Cell Phones
After entering the cell phone market in 2001, Hisense instantly rose to become the
domestic leader in the CDMA market in 2002. The quick ascent of Hisense is associated
with Hisense's long tradition as an R&D-focused company. Hisense set up a
telecommunications research institute as early as 1993. In 1996 and 1998, Hisense
developed its own analog and digital wireless phones. In 1999, assembling about 100
R&D people, Hisense established its Mobile Communications Research Institute and
started its R&D on CDMA cell phones. Hisense spent nearly one- fifth of the asset value
of its Mobile Communications Corporation on cell-phone R&D. Hisense also obtained
financial support from the State Economics and Trade Commission for the CDMA 1X
cell phone's development. On August 29, 2001, the government announced that 19
manufacturers (including Hisense) had been assigned CDMA licenses. That same
afternoon, Hisense announced the first color screen CDMA cell phone in China. To
Hisense, several MNCs have already dominated China's GSM market. However, in the
CDMA market, domestic producers are at the same starting point with the MNCs because
of the newness of CDMA technology. To some extent, domestic producers may even
have some advantages over the MNCs, such as license privilege, close relationship to
customers, etc. (Interviewee # 29, 2003)
According to Hisense, in addition to the advantages of knowing local culture and lower
production costs, the most crucial thing for a domestic producer is to possess its own cell-
phone technology. Based on the principle of technological innovation and developing
proprietary technology, Hisense unveiled several CDMA cell phones, such as the C2101
(the first color screen cell phone in China), C628, C520, and C2198, all of them self-
developed (Interviewee # 29, 2003). Even though Hisense only entered the cell-phone
market in August 2001, with the inauguration of China Unicom's CDMA network,
Hisense sold 100,000 units per month in 2002, making it the leader in the CDMA cell-
phone market. (Hisense. 2003)
10.6 Eastern Communications Group Co. Ltd. (Eastcom Group)
Eastern Communications Group Co. Ltd. (Eastcom Group) grew out of Hangzhou
Communications Equipment Factory, one of the largest mobile communications
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equipment manufacturers held by the Ministry of Posts and Communications (MPT). By
the end of 2001, Eastcom had 2,200 employees and annual sales revenue of RMB 10.5
billion. Eastcom mainly provides products and services related to systems and terminal
equipment for mobile communications networks. It has been listed as one of the top 500
industrial companies for the past six years. (Eastcom, 2003)
The company's main revenue (more than 98%) comes from its GSM and CDMA cell-
phone production. In addition, the company produces the integrated circuit (IC) calling
card, ATM switch, transmission systems and power supplies, etc. Eastcom was the
earliest domestic cell phone producer. With more than a decade of experience of
cooperation with Motorola, Eastcom is also the largest OEM handset supplier of
Motorola brands, accounting for some 15% of Motorola's cell phone output in China.
Early History
In 1958, the predecessor of Eastcom Group, Zhejiang Communications Equipment
Factory, was established with only 13 persons. In its earlier days (1960s and 1970s), it
had several significant achievements in the communications area and was one of the
largest communications equipment factories held by MPT.
In 1988, Shi Juxing became the head of the factory. After extensive market research, the
leadership decided to move in a new direction by importing mobile-phone production
technology from Motorola. The total number of cell-phone subscribers was estimated by
some state bureau to grow to at most 200,000 by the end of the century in China.
Although it had a total asset value of only RMB 20 million, the factory would need to
invest RMB 40 million for their new market venture. The large investment requirement
and the uncertainty of the future made the new direction look very risky. (Eastcom, 2003)
In December 1990 Eastcom signed the first contract with Motorola to import its cell-
phone technology. The cell-phone production line was sited in Hangzhou. In July 1991,
Eastcom signed a second contract with Motorola to import mobile-phone system-
equipment technology, so that they could take advantage of combining the sales of base
stations and cell phones. Eastcom achieved sales revenue of RMB 400 million in 1992,
ten times its initial investment. (Eastcom, 2003)
Investment Capital and Cooperation with MNCs
Eastcom had a long history of cooperation with Motorola, starting from the early 1990s,
both in terms of importing technologies and setting up joint ventures for cell phone
related production. In line with the industrial policies of the government, Eastcom
borrowed RMB 80 million for importing technologies from Motorola in 1990 and 1991.
In 1994, Motorola established joint ventures with Eastcom. In 1995, Eastern
Communications Co. Ltd. was established, and the next year the company went public to
obtain more investment capital from the market. Going public has transformed the
company in many ways. In addition to obtaining investment capital, the company has
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become more transparent in terms of management and has responded to market needs
better. (Eastcom, 2003)
R&D
Eastcom was aware that although it imported the production technology, it was still not
controlling the key technologies for cell phone. Therefore, the company needs to develop
its own key technology. Since 1990, Eastcom managers have hired over one thousand
professionals who have bachelors or higher degrees. Of the total workforce, 70% are
professional technicians. Eastcom has several R&D bodies, such as the national-level
technology center, Beijing Eastcom S&T Development Company (set up in 1996), a U.S.
company, a cell-phone research institute, post-doctoral stations, etc. In 1997, Eastcom
set up a cell-phone research institute in Silicon Valley, in the United States. In 1999,
Eastcom developed China's first domestic cell phone that had proprietary technology
(EC528). By September 2000, Eastcom had sold around 7% of the 65 million cell
phones sold in the domestic market up until that time. (Eastcom, 2003)
However, most of Eastcom's cell-phone sales still come from the joint venture set up
with Motorola. Eastcom has not established its own brand name in the market. For
instance, in 2001, Eastcom produced 5,178,000 units for Motorola, but only 365,700
units under its own brand name, less than 8% of what it produced for Motorola. (See
Table 9.5 and 9.6.)
10.7 Panda Electronics Group (PEG)
Founded in 1936, Panda Electronics Group Co., Ltd (PEG) is called the cradle of China's
electronics industry (PEG website, 2002). It is the largest electronics backbone enterprise
in China. 136 "Panda" brand was the first Chinese electronics product to enter the
international market and also the first "well-known brand" of the Chinese electronics
industry. With sales revenue of RMB 20.6 billion (profit RMB 950 million), it was
ranked by MII as No. 6 among the 100 largest electronics enterprises in China in 2001.137
PEG was a company directly supervised by MII. (PEG, 2003)
PEG has five national engineering research centers1 38 and a postdoctoral scientific
research station. It cooperates with 12 large international companies that are among the
500 largest companies in the world and with more than ten prestigious domestic
universities and research institutes to jointly develop new products. Every year, Panda's
136 PEG is one of the 120 pilot enterprise groups, 512 key enterprises, and six largest groups of electronics
industries in China.
137 PEG's major products cover High Frequency (HF) communication, satellite-communication systems,
mobile-communication systems, mecha-electronics production equipment, base stations, program-control
exchangers, mobile phones, TV sets, washing machines, DVD players, computers, monitors, system
integration, network, software, and radio receivers.
138 The five centers are: engineering research center for A/V digital products, national technology
development center, mass production technology center, micro-electronics technology design center, and
engineering research center for mobile satellite communication technology.
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revenue from new products is about 80% of the total revenue. Invention patents make
up 48% of its total patent applications. (PEG, 2003)
Cell-Phone Production
Panda Communications Industry Group is one of the six largest industry groups of
PEG. 139 The group14 0 first introduced domestic-brand mobile telephones, pagers, stock
pagers, and green mobile phones, all of which were honored as "First Chinese Goods"
and "Famous Brand Products China '97."
PEG has a long history of cell phone production and is one of the few who started cell
phone production in the early and middle 1990s. This long history, like that of Eastcom,
was closely related with its cooperation with Ericsson. PEG entered the area of cell
phones in 1990. In 1992 PEG set up a joint venture- Nanjing Ericsson Panda
Communications Co., Ltd. 141-with Ericsson to produce 900GHz analog base station
switches. In 1994 this joint venture produced 30,000 analog cell phones. Although
earlier than most other domestic producers in terms of entering the analog cell-phone
market, PEG was late in digital cell phones-it was not until 1998 that the second joint
venture between PEG and Ericsson, Nanjing Ericsson Panda Mobile Terminal Co.,
Ltd.,142 was set up to produce two brands of cell phone, Ericsson and Panda. In October
1999 PEG introduced its first digital Panda cell phone to the market. Since then, even
though PEG had produced the first Chinese analog cell phone, it has relied on cloning
Ericsson cell phones almost completely (Gu, 2002).
The license
Even though PEG was the leader in analog (IG) cell phones, it was not one of the first
ten domestic companies who were assigned licenses to produce digital cell phones. PEG
was hurt hard in the color TV price war of 1998-99. Because too many suppliers at the
time competed in the market, the price of a color TV dropped to below its production cost.
TV at the time was one of the major products of PEG; it thus suffered great revenue loss.
Over a dozen senior officials of the Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI) petitioned the
central government to help PEG. They requested transformation of PEG's RMB 0.9
billion bad debts to equity, and permission for the company to produce cell phones and
other high return products. Panda obtained a cell-phone license and started to produce
139 PEG has six industrial groups: Household Appliance Industry Group, Military Communication Industry
Group, Mechatronics Industry Group, Panda Communication Industry Group, Information Industry
Group, New Industry Group.
140 The group consists of four companies and two R&D centers. Panda International Communication
System Co., Ltd is the main body of the group.
141 The joint venture is to manufacture communication system products including the design, production, sales, and
installation of GSM/CDMA digital mobile communication system and switches. The company was incorporated in 1992
and has been authorized by the Ministry of Information as the first Sino-foreign joint venture licensed for access to digital
mobile communication system. In 2000 it was honored to be one of the "top 500 foreign invested enterprises" as well as
one of the "top 100 high technology enterprises " in China. For the time being it has grown into the supply center of
Ericsson in Asia-Pacific Region.
142 Business scope covers design, production and sales of digital mobile phones and accessories.
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cell phones (Finance, 2002a). Cell-phone production turned out to be the new-growth
opportunity the company needed as it quickly brought PEG great revenue.
Cooperation with Ericsson and Microcell
The type of cooperation represented by the joint venture of PEG and Ericsson is not rare
in the Chinese cell-phone market; other marriages of this sort include Eastcom with
Motorola and Shouxin with Nokia. Joint R&D and production, but different brands and
marketing are their common characteristics. To avoid competition from their Chinese
brands, the foreign partners will delay the products of the domestic brand, leading to
shortcomings of the domestic brand, such as weak brand name, fewer types, and longer
cycle for new products (Yang, 2002). At the same time, PEG was seen as a production
floor for Ericsson cell phones. For instance, in 2001, PEG produced 3.3 million cell
phones, but only 0.5 million were under the Panda brand name. The profit from the cell-
phone business was mainly from the processing fee of Ericsson cell phones.
Consequently, this stable profit source discouraged the company's efforts to develop its
own brand name. (Yang, 2002)
Selling 3.47 million mobile phones in 2001, PEG was the first among the domestic
producers (see Table 10.7) in terms of quantity.14 3 However, in 2002 the pioneer of the
analog cell phone fell to seventh. It was companies such as TCL, Bodao, and Xiaxin that
have gained large shares.
PEG's easy and stable marriage with Ericsson ended in April 2002, when Ericsson
decided to implement its global "efficiency plan" and terminated its cell phone co-
production with PEG. Ericsson handed its 65% share of the joint cell phone company to
Microcell, a Finnish cell phone designer. Although it was just established in 1997,
Microcell is one of the main mobile platform designers in Europe, whose main task is to
design cell phones for Nokia and Ericsson, as well as other European cell-phone
companies. Microcell does not have its own brand or production base. (Yang, 2002)
The restructuring of Panda Mobile has been described as an upgrade for PEG. The newly
established Microcell Panda Mobile Equipment Co. has first-class design technology
from Microcell, PEG's low-cost production, and the distribution network of
Tianchuang.144 Their cooperation has formed a complete and potentially strong supply
chain from design, to production, to marketing. In 2002, the company's sales reached 1
million units.14 5 (Gu, 2002)
143 It was No. 5 in the domestic market.
44 Right before that, Tianchuang 44 , the largest cell phone distributor in Jiangsu province joined Panda to
establish Panda Mobile Equipment Co..
145 In addition, to increase market share, Panda has cooperated with Yimei Telecom cooperation so that
Yimei will produce a double brand cell phone (Yimei plus Panda) 45. The new company will invest 0.15
billion in R&D, 0.2 billion RMB in sales and market expansion, and RMB 0.1 billion in production
technology and equipment upgrading. At the same time, Microcell will support the company by providing a
large amount of capital. (Gu, 2002).
182
Chapter 10. Case Analysis for Cell-Phone Manufacturers
10.8 Chapter Conclusion
According to a market research report on China Electronic News, consumers consider
domestic cell phones to be similar to the foreign ones in terms of their functions and
appearance, except that foreign cell phones probably have advantages in brand
recognition (CEN, 2003). Still, the rapid growth of domestic cell phone producers in
2002 went beyond most people's expectations. For instance, an officer from the MII said
that he had never expected that domestic cell phones would grow so fast in 2002
(Southern Weekend, 2003). What has enabled Chinese domestic cell phone producers to
achieve such a significant market share within a short period of only three years? Will
the growth be sustainable? What is the future of these domestic producers? This section
will summarize some findings from the previous case analyses.
Reasons for Growth
Apparently, domestic firms have just gone through the preparation and growth stage and
now entered the filtration stage. Several factors have directly contributed to the rise of
domestic cell-phone producers in the growth stage: on the demand side, there was an
explosive increase from Chinese consumers; on the supply side, domestic producers have
advantages in their distributional channels and connecting with the customers through a
"zero" distance relationship. They have worked hard to improve their innovation
capability, via innovative redefinition of, and adding new functions to, the product.
China's cell-phone market of the past four years has distinct characteristics of the growth
stage, the rising demand and supply. I view the current market for cell phones to be
similar to that of the color TV in 1996-whoever was in the market could make huge
profits because of the rapid growth of the demand. By October 2002, more than 90
million cell phones had been produced and sold in the Chinese market. As I have shown
before, China now is the country with the largest number of cell-phone subscribers. As
the standard-of-living is raised in the economy, more and more people have started to
accept the cell phone as a necessity rather than a luxury good, which has directly
contributed to the rising demand. In addition, the intense competition between two
service providers, China Unicom and China Mobile, and their efforts in providing various
new services to customers such as short messages, have facilitated the growth of the
demand.
On the supply side, first, it is clear that domestic producers have advantageous
distribution channels. Domestic producers sell their cell phones directly, while the
MNCs choose agents to sell their cell phones.'46 Because it is difficult to lower the
manufacturing costs, it is critical to decrease sales costs. The direct sales model has
benefited domestic producers in various aspects. For instance, direct sales can get better
and quicker feedback from the customers, while through the sales agents, there are too
many intermediate steps, and after-sales services usually lag behind. Sales agents enjoy
146 MNCs usually use the model of chief sale agent, then distribute to a sales agent at various location.
Even though they have large-scale production, they are not very effective in logistics and serving end-users.
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selling products, but usually they are not excited about dealing with the after-sale services.
Domestic producers have chosen to sell directly, probably because of their lower costs for
sales personnel. Most domestic companies have sales staff as the largest portion of their
employment. In addition, quite a few, especially those consumer electronics producers
such as TCL, Haier, Hisense, Xiaxin, and Konka, had already gained experience in
building sales networks for consumer electronics goods before they entered the cell
phone market. They are very experienced in building sales networks, especially in
second- and third-tiered cities. For instance, in most second and third tier cities, many
stores have domestic cell phones sales over 50% (Southern Weekend, 2003). It is worth
mentioning that these distribution channels also have a regional effect, i.e., the companies
have much better sales at locations close to their headquarters. 47
Second, keeping "zero distance" with the customers has become one of the primary goals
of domestic cell phone producers. In the Chinese market, the phrase "zero distance" was
created to describe the close relationship between customers and producers (CEN, 2003).
I consider that because of the direct-sales model, domestic producers maintain better
after-sale services for customers and get much quicker feedback from their customers to
their manufacturing functions, thus keeping closer relationships with the customers than
the MNCs.
Third, domestic producers have worked hard on improving their innovation capability by
redefining the concept and functions of cell phones, which has helped them to introduce
their products to the market. For instance, the first popular TCL cell phone, TCL999D,
which was designed with diamonds as decoration, suited the demand for certain Chinese
consumers at the time. Haier's Taizhi Star T6000 was a result of responding to a
consumer's letter requesting a firewall function and innovatively used their global R&D
network, a rare practice for other cell phone producers. Further, domestic producers have
an advantage in terms of designing the cell phone with an appearance that pleases
Chinese consumers. (CEN, 2003)
Further, domestic firms have generally invested large amounts of money in advertising.
For instance, PEG invested 60% of its yearly advertising budget (RMB 0.1 billion) for
their advertisement during CCTV's148 prime time for 2003. Domestic producers' choices
of popular singers or movie stars as spokespeople are very effective in the large market
segment that is oriented to young people. For instance, TCL chose the best-known
Korean actress Kim Hesing, who has many fans in China, to advertise TCL cell phones.
Future
In the next two years, competition in the cell-phone market will intensify as production
capacity matches or even surpasses demand. This is what I call the filtration stage of the
cell phone industry. Currently, China has a production capacity of 80 million units, half
147 For instance, in Guangdong Province, local brands, such as Southern High Tech, Kejian, dominate the
market; while in Zhejiang Province, local brands, such as Bird and Eastcom, have surpassed the sales of
Motorola and Nokia. (Southern Weekend, 2003).
148 CCTV stands for Central China Television, the national TV station in China.
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of the global capacity. In 2002, there were about 36 domestic cell phone producers in
China, 1 while for most countries in the world, there were at most only several producers.
The intense competition will lead to substantial industrial restructuring and leave only
several strong producers in the market, as predicted by the staged catching-up theory.
Hou (2003) expected that the cell phone market might follow the path of the color TV
market of 1996. The color TV companies competed with each other on innovative
concepts, distribution channels, and economies of scale. China's color TV market burst
into a price war as the production capacity far surpassed the demand. The whole industry
suffered from the price war unanimously, though not for long. The domestic firms in the
color TV industry successfully revitalized themselves by deploying two strategies: R&D
and exporting (Hou, 2003). Domestic cell-phone producers should foresee the
intensified competition and consult the experience of color TV producers in deploying
these two strategies.
Currently, there are three distinct groups of domestic cell-phone producers: (1) producers
of consumer electronics (TCL, Konka, Haier, Hisense, Xiaxin, Xiahua; (2)
telecommunications equipment companies (Eastcom, ZTE, Bird, Shouxin, Southern
HighTech, CECT); and (3) IT companies (Legend, Topid). Other companies are still
striving to enter the market (CEN, 2003). Economies of scale, distribution channels, and
most importantly the technological capabilities, will determine who will survive the
competition. Most profit from cell phones comes from superior R&D and sales
performance. Therefore, even though domestic firms have better sales networks, the
improvement of R&D is critical. The case analysis from this chapter has confirmed this
point. The ascent of TCL, Haier, and Hisense are highly associated with their unique
styles in building their innovation capability; on the other hand, the fall of former leaders
of the industry, Eastcom and PEG, has to do with their lack of motivation for developing
their own brand-names because of joint production with the MNCs.
Cell phone technology has three levels: the low level, consisting of a chip, the
intermediate level, consisting of systems integration, and the high level, consisting the
outer shell. Almost all domestic firms lack chip-level core technology. Only a few have
developed their own systems integration. Most just add a shell to foreign cell phones or
simply imprint their brand names. Chinese domestic firms currently use three different
strategies for R&D: OEM, self-development, and subcontracting R&D. Currently only a
few domestic companies are developing their own technologies, such as those
telecommunications equipment producers who entered the 3G market (Huawei, ZTE,
Datang) and Hisense, a traditional R&D-focused enterprise. Chinese companies may
also explore a new way to quickly strengthen their R&D capacity through acquiring
"helper companies" in Japan, who provide technology to large manufacturers. 5 0
149 12 companies produced both GSM and CDMA cell phones, 17 companies produce only GSM ones, and
7 companies produce only CDMA cell phones. (Hou, 2003)
150 Those "help companies" have contributed to the strong "R&D" capacity but small R&D staff of
Japanese companies. The large Japanese cell phone producers have the newest development technology for
cell phones - they collect the product information from the market, then define production process, and
hire/organize "help companies" to do R&D. Therefore, these are not passive subcontractors, but very
proactive ones. (Chen, 2003).
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As the industry moves toward more disintegration of the global value chain, fewer
companies globally will cover every aspect of the value chain. Rather, more companies
will focus on their specialization to enhance their core competencies. Specialization and
the recent movement towards specialization of global cell phone leaders implies this
trend. For instance, Nokia itself doesn't produce chips, Motorola contracts out
manufacturing of cell phones, and Ericsson focuses on being a cell phone technology
provider. This indicates that specialization may be a practical way for increasing core
competencies for Chinese producers as well.
The deployment of 3G will offer opportunities for domestic producers to catch up with or
even surpass the MNCs. Currently, Huawei, the largest telecommunications equipment
producer in China, has led the development of WCDMA in China, while ZTE, the second
largest in the same category, has led CDMA 2000 among domestic producers. The most
exciting opportunity exists in the area of TD-SCDMA, where China might lead the world.
Currently, the TD-SCDMA developer Datang has been assigned the most frequency
resources (155 MHZ) by the Chinese government, and it is estimated that the government
will give out 3G licenses by the end of 2003. It seems highly possible that one or even
two service providers will be given licenses to deploy TD-SCDMA. TD-SCDMA will
bring domestic producers the chance to build a complete supply chain which covers all
three levels of cell phone technology as well as technologies for mobile equipment, e.g.,
from base station, to switches, chips, design technology, components, and software.
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Appendix
Table 10.6 Sales Ranking of Cell Phone Producers in China's market, 2001
Rankin
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Source:
Sales (10 thousand units)
1645.3
1616.8
1163.7
980.6
517.8
416.1
347.7
313.4
277.0
253.7
184.2
166.6
132.0
130.0
128.3
112.4
95.0
68.4
62.2
Table 10.7 Sales Ranking of Domestic Cell Phone Producers in China's market, 2001
g Company
Panda Electronics
Samsung
Ninbo Bodao
Xiamen Zhongqiao
Haier
Kejian
TCL
ZTE
Xiamen Huaqiao
Eastcom
Southern Gaoke
Tianshida (Shenzhen)
Shouxin
Xiaxin Electronics
Zhongdian Telecom
Guowei (Shenzhen)
Finance Biweek (Chinese), No. 24, 2002
Sales (10 thousand units)
347.7
313.4
277.0
166.6
132.0
130.0
128.3
95.0
68.4
36.6
30.1
26.6
21.6
20.3
5.1
1.9
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g Company
Motorola (China, in Tianjin)
Nokia (Beijing)
Nokia (DongWan, Guangdong)
Siemens (Shanghai)
Motorola (Hangzhou)
Ericsson
Panda Electronics
Samsung
Ninbo Bodao
Phillipe Sangda
Alcatel (Suzhou)
Xiamen Zhongqiao
Haier
Kejian
TCL
Beijing Toshiba
ZTE
Xiamen Huaqiao
Beijing San lin?
Finance Biweek (Chinese), No. 24, 2002
Rankin
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Source:
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Table 10.8 Major Domestic Cell-Phone Manufacturers, Headquarter Location, Major Products and
Services
Company Headquarter
Name Location Major Products/Services
TCL Holding
Co., Ltd.
TCL Group
Haier Group
Co.
Household Electronic Appliance: Refrigerator, [VCD & DVD, Player
Video Wall, Washing Machine, Consumer Information Appliance, Family
Cinema System, Air Conditioner, Color TV, Internet TV; Information
Technology: Cable TV, Scramble and descramble System, Internet
Product Computer; Telecommunication: Mobile, Phone, Pager,
Huiyang, Telephone, Hyper-power Battery; Electrical Components: Switch, Green
Guangdong Lightening Products
produces a wide range of household electrical appliances in 86 categories
Qingdao, and 13,000 specifications; Domestic market share of Haier refrigerators,
Shangdong freezers, air-conditioners and washing machines is 30%.
Hisense Group
Co.
Ifl Qingdao,
Shangdong
Eastern
Communications
Group Co. Ltd.
M1&hIR Hangzhou,
A Zejiang
Panda
Electronics
Group Co., Ltd
PL# I1 NNanjing,
Jiangsu
specializes in consumer electronics, household appliance, and information
technology; main products include: televisions, air conditioners,
refrigerators, computers, DVDs, CDMA mobile phones, software and
network apparatuses
Cell-phone handsets for GSM and CDMA (>=98% of company's
revenue); IC calling card, ATM switch, transmission systems and power
supply.
HF communication, satellite communication system, mobile
communication system, mechatronics production equipment, base station,
program control exchangers, mobile phones, TV sets, washing machines,
DVD players, computers, monitors, system integration, network, software
and radio receivers
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11 Conclusion
This research uses a multi-case analysis approach, along with simple regression analyses,
to study China's catching-up as a late-industrialized economy in the information and
communications technology (ICT) industry. The significant contributions of this study
are: the staged catching-up theory framework, the findings from the cases, and the policy
implications.
This study contributes to the late-industrialization literature by filling its theoretical gap-
how domestic firms can catch up when there is strong MNC presence and what is the role
of innovation capability. The experiences of Chinese domestic manufacturers catching-
up in the ICT industry vis-A'-vis the multinational corporations (MNCs) are unique but not
well studied. Few latecomers were successful in catching up when there was a strong
MNC presence. Many researches have studied the successful catching up of Japan and
Korea, who did not face a strong MNC presence in their domestic market at the time.
Few, however, have studied China's recent experience, and fewer still attribute
innovation capability as a possible cause of catching-up with the MNCs. My research
contributes to the literature by filling this gap.
In this study, I develop a staged catching-up theory that can be used as a framework to
analyze the successful catching-up process of domestic firms in a late industrialized
economy while facing strong MNC presence (Chapter 3). The theory describes the
behavior of domestic firms, the behavior of the MNCs, and the role of the government, as
well as the spatial behavior at each stage.
The case studies (Chapter 6-10) confirm that Chinese domestic firms in the information
industries have followed a path of catching-up that can be described by the staged
catching-up theory, and innovation capability and self-developed technologies were the
ultimate driving force that has enabled leading domestic firms to catch up with the MNCs
in the telecom-equipment and PC manufacturing industries. These findings have
significant implications for policy makers, domestic firms and MNCs in the host
countries.
I organize this conclusion chapter as follows: Section 11.1 compares other major
literatures that explain the catching-up of the domestic producers and reveals why they
are inadequate. Section 11.2 summarizes important findings from the case analysis.
Section 11.3 offers policy implications and Section 11.4 presents directions for future
research.
11.1 Possible Explanations
Various analysts attempt to explain why domestic telecom equipment and PC
manufacturers have achieved high domestic market shares and why cell-phone producers
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have progressed so quickly. I focus on analyzing the following four dominant
perspectives and reveal why they are inadequate.
Guanxi and Corruption
Some analysts, such as Yeung (1997) and Hsing (1996), emphasize the role of guanxi or
personal relationships in social or business networks in China's economic development.
Schleifer and Vishney (1998) discuss the reasons for corruption and view corruption as a
mechanism to transform power into income for politicians. These analysts imply that it is
the sales and distribution channels of both industries, which favor the domestic producers,
that are responsible for the significant market share of domestic firms.
Corruption and guanxi exist in the system, because the customers for telecom equipment
products are mostly service providers owned by the government and customers for PCs
may largely come from the public sectors. There are chances for corruption because
government-run enterprises do not seek profit maximization, and individuals may use
their power to gain personal benefits. Because most customers for computer products are
from the business and public sectors (companies, education institutes, and governments),
there is ample opportunity for corruption and guanxi to favor domestic producers.
To support this explanation, I need evidence that, even though foreign products should
have been purchased because of a better function/price ratio than that of domestic
products, public-sector customers still purchased domestic products in the telecom-
equipment sector. Furthermore, individual customers should have drastically different
PC purchase patterns from public or business customers.
Even though it is hard to determine how much privileged access the government gave to
the domestic producers via guanxi and corruption, the following evidence is not
consistent with the above explanations. First, under the goal to maximize profit in a very
competitive market, telecom-service providers would not favor domestic firms just
because of guanxi and corruption. The Ministry of Information Industry (MII) divided
China Telecom into several different firms, and new service providers have entered the
market. The competition in China's telecom service market has been very intense among
the service providers, who are the main customers for telecom-equipment products. If
they do not make rational choices by purchasing the best bargains on the market, they
will fail to maximize their profit and go out of business. There is little motivation for
them to accept guanxi or corruption just to support domestic products, either as
companies or as individuals whose career paths depend on the companies' performances.
Furthermore, since the early 1980s, foreign telecom-equipment companies have learned
how to do business in China. Most foreign telecom-equipment companies have local
people working in sales and distribution. It is likely that these individuals may also use
guanxi or even bribery if they seem to work well.
Second, individual customers have similar purchase patterns as the business and public
sectors. The revenue from individual PC buyers constitutes a significant percentage of
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the total."' It is reasonable to assume that individual customers make rational choices,
i.e., generally choose products with optimal function/price ratios. Therefore, the similar
purchase pattern of individual buyers to that of the business and public sectors implies
that the business and public sectors have made sound purchases. Cell-phone users are
individuals primarily purchasing for private use. Therefore, we can safely assume that
most cell phone users made rational purchases.
However, it remains unclear how much the domestic firms might have benefited from
guanxi and corruption, especially in the earlier stages of development, when China
Telecom was the sole service provider. Although I agree that this might be a valid partial
explanation, I do not focus on this perspective, in part due to the difficulties in obtaining
adequate evidence. Moreover, such an explanation could never be entirely adequate in a
context of customer choice. Instead, I argue that the innovation and self-developed
technologies of the domestic producers is more important. Without them, in the
competitive telecom equipment and PC markets in China, the guanxi and corruption
mechanism would not work because domestic firms could not make the products with a
reasonable profit margin and would be wiped out by the MNCs, and customers would
have no alternative to buying foreign products. In fact, during the filtration stage, many
uncompetitive Chinese domestic telecom equipment and PC producers were wiped out
because they did not possess their own technology.
Protected Market and Privileged Access
Some (Fransman, 1995) claim that controlled competition could be an effective route for
the development of domestic firms, as observed by Fransman in the case of Japan. This
suggests that the Chinese market for telecom equipment and PCs may have been a highly
protected market, and that Chinese domestic firms may have been able to achieve high
domestic market shares because of a lack of competition from foreign producers.
Similarly, one might contend that the domestic producers usually enjoy privileged access
provided through the government, especially when they sell to large nationally owned
service providers.
However, data show that China has not charged unreasonably high tariffs on imported
products in these fields. For instance, the tariffs for PCs and components range between
9 % and 15%. 15 Further, foreign producers (both wholly owned and joint ventures) have
coexisted with domestic producers in China for at least a decade. In fact, domestic
producers in the PC industry started to grow after multinational corporations (MNCs)
came to China in the 1980s. Similarly, domestic producers in the telecom-equipment
industry have competed with MNCs from the very start of their existence. In the
telecom-equipment and PC markets, both foreign and domestic products are widely
available. People from Motorola, Nokia, and ZTE that I interviewed have acknowledged
that the Chinese market for telecom equipment, PCs, and cell phones is one of the most
competitive in the world.
15 Merrill Lynch, September 2000. China PC Industry: Fallacies and Facts.
152 ING BARINGS, Legend Holdings Limited, November 2000.
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Nevertheless, this research finds that privileged access can play a role only when the
domestic firms have already achieved a certain level of technological capability.
Privileged access to the government was important to the development of a few domestic
firms, such as GDT and Great Wall, at their earlier stage. But both GDT and Great Wall
had developed their own proprietary technologies-the first domestic public digital
switch system HJD04 and the first domestic PC-before they were provided with
privileged access to government support. The resources of government research
institutes and state promotion of R&D and its commercialization through national science
and technology programs ("Torch Program" and "863 Plan") have a general positive
effect on leading firms' effort in building innovation capability. Therefore, it is the state
promotion of research and development (R&D), rather than privileged access, which
matters most.
Privatization
Some analysts of economic reform and economic transition emphasize the role that the
market has played (Shleifer, 1994, 1998; Wu, 2001). Shleifer (1998) argues that
privatization should be advocated, because it encourages innovation and non-private
ownership is often in conflict with social welfare.' 5 3 These analysts imply that private
ownership and deregulation of the Chinese business environment ("free competition") are
the main reasons for the rapid growth of domestic firms.
Although I agree that the deregulated environment of the Chinese market provides a
healthy and competitive market for economic development in general, I argue that
observation of domestic firms in the information industry suggests that privatization is
not necessarily the sole impetus for development. First, most companies in the rapidly
growing telecom equipment and PC sectors have non-private ownership. For instance,
three out of the four leading domestic telecom equipment companies (ZTE, DDT, GDT)
are state-owned enterprises. In the PC sector, Legend and Founder, the two largest PC
manufacturers, are state-owned enterprises.
Perhaps, however, the public/private distinction needs refinement. My study shows that
it is not the ownership of a firm, but the way the firm is operated, that matters. Most of
these state-owned companies could be viewed as part of a new generation of Chinese
enterprises characterized by a unique form of enterprise governance: "state-owned, non-
government-run" (guoyou minying). They are owned by the state, but have operational
autonomy, like non-state-owned companies. The experience of enterprise restructuring
for most leading firms studied in this research supports Lu's (2000) argument that
technological capabilities and enterprise governance together have made possible the rise
of these Chinese firms.
Industrialization without Proprietary Innovation
153 The cost of innovation is high. Therefore, private ownership is needed for investors to reap satisfactory
returns on their investment. Furthermore, privatization disconnects the channel of control from politicians
who pursue their own selfish objectives, which usually oppose to social welfare. (Shleifer, 1998).
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The literature on late industrialization suggests that backward countries can catch up in
industries requiring large amounts of technological capabilities, even without proprietary
innovations (Amsden, 2001). If so, the implication is that Chinese domestic firms depend
on other countries' commercialized technology to establish modem industries, rather than
on developing their own proprietary technologies.
Although domestic products are cheaper than those of their competitors in China in the
information industry,'5 4 completely dismissing the possibility that the Chinese companies
possess their own proprietary technologies seems untenable. Chapters 7 and 9
demonstrate that innovation capability and self-developed technologies have strong
explanatory power for leading firms' high revenue and profit in the telecom-equipment
and PC manufacturing industries. The case analysis confirms that the leading domestic
firms have developed strong innovation capabilities (the skills necessary to design
entirely new products and processes) and that has mattered most for their rapid growth.
The above-mentioned prevailing explanations are not sufficient to explain why Chinese
domestic producers in the information industry have grown so rapidly in the last two
decades. However, they do provide some valuable points of reference for the present
research. Further, the variety of explanations shows the high interest of people from
different fields in understanding the phenomenon.
11.2Summary of Findings
This section summarizes findings from the case analyses (Chapters 6-10): (1) the staged
catching up of the three industries, (2) the catching-up's spatial manifestation, (3) the role
of the government, and (4) the role of innovation capability in leading firms' catching up.
The Staged Catching-up
The development of China's telecom-equipment industry and PC industry from the
1980s to 2002 indicates that domestic firms have caught up with the MNCs by the stages
described by the staged catching-up theory: the preparation, growth, and filtration stages,
and are now at the globalization stage, with the PC industry's stage development being
slightly ahead of the telecom-equipment industry (chapters 6 and 8).
In the early and middle 1980s, many domestic producers in the telecommunications
equipment and PC sectors acted as sales agents for foreign firms; which is precisely
described by the staged catching-up theory as what happens in the preparation stage. For
example, Huawei initially sold small-scale telephone switches for a Hong Kong firm;
similarly, Legend acted as the sales agent for several foreign companies; Founder sold
several foreign-brand PCs starting in 1992 before it began manufacturing its own PCs,
and it became the main distributor of Digital Equipment Corporation's (DEC) PCs in the
following year.
54 ZTE company data and ING BARINGS, China Research, Legend Holdings Limited, Nov. 2000.
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In the early 1990s, domestic firms in these two sectors entered the growth stages, i.e.,
they started manufacturing products in different market segments from the MNCs.
Originally acting as foreign-brand sales agents of MNCs in the late 1980s, many
domestic computer firms transformed themselves into PC manufacturers by first
exploring the specialized market of Chinese-language add-on cards. Likewise, in the late
1980s and early 1990s, telecom-equipment firms produced and sold the small-scale
telephone switches that rural telephone bureaus most needed.
In the middle and late1990s, the filtration stage of the industries, domestic PC
manufacturers upgraded themselves to broader areas of production, and domestic
telecom-equipment manufacturers started to produce large-scale digital telephone
switches. Consequently, both of them faced strong competition from the MNCs. Those
firms that were not competitive enough were forced to exit the market and only the
strongest ones survived. For instance, of the major telephone-equipment producers that
have survived, all had strong R&D capacities. Among the PC manufacturers, Legend and
Founder both survived by virtue of their superb marketing and management skills or
R&D capabilities. The rest of the firms, including Great Wall, either exited the market or
chose to cooperate with other foreign companies.
Having passed through the growth and filtration stages by first building their own
manufacturing and R&D capabilities, then competing with the MNCs, the leading
domestic firms in the telecommunication-equipment and PC manufacturing sectors
currently have globalization on their agendas, thus signaling that the industries are
entering the globalization stage described by the theory. Except for Datang, the firms I
studied in this research in these two sectors, namely Huawei, ZTE, Great Dragon, Legend,
Founder, and Great Wall, have all exported to the international market. Many also have
R&D centers abroad. The globalization stage turns out to be challenging for these
domestic firms, especially when the export target is a developed country, whose markets
require the best, most advanced products. In addition, a business environment different
from what they have been familiar with can make operations more difficult.
Less mature than the firms in telecom-equipment and PC manufacturing, domestic cell-
phone producers have gone through the preparation stage and are currently at the end of
the growth stage and the beginning of the filtration stage. It was not until 1999 that many
domestic producers started to enter the cell-phone market. Document No. 5 from the
State Council about cell-phone-production licenses served as a constraint for MNCs and a
control of domestic firms' growth. The expanding market and high profit margin quickly
lured many producers to this sector. Some were fresh start-ups focusing only on cell-
phone production; many others were from the consumer-electronics sector. Currently,
China has about thirty-six domestic cell-phone producers, the largest number of any
country in the world. As the sector enters the filtration stage, many will have to exit the
market.
For domestic electronics giants such as TCL, Haier, and Legend, even though they have
already entered the globalization stage in their original consumer electronics and PC
businesses, their cell-phone production is still in the growth stage.
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It is worth emphasizing that during the process of catching up, all these firms face great
organizational challenges. Domestic firms will need to learn organizational structure and
functions from the West (but tailored to fit the Chinese environment), or to restructure
themselves to facilitate growth (such as by mergers and acquisitions), or to solve
problems associated with their rapid growth (such as unclear ownership and
organizational and managerial failures). Further, firms will need to explore new ways of
obtaining investment, for instance, by selling non-core competency branches or by going
public.
Almost all companies have been moving themselves toward modern enterprises with
Chinese characteristics through resolving ownership issues and restructuring their
corporations. Some have been quite effective, such as ZTE, Legend, and Founder; some
are still striving to find a way, like Great Dragon.' 5 5 Others, such as Huawei and Datang,
are reluctant to respond to this urgent need. But all have felt the necessity of
restructuring into a modern, efficient organizational structure. This situation may be
especially Chinese, because China is in transition from a central planning economy
towards a market economy.
Spatial Manifestation
Preparation Stage (Concentration)
At initial stages, domestic firms preferred locations where there was a good business
environment or innovation. Among the twelve companies, three started in Shenzhen
(Huawei, ZTE, and Great Wall), three started in Beijing (Datang, Legend, and Founder),
two in Qingdao (Haier and Hisense), and one each in Zhenzhou (Great Dragon), Huizhou
(TCL), Hangzhou (Eastcom), and Nanjing (Panda Electronic). The variety of the
locations indicates that, to get started, high-tech companies need places with either a
good business environment or with innovation.
This view is similarly shared by many analysts and reflected in policies implemented by
different governments in the world. For instance, Silicon Valley has been favored by
many entrepreneurs because it is the place where many innovations happen, and it has a
friendly business environment (such as financial opportunities provided by venture
capitalists) for small start-ups.
Support from the local government, especially in the preparation and the growth stages,
can be a determining factor for both domestic firms' and MNCs' location decisions. For
instance, the local government of Shenzhen, the first special economic zone in China, has
been well known for its encouragement of entrepreneurship and creation of a friendly
environment for entrepreneurs. It is in Shenzhen that Huawei and ZTE, two leading
155 Great Dragon has experienced three serious organizational restructurings. The first and second ones
turned out to fail. It still remains a question as to how effective is its third restructuring. (Ren Min You
Dian, Nov. 11, 2002)
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domestic telecom-equipment producers, started as trading companies, but later
transformed to become manufacturers.
The city government of Qingdao, Shandong Province, is said to be very proactive and to
have a long-term vision. Qingdao is the home for two companies in the present research-
-Haier and Hisense. The growth of these two giant electronics companies and Qingdao
Beer, another famous brand in China, is closely associated with the Qingdao
government's efforts. A similar relationship can be found between TCL and the local
government of Huiyang Area and between Eastcom and the Hangzhou city government,
especially in the growth stage of the industry.
Growth Stage (Expansion)
At the growth stage, the companies started to have several locations for their branches in
addition to their original headquarters. Both Huawei and ZTE built their main R&D
facilities somewhere other than at their headquarters in Shenzhen. At this stage, as the
companies started to increase their investment in R&D, Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing, and
other cities in the mainland were more attractive to them, because these cities have highly
concentrated, skilled R&D labor pools. Meanwhile, to expand its production capability,
GDT built its manufacturing site in Changchun, one of the most famous manufacturing
cities in Northeast China. The companies chose the locations to satisfy their needs for the
resources they wanted to develop.
Filtration Stage (Consolidation)
In the filtration stage, as the telecom and PC industries started to consolidate,
manufacturing took advantage of economies of scale and concentrated in only a few
places. Sales, in contrast, were found to have a dispersal trend as the surviving firms
formed national-sales networks. In addition, a few locations, such as Beijing and
Shanghai, became the best sites for R&D for domestic firms as well as MNCs. The
largest firms in China's PC industries are clustered in the ZhongGuanCun area in Beijing,
with numerous other IT companies. A similar pattern was found with regard to the R&D
facilities of the telecom-equipment firms when the industry entered the filtration stage.
The co-existence of agglomerated economy and dispersal economy reflects the different
spatial requirements of different functions.
Globalization
The spatial characteristic of the globalization stage is to internationalize different
production functions, including R&D, marketing, and manufacturing, but especially the
R&D functions. This characteristic is somewhat different from the globalization of the
MNCs, who usually start by internationalizing sales and manufacturing functions. As
telecom and PC domestic producers enter the globalization stage, Huawei, ZTE, and
Great Dragon all export their products to Russia, Eastern Europe, Africa, South America,
and even the United States. Leading the market share of the Asia Pacific region, Legend
has been very aggressive in entering the international market. International cooperation
has become common practice, for instance, Texas Instruments (TI) has joint laboratories
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with three of the producers--Huawei, ZTE, and Datang on digital-signal processing, in
which TI is the best of the world. And the telecom-producers also have close cooperation
with South Korean peers, especially in the 3G area.
Domestic producers also have built their R&D centers directly on the technology frontier,
so that they can be as close as possible to the innovation centers of the world. For
instance, Huawei has a total of five oversea R&D offices in the United States (Dallas and
Silicon Valley), Sweden, India, and Russia. ZTE Korea FutureTel Co., Ltd., a holding
company of ZTE, is engaged in development of a CDMA handset. Moreover, their sales
offices have started to blossom in China's major cities, as well as abroad. Globalization
is thus reflected in the location patterns of the companies. At this stage, the companies
have favored locations with good R&D resources and easy market access both
domestically and internationally.
Chinese domestic cell-phone producers currently are at the end of the growth stage and
the beginning of the filtration stage. Yet those that diversified from consumer
electronics have already accomplished globalization in these business areas. They are
able to take advantage of their global resources for cell-phone development and
marketing. For instance, the T6000 is an R&D result of Haier's global research teams in
China, Europe, and the United States.
Government in the Catching-up Model
The role of the Chinese government is most conspicuous in the preparation and growth
stages during the catching-up. In these stages, the government has exercised two types of
control to create or maintain some room for domestic firms to grow: (1) the control of
imports and (2) the control of setting up of manufacturing units by foreign firms. In the
growth stage, the government imposed tariffs to discourage importation, for example
when both domestic firms and joint ventures (JVs) started to produce switches. In terms
of controlling the setting up of manufacturing units by foreign firms, the government
allowed only JVs in the expectation that such ventures would bring some technology
transfer. The government imposed local-content requirements on MNCs. MNCs
henceforth used their percentage of local content to indicate their contribution to the
Chinese economy.
The analysis of telecom-equipment manufacturers clearly shows the various patterns of
government involvement. At the preparation stage, the government allowed the imports
of foreign switching systems and, to some extent, supported the foreign imports because
of China's urgent need to improve its outdated telecommunications infrastructure.
However, the government (MPT) encouraged domestic development of switching
systems starting from the early 1980s. The development history of HJD04 was clear
evidence of MPT's intentions.
In the growth stage, the government controlled imports and implemented the strategy
"exchange technology with the market" as they thought JVs were a good way to get
foreign technology. As more and more domestically developed switches were certified
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and licensed, the government helped domestic producers in various ways: (1) financially,
through financial aid for technology improvement in certain key products, and facilitating
trust loans for customers who bought large quantities of telecom products from domestic
producers, especially for companies within the MPT system; (2) market access:
organizing two "Domestic Switches Customer Coordination Conferences" and helping in
export; (3) resources: frequency spectrum allocation that favors TD-SCDMA, which
definitely increased the bargaining power of domestic producers to lower patent fees for
other 3G standards.
For PC manufacturers, even though few government interventions were available for
Legend and Founder, their supporting institutes--the Chinese Academy of Sciences and
Beijing University--compensated for the lack of government support. In addition, it is
evident that the MiEI and its strong support for Great Wall played a vital role in Great
Wall's growth and its cooperation with IBM.
In the area of cell-phone manufacturing, the government has used Document No. 5 as a
way of constraining foreign cell-phone manufacturers from setting up manufacturing
units in China. Its main purpose is to encourage domestic development of mobile
communications. The document has saved some room for domestic producers in the
rapidly expanding cell-phone market.
Innovation capability and self-developed technology
This study has proved that innovation capability and self-developed technologies have
been the key to Chinese domestic firms' catching-up with the MNCs and have
determined who are the leading domestic firms in these industries. Table 11.1
summarizes major findings on this issue.
First, simple regression analysis confirms that strong innovation capability contributes to
companies' leadership and heavy R&D spending accounts for leading companies' high
revenue and profit in the telecom-equipment and PC manufacturing industries.
Second, the cases confirm that innovation capability and self-developed technology are
crucial for starting and growing a high-tech company in China. The leading telecom-
equipment manufacturers all developed small-scale digital switches and used them as a
main source of income initially. The leading PC manufacturers all started their
companies with self-developed technology--Chinese language add-on cards (Legend
Chinese add-on card and GW 0520 card for Legend and Great Wall, respectively) and the
fourth-generation electronic publishing systems for Founder.
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Table 11.1 Major Findings on Innovation Capability
Findings
Importance of innovation
capacity and self-developed
technology
(at entry point and at later
stages)
Evidence/ Examples
Regression Results:
Strong explanatory power of Innovation capability to
Industrial Leadership, R&D Spending to Profit and
Revenue
At entry point (growth stage):
GDT, Huawei, ZTE, and Datang (self-developed switches)
Legend (Legend Chinese-language add-on cards), Founder (4*
generation electronic publishing systems), Great Wall (GW0520
card and first Chinese PC)
TCL (jewelry phone), Haier (firewall phone), Hisence (CDMA and
color screen phone)
At later stages (filtration and globalization stages):
Where does the innovation
capability come from?
(Channels for building
capacities)
-- Internal development
Huawei, ZTE, and Datang entered other subsectors through self-
developed technologies
Legend's market war for most advanced PCs
Founder's monopoly position in electronic publishing through
continuous innovation
Large internal R&D investment
Huawei, ZTE, Datang, GDT, Hisense, Founder's heavy R&D
investment
Specialization (investment a narrowly focused area)
Huawei
-- External resources
-- Being local
-- Technology transfer through
JVs (seems unsuccessful)
What has facilitated building
Early stage: Initial resources of their attached entities
Legend (CAS), Founder (Beijing University), Great Wall (MEI),
Datang (CATT)
Later stages: Alliance with both domestic and foreign institutes and
companies
Almost all companies have R&D partners
Understanding of consumers
e Haier (Firewall), Legend (1+1 PC), Huawei (mobile intelligent
network)
Partial Innovation with Chinese Characteristics
e TCL (Jewelry Cell Phone)
Great Wall (JVs with IBM)---became lower value-added component
maker of IBM's global value chain
Eastcom---cooperation with Motorola failed to improve its
technological capacity.
Panda Electronic (with Ericsson)--no incentive for self-
development and kept it steps behind Ericsson's cell- phone
development
S&T projects (863 Plan, etc.) - direct
199
Chapter 11. Conclusion
innovation capacity?
-- Government involvement
-- Network clustering
(Location concentration of
R&D functions)
-- Disintegration of the global
value chain
-- Subsector linkages
Innovation capacity does not
guarantee success; it has to be
matched with a good corporate
and management system.
Financial loan for technological improvement - direct
Other financial loans, customer loans for supporting production in
general- indirect
Policies, regulations for controlling imports and FDI (tariff, control
of JVs, Document No. 5) - indirect
Domestic clustering:
* Beijing: R&D centers of Legend, Founder, Huawei, ZTE,
Datang, GDT, etc., most concentrated in Zhong Guan Cun Area;
" Shanghai, Nanjing, etc.
International clustering:
" Huawei (R&D centers in Silicon Valley, Dallas, Sweden,
Bangladore)
e ZTE (South Korea for for its CDMA R&D center)
Telecom-equipment: a component-based architecture replaces a
monolithic model
PC: already has a disintegrated value chain (IBM Open architecture)
Cell phone: companies move towards specialization
Nokia does not produce chips
Motorola contracts out manufacturing
Ericsson focus on being a cell-phone technology provider
Telecommunication equipment manufacturers:
shortened time to catch up with the MNCs' technology
Cell-phone manufacturers:
1G-2G-3G: more and more self-developed technology
GDT: serious structural problem => from leading to lagging behind
Datang: how to transform from a government research entity to a
modern enterprise
Huawei: pursuing better management (consultation with
international experts)
Founder and Great Wall: experience of failed management
Legend: successful restructuring
TCL: successful corporate reform
Haier: superb management system as a national model
During the later stages, telecom-equipment manufacturers entered into other sub-sectors
through self-developed technologies, such as access equipment, transmission equipment,
routers, and switches. As shown in Chapter 9, domestic PC producers have caught up
with the MNCs by making PCs with the most technologically advanced components
rather than just seeking a low-cost advantage. Legend initiated a market war in the
middle 1990s by advertising the most advanced PC in China at the time. Founder's one-
decade monopoly position in electronic publishing was maintained by its continuing
innovation.
In the domain of cell-phone production, TCL's jewelry phone (a totally innovative
product concept), Haier's firewall phone, and Hisense's self-developed CDMA and
color-screen phones all brought market success to these companies. Their successes only
underscore the importance of self-developed technologies.
Channels for Building Innovation Capability
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This study confirms that in-house R&D development, supplemented with external
alliance, is the key channel for domestic companies to build innovation capability.
Moreover, this study finds that joint ventures, as a means to build technological
capabilities, are not effective for the firms studied here.
First, a large internal investment is critical to a firm's innovation capability, as the high
R2 value of the regression analysis between the R&D spending and the ranks of
innovation capability indicates. Due to the R&D-intensive nature of the sector, all
telecom-equipment manufacturers (Huawei, ZTE, Datang, and Great Dragon) invested
heavily in R&D, achieving a level over 10% of their annual revenue. Consequently,
these companies have self-developed most of their core technologies. Founder and
Hisense, which devote the greatest percentage of revenue to R&D in their respective
groups (PC manufacturers and electronics manufactures), are renowned R&D-oriented
enterprises and lead in innovation capability. The research also finds that investment in
a narrowly focused area can help a company to build innovation capability quickly;
Huawei is well known for this strategy.
Second, external resources have been essential to support companies' innovative
activities at the early stages. Legend, Founder, Great Wall, and Datang all have a
technologically oriented entity as their founding organization, namely, ICT of CAS,
Beijing University, MEI, and CATT. These institutes provide fertile soil for these
companies to grow in and the technical expertise directly from the institutes has become
part of the companies' initial innovative capability. Further, all the companies studied
here have strategic alliances or R&D partners in various areas, domestically or
internationally, especially in the areas of their core competencies or where they intend to
build competencies. This phenomenon indicates that strategic alliance seems to be an
effective way to keep up with cutting-edge developments and to quickly ramp up a
company's innovation capability. Nevertheless, external alliance is conditional on the
company's internal development; without the strong internal development of R&D,
external alliance will not be effective.
This study also confirms that joint ventures, as a means to build innovation capability, are
ineffectual for the firms studied, i.e., Great Wall, Eastcom, and Panda Electronics. Great
Wall's cooperation with IBM, though preserving it from failure in the market, only made
it a low-value-added component-maker of IBM's global value chain. Similarly,
Eastcom's cooperation with Motorola has not helped it to improve its innovation
capability. Further, Panda Electronic's marriage with Ericsson left it no incentive for a
self-developed cell phone and has kept it always one or two steps behind Ericsson's
phone development.
Government Involvement
My research suggests that the government can help companies to build knowledge-based
assets directly through national science and technology (S&T) projects or through
funding for technological improvement. Indirectly, it can help build critical assets by
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supporting domestic firms in general; I give the details of the Chinese government's
indirect involvement in Chapters 6, 8, and 10.
The Chinese government has used national S&T programs such as "Torch Program" and
"863 Plan" to encourage R&D activities and commercialization of R&D by companies.
The companies with strength in the corresponding fields are funded for cutting-edge
research. The funding and coordination of different entities provided by the government
for the same research objective has proved to be a very efficient way to close the
technological gap. National S&T projects have not imposed strict performance standards
on those industries and companies that they aid, as was the case in South Korea (Amsden,
1989); however, they encourage and reward companies' efforts in improving
technological innovation capabilities by merit-based selection.
Even though China started its R&D in telecom equipment very late, it has always had a
very strong basic research base in the field of telecommunications and electrical
engineering. In addition, because all the research institutes and universities involved in
telecommunications are under the direct control of the MR (original MPT), those entities
historically have had a very close interconnection with each other. When a group of
Chinese telecom-equipment providers started to arise, it was these state-owned institutes
and universities that provided most of the technical human resources needed by the
companies, as well as being involved in many national science and technology projects.
The existence and strong presence of these entities has ensured the technological prowess
of the domestic producers, which is in line with the analysis by Freeman (1987), Nelson
(1992), and Porter (1990) on national innovation systems (NIS). The findings from my
research thus confirm that the government is needed to take responsibility for education
and training, and for developing an infrastructure to support industrial development, as
indicated by Friedrich List (Lundvall, 1992).
This research confirms that government involvement has rewarded companies' efforts to
build innovation capability and develop proprietary technologies through a positive
feedback system, which is composed of: network clustering, disintegration of the global
value chain, and sub-sector linkage. Detailed discussion of the above three elements in
the feedback system can be found in Chapters 7 and 9.
11.3 Policy Implication
This research has implications for how China can catch up, especially through developing
domestic firms' innovation capabilities, in high-tech manufacturing areas despite the
strong presence of MNCs. Also relevant is how other countries or regions, either late
industrializing countries or less-developed regions in developed countries, can use the
findings from this research to facilitate the development of their local firms in high tech
industries.
The staged-catching up theory helps policy makers and domestic firms to understand the
process of successful catching-up and the driving force underlining the process. With
this understanding, domestic firms and governments can choose the most effective
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strategies according to the stage the industry is at and prepare for changes in the next
stage.
Domestic firms are vital for building high-tech industries for late industrializing countries.
This research emphasizes the importance of innovation capability, which is different from
the existing literature. The research stresses that domestic firms should prioritize
building innovation capability from the very beginning to ramp up their competitiveness
and to survive in the filtration stage, even though its benefit may not be so distinguished
in the growth stage. It also suggests domestic firms focus on in-house R&D development
to build their innovation capability, supplemented with external alliances, since the
latter's effectiveness is conditional on the strength of the former. Furthermore, while
most literatures tend to emphasize the advantages of MNCs in the host country, this
research points out that domestic firms have advantages over MNCs in the local market;
domestic firms should use these advantages to develop innovative products that suit local
demand. Finally, it reminds us that joint ventures tend to leave the domestic partners
under the shadow of the MNCs and discourage them from developing their own
proprietary technology and brand name. Further, firms need to have a matching
corporate structure and good management system to ensure the sustainability of growth,
especially at the filtration and globalization stages.
For governments in late-industrializing economies, their involvement in knowledge-
based assets, which rewards firms' efforts in building innovation capabilities, is critical,
as it helps to strengthen the positive feedback system for innovation capability building.
Direct involvement such as financial support, market access, and resource provision are
essential at the growth stage, but not so necessary once the industry enters the filtration
stage. Merit-based selection of candidates for national S&T projects is effective in
rewarding leading companies' efforts and encouraging innovation activity at the company
level. Further, cooperation between universities, research institutes, and companies are
essential for the progress of the entire industry at the technology frontier. Analysts
believe China still has not caught up in the high-performance computer industry, even
though one firm (Dawning) has caught up with the MNCs in innovation capability. This
example confirms that group advancement, rather than one or two individual firms' super
performance, is necessary in signifying the catching-up, which corresponds to an old
Chinese saying "a single hand cannot clap."
The phenomena of geographic clustering of firms' R&D functions suggests that location
does matter for companies' accumulation of innovation capability. Government effort in
building high-technology zones could be effective, especially when such a location has
already been a magnet for high-skilled labor. Further, specialization and diversification
into rising sub-sectors are good strategies for firms to catch up in industries characterized
by disintegration of the global value chain and strong sub-sector linkages, such as, but not
confined to, telecom-equipment, PC, and cell-phone industries.
This research identifies innovation as the driving force for China's information
industries' catching-up, which is in line with the argument of Yusuf (2003), who points
out that innovation will be the driving force for East Asia's future growth in his new book
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"Innovative East Asia: The Future of Growth." In addition to specific industry policies,
a set of public and private initiatives could stimulate innovation (Yusuf, 2003), which
includes strong education for a highly educated work force, R&D promotion, information
technology to improve productivity, and continuing innovation of firms and networking
among them through dynamic urban clusters. Domestic firms in the information
industries seem to have benefited from most of the initiatives mentioned above.
As China has joined WTO, domestic firms have concerns about how they will adapt
themselves to the new environment. In some sense, WTO will push every industry to
enter the filtration and globalization stage much earlier than they expected. WTO will
bring both benefits and disadvantages (Xu, 2001). One of the benefits is the reduced cost
of production for domestic producers, resulting from the removal of tariffs on imported
components, which will make domestic producers more competitive in the international
market. In addition, the reduced barriers to exporting to WTO signatory economies will
enhance the market-entry ability of the domestic firms. Therefore, WTO opens the door
not only for foreign corporations, but also for Chinese producers. There may be some
problems encountered by domestic producers when switching to the newly developed
market. More professional help and support will be needed. It is also suggested that
Hong Kong can act as China's globalization partner and professional middleman for
bilateral transactions by using its expertise and talents in trading (for instance, the OFTA
and UST's training programs for Chinese telecom regulatory and industry people) and its
abundant investment capital (Xu, 2001).
11.4 Future Research
There are several directions that this research can carry on: (1) study more firms in the
three industries; (2) study the catching-up process in other high-tech industries in China;
and (3) study the catching-up process in the information industries of different late-
industrializing economies.
First, I would take a more quantitative research approach by studying more domestic
firms and MNCs in these three industries. I would select not only the domestic firms
with strong innovation capability, as represented in this research, but also firms with
comparatively low innovation capability and few self-developed technologies. Further, I
would select multinational corporations in China to do comparison analyses. Few studies
have addressed the innovation capability of MNCs in the host country versus domestic
firms. Shen (1999) compares the development of PDSS of Shanghai Bell with GDT. I
believe this plan will bring some fruitful policy recommendations for the government in
how to guide MNCs in the process and what are the possible venues for MNCs to
contribute to the growth of domestic firms. I would prepare my own survey forms,
designing survey forms for detailed R&D information. With more firms, the result of
regression analysis will be more convincing.
Second, I would use the staged catching-up theory developed in this study as a
framework to analyze other industries' catching-up in China, such as the high-resolution
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TV industry, the high-performance computer industry, the automobile industry, the
chemical industry, etc. The different degrees of high-tech of these industries pose
different requirements for domestic firms. It would be interesting to verify the generality
of the staged catching-up theory and compare the variations.
Third, I realize that China has a very different institutional context from many other late-
industrialized economies, such as a large domestic market and the transition from a
socialist planning economy to a market economy. Therefore, I believe that doing a
comparative study of China and other countries will be interesting; for instance, China
and India, both of which are countries with a large population and with ample human
resources in information industries. India's catching up in the software and
biotechnology industries, which mainly service foreign markets, presents a drastically
different path from China. Further, studies of China and other former communist-regime
countries such as former USSR countries and Eastern-European countries will be
appealing since, in addition to the similar transitioning economy, they all have strong
bases of education, which are necessary for firms to accumulate innovation capability at
the firm level.
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